Influencia de la familia y el ambiente cultural en el aprendizaje temprano

Cooperation within security alliances has reduced military costs incurred by the allied states. At the very core, alliances reduce cost of having access to military capabilities without necessarily demanding increased spending to acquire them. The cost-saving235 _{idea rests on the}

capability aggregation model, in which alliances serve as substitutes236 _{for internal sources of}

power (Kaplan (1957), Morgenthau (1973), Walt (1987), and Waltz (1979)). Cost-saving rationale of alliances has been explained by cooperative game theories. These rest on the logic that alliances decrease transaction costs, or the cost of collective product, services or activity of cooperating states (Young, 1994).237 _{Alternatively, scholars applying a resource-based view}

of the firm to strategic alliance formation determine that states can conserve their resources

235 _{Sometimes, however, alliance cooperation has been associated with increased military expenditures. Mancur}

Olson (1971 (1965)] offered the first theoretical explanation for the allies’ varying contributions to collective security. In The Logic of Collective Action, he explained why groups providing a public good will experience ‘a surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation of the great by the small.’” [Oneal, John R. and Paul F. Diehl (June 1994), “Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 373-396, pp.373-374]. A number of subsequent studies found that NATO members’ defense burdens increased with state’s economic size (van Ypersele de Strihou (1967, Pryor (1969), and Beer (1972), Oneal and Diehl (1994)). Others determined that free-riding in alliances is not a function only of small countries. Smaller and medium size states were found to free-ride in military alliances: while a vast majority of smaller NATO allies were found to be free-riders between 1956 and 1988, “relatively larger of the smaller states [did] not free-ride any less than the relatively even smaller alliance members.” [Sandler, Todd and Keith Hartley (2001). “Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No.3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 869-896, pp.871-872]. However, Russett (1970) demonstrated that the explanatory power of the theory of collective action declined over time. Subsequent studies in fact demonstrated that the association between defense burden and GDP was not statistically significant in any year after 1968 in NATO members (Sandler and Forbes (1980), Oneal and Elrod (1989)), [Oneal and Diehl (1994), pp. 375].

236 _{However, sometimes alliances do not serve as substitutes for internal sources of power. Reduction in free-}

riding within alliances has been attributed to the need to project credibility of extended deterrence [Oneal and Diehl (1994: 391). Recently, Turkey, a NATO member, has announced its decision to pursue self-sufficiency in defense. Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik said that “reducing dependence on foreign arms is a key goal of the Turkish defense industry.” [Bekdil, Burak Ege (June 21, 2016) “Turkey Launches 3rd _{Corvette, Vous Self-}

Sufficiency in Defense,” Defense News Online:

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2016/06/21/turkey-corvette-ship- aircraft/86172398/

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and reduce their costs through closer cooperation and creation of strategic partnerships to overcome existing disadvantages.

In the transaction cost approach to alliance formation, underlying cooperative strategies are driven by economic motivation to reduce costs (Hennart (1988, 1991), Pisano and Teece (1989), Shan (1990), Williamson (1991)).238 _{The primary reason for pursuing}

cooperation within strategic alliances is to gain a comparative advantage. In this context, alliances are formed because they offer “significant advantages for [actors] that are lacking in particular competencies or resources to secure through links with others possessing complementary skills or assets; it may also offer… opportunities for mutual synergy and learning.”239

To explain how cooperation leads to cost-cutting measures, some scholars developed a resource-based view of the firm and established a resource-based theory of strategic alliances. The key premise rests on the value-creation potential of resources that are pooled together.240

The model predicts that cooperation conserves resources and shares the cost of risks (e.g. Hamel et al. 1989, Ohmae 1989), signals legitimacy (Baum and Oliver (1991)), offers opportunities for gaining new competencies (Hagedoorn (1993(, Hamel et al. (1989), Hennart (1991)), or simply enhances power (Hagedoorn (1993)). Das and Tang (2000) found that greatest value and savings are expected when inter-partner resources are supplementary or

complementary, but not wasteful.241 _{Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) used the resource-}

238 _{Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996: 136)} 239 _{Child, Faulkner and Tallman (2009:1)} 240 _{Das and Teng (2000)}

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view model to expand on the traditional theory, arguing that strategic alliances form when “firms are in a vulnerable strategic position.”242

Literature on military alliances has recognized that the optimal functioning of alliances leads to mutual economic gains through comparative advantage. Mutual gains come from economic specialization of defense industries among allied states (Hitch & McKean, 1960). Economic specialization commits states to collectively fund those weapons and forces that provide pure public goods.243 _{Whether specialization actually occurs depends on mutual}

gains.244 _{Mutual economic gains arise from collaboration in producing costly high-technology}

weapons, or costly transport and manufacturing of large quantities of relatively cheap weapons, or economies of scale through cooperative defense industrial policies (Hitch & McKean (1960), Hartley, (2006)). Efficient defense industrial policies have led to gains from trade, scale and learning, reducing duplication of costly R&D, or from competition.245

Cost analysis of cooperation dynamics within NATO has demonstrated that members of an alliance take advantage of economies of scope and “lower cost per linkage assigned to each activity.”246 _{Similarly, investigation of the effect of cost advantage on allied states’}

spending behavior determined that allied states would reap only benefits – such as cost-sharing savings – if it were to expand to include new entrants (Sandler and Hartley, 2001).247

242 _{Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996: 136)} 243 _{Hartley (2006: 474)}

244 _Ibid.

245 _{Ibid., pp.478-479}

246 _{Sandler and Hartley (2001: 892)} 247 _{Ibid., p.875}

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Military capacity of states can improve even under declining defense spending if countries cooperate. Actors seek strategic partners in alliances to gain competitive advantage and access to desired military capabilities: “Valued competencies and resources are often available only from a partner or from sharing their development with a partner. Alliances enable firms to gain access to partners’ advanced technology or to share the high cost of developing new capabilities through research and development (R&D).”248

This claim aligns with the argument that in the absence of common imminent threat (like the one NATO members faced during the Cold War), sustaining military alliances in the 21st _{century requires a degree of convergence of economic, political and security interests and}

activities among the allied nations (Brattberg and Varga (2012)). Defense cooperation leads to power projection and preserves military capabilities as countries share and pool materials and equipment, build joint facilities, and cooperate in industrial and technological spheres (Jones (2011)).

Collective cooperation can put off a military crisis arising out of declining military expenditures for a generation or more.249 _{Pooled capabilities reverse the rising ratio of}

overhead costs to capability affects as nations reduce their front-line forces, avoid duplications and increase coordination. Cooperation with allies implies improved military capability at a lower cost: the number of people needed decreases, cost of manpower support decreases, and further savings result from outsourcing of larger contracts.250 _{Pooling of military forces reduce}

248 _{Child, Faulkner and Tallman (2009:2)} 249 _{Alexander and Garden (2001:520)} 250 _Ibid.

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unit prices, leaving governments both “challenged and assisted by peer pressure and by the difficulty of escaping from binding international organizations.”251

This overview demonstrates that states can generate more defense capability for less money if they pool their resources and increase their collective collaboration. By combining their resources and sharing their joint products, programs or services, countries achieve comparative advantages at a lower cost. Increased collective collaboration can coincide with national defense reform, in which governments intentionally reduce the total size of their military manpower and jettison outdated military equipment, making resources available to finance collaborative projects. This can lead to a decline in national military capacity in aggregate, but simultaneously an increase in collective investment in R&D. I therefore probe the hypothesis that defense spending cuts are not detrimental to European military capacity if they are associated with pooling and sharing of states’ resources at a collective EU level.

Mechanism 2: Spending Cuts Are Not Detrimental to Military Capacity when States Collaborate