El rol del maestro en el ambiente social/ cultural del menor de 6 años

Buck-passing can also explain non-detrimental outcomes in military capacity under declining military spending. Realists explain buck-passing as states’ free-riding on the balancing efforts of other states.252 _{Defense realists view buck-passing as an attractive policy choice for}

those states that are relatively secure, have powerful allies capable of containing foreseeable

251 _Ibid.

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threats and are geographically and technologically less vulnerable to immediate invasion.253

Offensive realists argue that states choose to buck-pass in the presence of a wealthy ally willing to pay the costs of containing a threat.254 _{Others see buck-passing possibility in the presence}

of a credible ally.255

I use buck-passing as a term that relates to the states’ choice to “adopt strategies that transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others.”256 _{It is a ‘waiting’ strategy of those states}

that understand their military capabilities to be limited,257 _{or act as ‘defensive positionalists’}

rather than power maximizers, while seeking to maintain their position within the system.258

States may choose to abstain from aggressively maximizing power because they may not be strong enough to do so, lack the opportunity due to their geographical location, or fear provoking a hostile counter-balancing coalition or pre-emptive strike on the part of the rival.259

The threat typically means a rise of a hegemon and buck-passing a shifting of burden of war to others.260 _{Buck-passing strategies may lead to diminished defense expenditures if}

253 _{Lind (2004: 104). Also see Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Snyder (1990) “Chain}

Gangs and Passed Bucks”; Robert Jervis (1978) “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma“; and Van Evera (1998) “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.”

254 _{See Snyder (1984) “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”; or Victor D. Cha (1999) Alignment despite}

Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle.

255 _{See Press (2005) Calculating Credibility: How leaders assess military threats.}

256 _{“Both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is the most common in multi-polar system.}

[Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79; and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks."] Barry Posen has written that states will prefer to pass the buck when the expected cost of fighting is high. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.” [Lind, Jennifer M. (2004). “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” International Security, 29:1, pp.92-121, p.104]

257 _{“Robert Powell has argued that states will engage in buck-passing (or, “wait”) if the extent to which military}

capabilities cumulate is low. (Powell, In The Shadow of Power.)” [Lind (2004), p. 104]

258 _{Webber, Mark and Adrian Hyde-Price (edt.) (2016). “Theorizing NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic}

Alliance,” Routledge, New York, pp. 1-247, p.47

259 _Ibid.

260 _{Cimbala, Stephen J. (1994). “Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War,”}

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states choose to pass the buck “because they expect their relative position to be strengthened by standing aloof from the mutual bloodletting of the other powers.”261 _{Waltz has described}

some European states during World War II as buck-passers: “As the German threat grew, some British and French leaders could hope that if their countries remained aloof, Russia and Germany would balance each other off or fight to the finish.”262 _{Barry Posen has argued that}

the defensive military postures adopted by both France and Britain in the context of the German threat were “designed to pass the cost of fighting Germany to other allies.”263 _Buck-

passing implied Japan’s decline in defense spending and military posture in general in the 1950s through the 1970s, when Japan did not face a Soviet threat. The U.S. was found pursuing a buck-passing strategy vis-à-vis Europe until the early 1960s, in hope of providing an impulse for European countries to become an independent pole of power, capable of balancing the Soviet Union largely without the assistance of the United States.264 _{As a consequence, U.S.}

withdrew some military troops, reducing its military presence in the European theater and with it also the need of additional defense expenditures.

In the contemporary European security context, I understand ‘threat’ it terms of instability that states decide to address through out-of-area military missions, or international crisis-management operations. Recently, scholars have argued that because Europeans benefit from the US security hegemony and find themselves militarily weaker, they leave it up to (buck-pass) the US to deal with “hard” security threats. This relative weakness vis-à-vis the

261 _{Snyder (1990: 141)} 262 _Ibid.

263 _{Snyder (1990: 141)} 264 _{Green (2012)}

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US motivates European civilian over military power as a way to “soft” balance the US,265 _or

to let the US deal with global security while Europe can “focus on trade and economic issues.”266

In this context, buck-passing relates to a rational choice of a state to abstain or withdraw from actual military action, transferring the cost of containing threats to other states. Buck-passing thus relates to free-riding within alliances when states make independent decisions to withdraw from military deployments agreed to by the alliance, effectively placing the burden of crisis-management on others. Free-riding states spend less as they shirk on preparations for potential military action and buck-passing states spend less because they abstain from actual participation in military operations (Snyder, 2007).267 _{Scholars of economic}

theory of alliances found that alliance members share spending burdens disproportionately (Olson 1965, Olson and Zeckhauser 1966).268 _{This means that alliance dynamics leads to cuts}

in defense spending in some countries, but prompts other governments to increase their defense expenditures.269

265 _{See Jones (2007), Posen (2006).} 266 _Ibid.

267 _{Snyder, Glenn H. (August, 2007), Alliance Politics, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Cornell University}

Press, pp. 432, p. 34

268 _{Sandler, Todd and Keith Hartley (2001), p.871}

269 _{Theory of defense as a purely public good proposed that membership in military alliances prompts smaller}

states to decrease their national defense spending, or free-ride on greater defense expenditure of economically larger allies. The first theoretical explanations of varying contributions to collective security were offered in the work of Mancur Olson (1971 (1965)]. In The Logic of Collective Action, he explained why groups providing a public good will experience “a surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation of the great by the small.’” [Oneal, John R. and Paul F. Diehl (June 1994), “Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 373-396, pp.373-374: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449016] However, more recent theoretical predictions about who decides to free-ride on defense spending of other allies have deviated from the purely public good assumptions, countering the predictable free-riding behavior of smaller states in alliances. These latter theories are based on models of defense as a joint product, where military expenditures provide multiple benefits (deterrence, damage-limiting protection in wartime, and the pursuit of nation-specific interests) of varying degree of publicness among allies. [Sandler, Todd (1993), “The Economic

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Relinquishing of balancing responsibilities can mean declining military expenditures. Balancing is often costly and may in fact undermine national long-term security through depletion of state’s manpower and wealth.270 _{Joining a coalition of states in an effective military}

alliance typically requires converting economic wealth into military power. To be able to contribute to an alliance, a state “must be able to defend itself as well as offer additional forces to assist its prospective allies.”271 _{This logic signals continued investment in military capacity,}

even if an allied state buck-passes on foreign deployments.

Reductions in overseas deployments related to buck-passing strategies can reduce aggregate defense spending. However, if buck-passing countries continue to modernize, invest in their military equipment and in the preparedness of their personnel, the cuts in defense spending do not have to be detrimental to military capacity. I therefore probe the possibility that defense spending cuts are not detrimental to military capacity if spending reductions stem from reduced operational engagement abroad, not reduced investment in national military and defense.

Mechanism 3: Spending Cuts Are Not Detrimental to Military Capacity when States Buck-Pass

Theory of Alliances: A Survey,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 446-483, p. 447] This means that defense burdens are “predicted to be shared more in accordance with benefits received,” rather than solely on the basis of economic size. [Ibid.]

270 _{Lind (2004: 104)} 271 _{Brawley (2009: 10)}

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Chapter 4: Defense Reform

Evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests that defense spending cuts do not always decrease military capacity. In 30% of all cases, cuts in defense spending related to increases in national military manpower and military equipment stock. Such increases imply that countries attempt to improve their military potential even when their aggregate defense spending and military capacity decline.

The inverse relationship between a decline in defense spending and increase in military capacity is possible when governments implement defense reform policies. States can keep certain military capabilities or improve elements of national military potential even under budgetary pressure. In practice, states have implemented reforms by cutting some programs but simultaneously reinvesting in others, or by cutting some defense spending line-items (such as Operation and Maintenance) in favor of other line-items (such as RD&E and procurement).272

In this chapter, I probe whether cuts in defense spending are non-detrimental to military capacity because they relate to defense reform. I do so by examining evidence of the necessary conditions of potential defense reform mechanism. First, I evaluate whether DSCP’s were accompanied by increases in service-level military manpower and military equipment as

272 _{Eaglen, Mackenzie(2011). “Taking a Scalpel to the Defense Budget.” The Heritage Foundation. For example,}

the US defense reform in the 1990s initially cut Procurement as a way to accelerate RMA. [Cordesman, Anthony (1998). “Trends in US Defense Spending, Procurement, and Readiness: The Growing Gap Between Strategy, Force Plans, and Resources,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 30.] And investing in RDT&E and Procurement while reducing waste and excess capacity in operations, maintenance, and personnel was part of the explicit strategy behind US defense transformation efforts in the late 1990s. [Neal (2006: 87)].

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well as line-item spending on R&D. I identify sustained and non-sustained increases in these variables during DSCP’s. When DSCP’s relate to an aggregated decline in military capacity only sustained service-level increases in military equipment, manpower, or line-item increases in R&D spending indicate potential defense reform.

Second, I evaluate strong and weak cases of potential defense reform. This evaluation requires an aggregated analysis of service-level and line-item increases across all three indicators of potential defense reform. Strong cases of reform entail increases that are fully sustained through the DSCP. Weak cases mean increases that are only partially sustained or not sustained during a DSCP and may entail any one of the three indicators of defense reform.

Third, I evaluate how DSCP’s associated with specific types of defense reform relate to changes in military capacity. I expect to see evidence of potential defense reform in all DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity. I then compare these findings with evidence of potential defense reform in the 21 DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity. Greater evidence of defense reform in the former DSCP’s supports the defense reform hypothesis.

Last, I process-trace three cases of potential defense reform: Sweden (2007-2009), Bulgaria (2008-2012), and Slovakia (2008-2012). Sweden and Bulgaria present the most dissimilar cases of the same type of potential defense reform. Bulgaria and Slovakia present the most similar cases with opposite defense reform outcomes.

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