INTRODUCCIÓN HISTÓRICA

MOFA has de jure authority over grant aid and technical coperation, and over the ‘declaratory’ aspect of aid policy. MOFA plays a crucial role in bargaining and consulting with MOF, as described in the previous section. It has advocated aid doubling plans, on the grounds that Japan had international responsibilities. Outside pressure on Japan (whether from recipients or other donors) also is filtered through MOFA (and may even be solicited by MOFA). It has influence over absolute aid levels and new aid initiatives. It may also determine the priority of particular recipients and thus projects. MOFA is concerned with how aid fits into Japan's overall foreign policy and conceives of aid in political/strategic terms and often as a diplomatic instrument or tool. It thus argues for aid disbursements on political grounds. But it also sees aid (especially grant aid and technical assistance) as aimed at alleviation of poverty rather than as subsidising or supporting a Japanese industry. In other words, the political value lies, to some extent, in the humanitarian and development goals of ODA. This can put it at odds with other ministries who see aid in terms of promoting their own sectional and industry-based interests.29

Not surprisingly, MOFA derives much of the power and status it has in the bureaucracy from the aid budget over which it has authority. For this reason, it is anxious that this authority not be taken away from it. 30 Nor is it in favour of putting more power over aid decisions into the hands of the Diet (that is, through adoption of an aid law31). In general, however, MOFA concerns itself with broad policy initiatives (on diplomatic grounds) while aspects of project level formulation tend to be delegated to other ministries and agencies and the private sector. This includes project

identification and design. Because much depends on how far projects match the

29 For example, in response to DAC pressure, MOFA favoured a greater emphasis on basic human needs in Japan’s ODA, which MITI and MOF opposed because it did not fit with their respective trade and investment, or fiscal priorities. Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence o f Japan’s Foreign Aid Power,

p.56.

30 In 1988, a report by the Administrative Management Bureau o f the Management and Coordination Agency recommended the transfer of the grant aid budget to JICA; a proposal that has not been acted upon. Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge, pp.80-4.

31 This refers to a move by some politicians to adopt a ‘basic law’, which would put aid policy directly under the jurisdiction o f the Diet. For more details, see Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge,

procedural and policy guidelines noted earlier, these tasks may be instrumental in final decision making.

There are two main sets of policy actors in MOFA. On the one hand, there are those that belong to the Economic Cooperation Bureau who are concerned primarily with aid policy and managing the project cycle. This bureau is made up of the following divisions: Grant Aid, Technical Cooperation, Yen Loans, Aid Policy, Research and Programing, and Development Cooperation.

It is the Grant Aid Division that receives the initial project request and coordinates the subsequent investigation and project development. This includes bargaining with MOF to support specific projects.32 In this context the Division’s main priority is to secure MOF approval for projects and this in turn depends on whether there are ‘good’ projects. The Grant Aid Division is staffed by a number of

secondments from outside MOFA. These include (as of m id-1993) staff from Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company (a public corporation under the Post and

Telecommunications Ministry), MAFF, Ministry of Construction, Bank of Sapporo, Tokyo Gas, JICA and MOF. Some of these positions, though based in the Grant Aid Division, oversee economic cooperation in general.33

The practice of ‘cross-posting’, which is a widespread phenomenon within the aid bureaucracy, aims to alleviate staff shortages within MOFA and ensure that consultations and coordination may be effected.34 It is also a means of facilitating power sharing within the aid system. There is thus a dual function for these

secondments: to undertake specific tasks but also to provide contact with other parts of the bureaucracy and the private sector.

The other set of actors belongs to the regional bureaux and divisions. These bureaux cover Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and Africa, Europe and Oceania, and North America. The Oceania Division, in the Bureau for European and Oceanic Affairs, is in charge of political relations with the Pacific island states, Australia and New Zealand.

In most cases, the role of the regional division is to lobby on behalf of its region for continuing or increasing amounts of aid. In this way, regional divisions may act as allies of the recipient governments. The regional division sees aid as necessary for friendly relations with recipients and for promoting specific foreign policy interests. It

32 Although the Grant Aid Division leads negotiations with MOF on specific projects, the negotiations on overall budget allocations involve other sections o f the Economic Cooperation Bureau and, as negotiations progress, increasingly more senior officials are involved. Interviews, MOFA. 33 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993.

34 David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest in Japan’s O D A ’, p.185. He suggests that this system, known as shukko, is one reason why ‘the decentralized aid system keeps functioning’. This is assessed in more detail below. There is also movement o f staff from the government agencies and ministries to the private sector.

may thus argue in support of projects. One way this is done is if the Japanese Ambassador resident in a recipient country directly approaches the Economic

Cooperation Bureau and recommends a project. Another channel is from the regional division direct to the Grant Aid Division. This will occur especially in the lead up to an event such as the visit to the region by a high ranking Japanese team (led by a minister, vice-minister or even prime minister). It is expected that the visit will be marked by an announcement of a new aid package or the signing of an Exchange of Notes. This is sometimes referred to as omiyage gaiko or souvenir diplomacy. Similarly if Tokyo is hosting a visit by a foreign head of government, an aid announcement will generally be made at the time to signify close relations and build good will.

In such cases, the impact of political overtures is to rearrange the order of priority of planned projects, by pushing up one country so that an Exchange of Notes can be timed with a visit (and thus pushing down another). If the aid initiative applies to an entire region, more project requests will be sought from those countries.35

Another way that the regional division may play a role in aid policy is when the Grant Aid Division seeks information and guidance in formulating the project and preparing documents for MOF; that is, explaining the merits of the project on the basis of Japan’s political and diplomatic interests, as well as the recipient’s development needs and economic strategy.36

Although MOFA as whole may be in favour of ODA and share a common view that aid flows should be maintained or increased, there are likely to be differences within the ministry about the specifics of this approach. These differences are evident especially on questions of diplomatic/political versus procedural issues. While regional divisions may favour increasing aid on diplomatic grounds, the divisions of the

Economic Cooperation Bureau may be more concerned about fiscal or security considerations.37

35 These details were provided to the author in an interview with an official o f the Grant Aid Division, MOFA, December 1992.

36 Interviews, Oceania Division, MOFA, November 1992 and June 1993. The extent to which MOF is influenced by political and diplomatic arguments is not clear. Most important to MOF is that proposed grants be for ‘good’ projects. Part o f this requires that the project be a priority in the recipient’s development plan. Given that the aid budget has grown considerably since the late 1970s largely on the basis o f political arguments, it is apparent that MOF is sensitive to the political and diplomatic nuances o f ODA.

37 For example, whether conditions in a particular country are safe enough for dispatching ofexperts or volunteers. One official noted that conflict occurred in policy towards Peru. When the regional division sought to increase numbers o f volunteers and experts in order to demonstrate support for President Fujimori, the Technical Cooperation Division resisted because o f the dangerous conditions in the country at that time. In this case they recommended increasing the number of trainees received by Japan, rather than dispatching more volunteers and experts. Interview, Technical Cooperation Division, MOFA, January 1993.

MOFA has formal jurisdiction over grant aid policy, but it is important to note the limitations on MOFA’s decision making power. MOFA has been described

elsewhere as the ‘window’ through which requests are made and aid disbursed,38 while in reality it shares power with a number of other ministries. Chief among these is MOF (as already described) but other economic ministries have considerable influence over areas that correspond to their domains. These include MITI and MAFF (see below).

MOFA’s role over aid policy is constrained by its lack of personnel to

adequately administer the aid budget and the lack of expertise on aid and development matters.39 The senior policy makers in MOFA are usually ‘generalists’ who rotate their positions every two years. This means they must rely on others (technical bureaucrats, other ministries and private sector consultants) for information and to administer aid policy.40

The role of MOFA, beyond the declaratory level, is also weakened by the need to confer with a wide range of ministries and agencies, which is a legacy of the origins of the aid program and reflects the decentralisation of power within the aid

bureaucracy. In terms of the political clout of the ministry in the overall bureacracy of Japan, MOFA is relatively weak. In part, this reflects the lack of a powerful domestic constituency or private sector ‘clients’.41 Moreover, compared with other ministries, there is little movement of senior diplomats from government to the private sector

(iamakudari) as there is no obvious place for them to g o.42

38 The idea of MOFA as a ‘window’ for aid flows was used by several scholars of Japanese ODA interviewed by the author. It is also a description used by Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.39.

39 Details of ODA staff levels in the Japanese government are in DAC, Aid Review 1990/91, Report by the Secretariat and Questions for Review of Japan, OECD, Paris, 1991, p.34. In 1991, Japan’s aid staff was 36 per cent of the US level, despite the fact that the two countries disbursed roughly the same amount of ODA. There has been difficulty in increasing staff for managing the aid program due to the fiscal austerity measures of the government in the 1980s, which restricted growth in the bureaucracy. In addition, other ministries are resistant to staff reductions in order to allow a faster increase in the aid related ministries. The implications of this staff shortage include reliance on private sector, protracted implementation, and preference for large-scale projects. Susan J. Pharr, ‘Japanese Aid in a New World Order’, in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds), Japan: A New Kind of

Superpower?, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 1994.

40 There are two types of bureaucrat in MOFA: the higher elite, on track to becoming an ambassador; and the lower ranked technical bureaucrat. Ellis S.Krauss, ‘Politics and the Policy making Process’, in Takeshi Ishida and Ellis Krauss (eds), Democracy in Japan, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1989, pp.39-64.

41 As Kent Calder observes, unlike other ministries, MOFA lacks any ‘domestic juridiction’ or any regulatory power over business and industry. Kent Calder, ‘Japan’s Changing Political Economy’, in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn (eds), Japan s Emerging Global Role, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1993, p.127.

42 This refers to the process whereby senior bureaucrats seek jobs outside of government once they reach the pinnacle of their government career. Amakudari (descent from heaven) ensures that close ties between related government and private sector bodies are facilitated. See John Creighton Campbell,

A principal source of power for MOFA is the authority it has over JICA, which is the key implementing agency for grant aid and technical cooperation. Close ties between the two organisations are facilitated by cross-posting of staff. But there are also tensions between the two on issues of jurisdiction and policy.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

JICA is a public corporation, or tokusho hojin, established by a special law to be an ‘instrument’ of national government.43 It is primarily under the jurisdiction of MOFA, and partly of MITI and MAFF. Under a law passed in 1978, the responsibilities of JICA grew to encompass the implementation of capital grant aid.44

JICA is mostly involved with technical assistance, being the main implementing agency. It is charged with allocating the major portion of the technical cooperation budget. Other ministries and agencies also have a share of this budget. JICA works closely with the Technical Cooperation Division in MOFA. The role of the latter is to negotiate with MOF about the breakdown of the technical cooperation budget (such as numbers of trainees received and volunteers dispatched) and to set general policy guidelines for technical cooperation.

JICA is staffed by professional aid bureaucrats, rather than transient ones as in MOFA, and often these officials have served in the countries they are working with. MOFA officials, on the other hand, rotate positions about every two years, so they do not have the time to become 'expert'. This applies to grant aid as well as technical cooperation. JICA is also staffed by a number of secondments from other ministries. The President of JICA is appointed from MOFA. Other senior positions are held by officials from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the Export Import Bank. In addition, according to one estimate, staff from other ministries head two-thirds of the Agency’s departments.45

JICA’s role in grant aid essentially is two-fold: to carry out basic design surveys and to implement grant aid, especially when this is related to technical cooperation. This includes liaising with private sector contractors, the recipient country and Japanese

‘Democracy and Bureaucracy in Japan’, in Takeshi Ishida and Ellis Krauss (eds) Democracy in Japan,

University o f Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1989, p .l 19. According to Arase, one section o f the private sector that has developed a close relationship with MOFA is the financial industry — that is banks. David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination’, p.185.

43 Institute of Administrative Management, Organisation o f the Government o f Japan, Tokyo, 1992, p.108.

44 JICA, Organisation and Functions, 1992, p.4.

45 It has also been noted that this practice may undermine morale o f career staff members o f the implementing agencies, as their own opportunities for advancement may be limited. Robert M. Orr, Jr., The Emergence o f Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, p.49. The Management and Coordination Agency report referred to earlier recommended against this practice of reserving departmental posts in JICA for ‘outsiders’. Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, p.83.

banks. It also screens contracts between the recipient and Japanese private sector firms. In general, JICA is less important in making overall aid policy (for instance, deciding who is to receive aid and who is not) as it is primarily involved in implementation work.

Its raison d'etre is delivery of aid programs. In this context, JICA has more interest in

the follow up of projects and ensuring that projects achieve their ‘development’ objectives. JICA officials are also interested in promoting close ties with recipients since their work revolves around ‘people to people’ contact.46

Recent policy innovations, such as Small-Scale Grant Assistance, have led to a more proactive role for JICA. For example, volunteers from the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) program, administered by JICA, carry out project identification work for the Small-Scale Grant Assistance scheme. But proposals that JICA assume more authority over grant aid policy have not been adopted.47