En el infierno había niñas

The preceding section has detailed how participatory practices have yielded mixed results in achieving policy change, and how some literature suggests that a more fundamental power shift toward the citizen is required to address social exclusion challenges. While the question of whether the aim of decision making is that decisions should be made by the people (as opposed to by their

democratically elected representatives) or closer to the people, the concept of citizens as members of the decision-making process implies inclusion and mutual rights and obligations (Hutton, 2013). This section will outline the relevance of rights to issues of social equity, first of all stepping outside the sphere of mobility and transport to understand the potential relevance and critiques before presenting arguments for the consideration of mobility as a right.

At the essence of an understanding of rights is that by bestowing rights upon someone or an organisation, some form of entitlement is conveyed to the ‘right- holder’ (Watts and Fitzpatrick 2017). There are many forms of rights including ‘moral or legal, abstract or specific, enforceable or unenforceable, and national or international’ (Watts and Fitzpatrick 2017). The notion of rights and

responsibilities, is complex and it is not always easy to understand their practical applications.

Rights emerged from seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers during the period known as the Western ‘Enlightenment’ which saw the first Bills of Rights in England, America and France. Rights were seen as ‘fundamental, bestowed by God or another divine source, or by some understanding of the nature of humanity’ and were commonly seen as rules or constraints limiting the actions of the individual against the pursuance of collective goals (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2017 p. 38-39). These so-called ‘natural rights’ were firmly

entrenched within the idea of acting in a morally good manner, and therefore were deontological i.e. related to duty and obligation, by their very nature.

Natural rights have been superseded by the concept of human rights. This form of rights has found expression in many international instruments by way of Article 25 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which asserts;

‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and his family, including food, clothing,

housing and medical care and necessary social services’. (UN- Habitat, 2013)

It is explicit in this quote that every human being ought to have access to the rights specified above, and it is incumbent on UN member states to ensure their delivery. Human rights differ from natural rights as the onus is on the collective to provide a basic level of living standard for each and every individual.

The idea of human rights, often simply referred to as ‘rights’ has increasingly gained policy traction in the developing and developed world due to its

‘considerable ethical and intuitive force’ (Watts and Fitzpatrick 2017, p. 40). Part of the attraction towards rights-based approaches stem from notions of equity

as a means of tackling the many forms of inequality that exist within the distribution of societal resources.

When these rights are translated into legislation, such as an unemployed worker’s entitlement to jobseekers’ allowance or housing benefit, there are policies and guidelines clarifying entitlements which contextualise and define the rights and entitlements. This clarification process into law aids the use and enforceability of the right and channels exist by which individuals can seek redress through an appeal system or the domestic court systems (Watts and Fitzpatrick 2013, p. 43). Scruton (2006) cited in Watts and Fitzpatrick (2017) emphasise that it is only when rights become realities by being embedded into legislation do they move from the purview of transnational committees ‘in the realm of dreams’ (p. 44).

However, there are critiques to the application of rights to the notion of

wellbeing and the individual needs. Ignatieff (1987) argues that love, belonging, dignity and respect are all things that we need, as well as the physical items, which cannot be provided for within a formal framework of rights. This

statement undermines the notion that entitlements can be defined and provided for across the spectrum of human need.

There are also examples where the existence of human rights has been used in, at best unintended, and at worst, highly problematic situations because rights can be used as what Dworkin calls ‘trumps’ in a policy context whereby certain policy priorities have a ‘protected’ status (1977 in Watts and Fitzpatrick 2017). A court case and subsequent appeals have debated whether the legal ability for communities to have areas of land designated as village greens, to

protect them from development, may be incompatible with landowner rights (Baker 2008). Preserving landowner rights is clearly not the primary concern here but they are being used in this situation to prevent the village green designation. This is an example of a perverse use of the notion of rights.

Critics of rights-based policies suggest that whenever rights are bestowed on a person, ‘power situations’ arise in that public officials administering the right, for example to housing or to welfare payments, have considerable power over ‘claimants’ as there are normally conditions placed upon claimants. The process of claiming job-seekers allowance with specified time limits and adhering to expectations that claimants will actively seek employment, provides a good example here. This power dynamic leads to the uncertainty as to whether

service users are ‘beneficiaries’ with an implied debt of gratitude to the purveyor or original ‘rights holders’ (Spicker 1984, cited in Watts and Fitzpatrick 2017).

Yet, in spite these weaknesses, human rights discourses retain a key strength: the value of a ‘shared vocabulary’ (Ignatieff 2000, p.349) which can be more useful than harmful, particularly in countries where democratic traditions and the protection of minorities remain weak or underdeveloped (Watts and Fitzpatrick 2017).

These debates provide the foreground through which to consider the meaning of rights-based approaches.