The first stop in the quest for a more robust, practical and practicable ecological philosophy of sport, that ideally will lead to a more profound change of the way people live their lives, is ‘ecosophy’. This portmanteau of ecology, the scientific analysis and study of interactions among organisms and their environment, and philosophy, literally: the love of wisdom, has been coined by Norwegian Arne Naess (1912–2009), the founding father of the deep ecological movement in the early 1970s. Deep and shallow
ecology are two key notions in Naess’s ‘theory’. Shallow ecology refers to all human strivings to create a more sustainable world, say more or less energy neutral Olympics. These practical efforts similes the light green approach as distinguished by Jarvie & Thornton. Deep ecology, on the other hand, denotes a truly ecosophical dark green mindset to actually change the way humans reel and deal with ‘nature’.
In consonance with the idea that practical philosophy is about overcoming the self-imposed limits of meta-ethics and trying to awaken philosophy from its “metaphysical slumber” and its “conceitedness, marginality and isolation” (Zwart, 1999, my translation), I argue that the specific situatedness, or being-in-the-world, of philosophers does play a decisive role in their philosophies.55
Meaning cannot simply be distilled out of thin air. Real love of wisdom is always in need of naturing surroundings. If not, it fades away in a tasteless metaphysical aporia.
The importance of an ongoing dynamic contextual embedding also goes for Naess’s holistical ponderings on a better, more co-existent world. His ecosophy is an amalgam of a sometimes vague speculative vitalism (Loland 1996, p. 71) with spirituality, straightforward moralism (Minimize your ecological footprint! Cherish life in its entirety! Enjoy nature properly!) and the linguistic preciseness and nearly mathematical reasoning of analytic philosophy. It is a tactile mixture of personal intuitions and a rather rigid system of hypotheses and prescriptive norms that cannot be understood without reference to the natural habitat from which it arises.
As for Naess’s specific biotic roots: he was a noted mountaineer who in 1950 led the expedition that for the first time in history scaled the Tirich Mir (7,708 m.), the highest mountain of the Hindu Kush range. He shares his attachment to the remote highland with Friedrich Nietzsche, who in Ecce Homo already proclaimed that philosophy is a voluntary and solitary walk through icy mountains,56 and with
Martin Heidegger, who preferred the simple life of thinking, writing, walking and skiing in the Black Forest above the vibrant but hectic and artificial culture of university life. Only in solitude one can find life in its naked state. Nietzsche, who was always suffering from mood swings towards the negative, felt rather comfortable at the little Swiss mountain village of Sils-Maria, close to the Maloja-pass, an area of “barren ruggedness—rather than prettiness” (Linley, 2014). And Heidegger found his peace of mind at his little den at Todtnauberg, a small mountain village at 1000 meters above sea-level, 20 kilometers south of his alma mater in Freiburg, far from the bustle and the overcrowding.
Also Naess had his refuge. He frequented his Tvergastein hut in the Hallingskarvet massif in order to ponder over the deeper matters of life. This off the grid safe haven plays an important role in Naess ‘Ecosophy T’. ‘T’ is said to represent Tvergastein in this all-inclusive environmental ‘theory’, which is also a prescriptive guide for leading the good life:
55 “From word to world, from deduction to induction” (Zwart, 1999, my translation).
56 “He who knows how to breathe the air of my writings knows that it is an air of the heights, a bracing air. One must be made for it, otherwise the danger is no small one of catching cold in it. The ice is near, the loneliness is tremendous — but how peacefully all things lie in the light! How freely one breathes! How much one feels beneath oneself! Philosophy, as I have understood and lived it hitherto, is
2
By an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy as a kind of sofia (or) wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and prediction. The details of an ecosophy will show many variations due to significant differences concerning not only the ‘facts’ of pollution, resources, population, etc. but also value priorities (Naess cited in Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 8).
Heidegger cultivates his garden at his den at Todtnauberg , near Freiburg, Germany. (Source: Kinkatso & Co)
Although Naess’s work is permeated with friluftsliv—the Norwegian predilection for unpolished outdoor activities such as hiking,57 climbing and kayaking—, his connection with canonized sport
is at first sight anything but obvious. At the beginning of his Outline of an Ecosophy of Sport (1996), Sigmund Loland stipulates that in the ecological movement “to a certain extent, competition has been seen as the very counter-principle to ecologically sound practice in which cooperation and symbiosis are considered key values” (p. 70). Based on the work of his fellow-countryman, Loland nonetheless argues that sport, at least to some extent, can be ecosophically justified. Loland characterizes Naess’s ecosophical theory as “a speculative, at times vague vitalism with the clear-cut rationality of analytic philosophy” (p. 71-2). The analytical, puzzle-solving fundamentals of Naess’s thinking can be summarized as follows. Ecosophy T consists of a set of norms (N) and hypotheses (H). N1 is the ‘top norm’ which refers to Self-realization! All other norms and hypotheses are logical derivations of N1.
The hypotheses provide a supporting network, as they are verbal articulations of the relationship between norms. The use of both hypotheses and norms is considered by Naess to be important. Disagreements on norms are often caused by disagreements on facts. By including hypotheses, the chance for locating disagreement increases while at the same time underlining the status of the norms not as absolute and rigid rules, but as prima facie guidelines (p. 72).
The constitutive norms of Naess’s ecosophy T can be captured in a few words or sentences ending with an exclamation mark. This renders Ecosophy T into what could be coined a holistic ontological system, which consists of a total world view, with a definite sender (Naess) but with no definite receivers, Loland argues. “The norms are considered valid for all life forms in all situations. Naess’s ecosophy is in this way a cosmology, a total view of how ‘all things are interconnected’”(p. 72).
Loland stipulates that Naess is reluctant when it comes to what he calls ‘precisations’ of the relation between his ‘top norms’ and their realization in T(heory) terms, “as general and vague terms that represent powerful intuitive ideas that are shared by many and inspire a variety of inspirations” (p. 72). As if true ecosophy only can be ‘felt’ by true adepts. Nevertheless, on the prescriptive, straightforwardly normative side Naess distinguishes three ways of interpreting N1: Self-realization!
The first theory that people may adhere to (T1) is ego-realization. This represents the traditional view in Western culture, with “a predominant anthropocentric, individualist, and utilitarian world view … in terms of ego-realization, the maximization of narrow self-interest” (p. 72). Nature is instrumental in this view. T2 refers to self-realization in a somewhat wider sense, since in this perspective also other humans are included. “It can, perhaps, be linked to conceptions of self realization within mainstream humanistic psychology and moral philosophy—for example, to traditional interpretations of eudaimonia or ‘the good life58”’(p. 72).
57 In 2014 I experienced that quite dangerous, un-secured hikes over windy cliffs, that probably would lead to a nation-wide political discussion in The Netherlands, in Norway are labeled as family-friendly pastimes.
2
Naess prefers, of course, a less specialized precisation—T3. T3 refers to an expanded, ecological Self that is realized in a process of deep identification with individuals of all life forms. This idea is linked to holistic traditions of both Western and Oriental thought, to notions such as ‘the universal self,’ ‘the absolute,’ atman (sanskrit), and to ideas of the comprehensive structure of the self found in the writing of thinkers such as Spinoza and Gandhi (p. 73).
Building on T3, the magnanimous form of the ‘ecological Self!’, Loland sets forth his argument for a practicable conception of sport that despite its competitive (so to some extent also always destructive) disposition still can stand the ecological litmus-test. Key in this effort is to radically change59 the way
humans deal with sport—and thus inevitably also with their natural habitat, so with life in general— are a constant hovering between holistic ‘Self-realization!’ on the one hand, and the idea of ‘biospheric egalitarianism’ or ‘the democracy of all life forms’ on the other. In telegram-style Naess
Naess overcomes the classical Cartesian subject-object-divide by means of his ‘relational field ontology’, in which humans are not interpreted as superior to other species, but as humble participants in the larger scheme of being. “Objects, plants, animals, persons, or practices like sports cannot be fully understood as single entities and in isolation, but only as relational wholes” (p. 73). All life forms possess intrinsic value and thus have “a universal right to live and blossom”(p. 74).
Beyond Meinberg’s before-mentioned well-willing anthropocentricism, which remains in the realm of classical metaphysics, Naess calls for replacing classic subject-object dichotomies (that put humans at the top of the evolutionary pyramid)60 by a more inclusive theory. He does so by proposing
a ‘relational field ontology’, a comprehensive and inclusive theory of being that envisions humans as co-evolutionary parts of a whole rather than (just) benevolent stewards of nature. Entities or things, including humans, are knots or junctions within the holistic field of being. To be is to be perceived.61
All statements ‘about the thing’ are relational statements: statements like ‘thing A is B’ are in Ecosophy T abandoned in favour of ‘thing A is B in relation to C’ or the relational thing AC has the quality B (Naess, cited in Loland 1996, p. 73).
In Naess’s relational field ontology the distinction between humans and environment becomes artificial and meaningless, thus unnecessary. It is the interrelation between entities or things, formerly known as subjects and objects, that counts. Still, it cannot be denied that humans have a rather unique position.
59 Cf. Keulartz (2005) for a more detailed account of mitigation (a radical change of lifestyle, making a u-turn) versus adaptation (adjusting your lifestyle, steering away) and for how only boundary work and post-metaphysical pragmatism can help us out of the stalemate between a light-green market-liberalism and radical dark green approaches. In chapter 5 Continental Pragmatism: Enduring Life in the
Strenuous Mood I will propose a synthesis of both visions.
60 Mark Twain (1835-1910) was already hesitant : “Man has been here 32,000 years. That it took a hundred million years to prepare the world for him is proof that that is what it was done for. I suppose it is, I dunno. If the Eiffel Tower were now representing the world’s age, the skin of paint on the pinnacle-knob at its summit would represent man’s share of that age; and anybody would perceive that the skin was what the tower was built for. I reckon they would, I dunno” (1993, p. 106).
61 In Chapter 6 Continental Pragmatism: Enduring Life in the Strenuous Mood will argue that Naess’s relational field ontology overlaps with William James’s subtle pragmatism.
They have a special capability of putting the interconnection between all there is into meaningful words and thoughts. This ability to verbalize and literally re-flect hopefully will lead to acknowledging that we should strive for peaceful coexistence. Eros is the widest interpretation of the identification of humans with other species. “In love one loses part of one’s identity by gaining a greater identity, something that in its truest sense cannot be spoken of” (Naess 1989, p. 11).
Naess’s universal love principle provides a course of action worth striving for, Loland contends. On the one hand humans have to become fully aware of their ‘greatest good’, their ultimate telos: to strive for maximized Self-relation! in consonance with non-human species.62 On the other hand humans have to
realize that they are unique because of their lack of biological specialization.63 This peculiarity enables
them “to adapt to situations in almost all parts of the ecosphere” (p. 74). Because of this Sonderstellung (‘special position’, Max Scheler), their exceptionality, humans are more powerful than other species. They are capable of reconsidering their brute supremacy over other life forms. They possess the power of reason. They are able to ponder over their own actions on earth “and in fact influence Self-realization through deliberate action” (p. 74). For Naess this implies an ethical responsibility in the way we relate to ‘others’, since we can “consciously conceive the urge other living beings have for self-realisation” (Naess, cited in Loland 1996, p. 74).
Loland goes on to say that Naess’s call for human responsibility is a matter of inner conviction, not of external duty.64 “This is the true realm of freedom in a Spinozistic sense, ‘a way home’ to what
we really are. Naess emphasizes the importance of moving from ethics to ontology and back” (p. 74). The ongoing oscillation between ought, is and ought paves the way for introducing so-called “Self-realization potentials” (p. 75), as Naess calls the potency of different forms of life to bring their capacities into actuality. Self-realization potentials result in adding something to the vast whole of life per se. No matter how futile the concerned ‘individual’, actualised potentiality always results in an increase of ecosophical joy. Say a flower that attracts bees by blossoming or just pleasures the human eye. “The key ideal of Ecosophy T, then, is this: Unity and diversity of life” (p. 75). Loland summarizes Naess’s ideal ecosophical scenario as follows:
N 1: Self-realization!
H1: The higher Self-realization attained by anyone, the broader and deeper the identification with others.
H2: The higher Self-realization attained by anyone, the more its further increase depends upon the Self-realization of others.
H3: Complete Self-realization of anyone depends on that of all. N2: Self-realization for all living beings!
H4: Diversity of life increases Self-realization potentials. N3: Diversity of life!
62 It should be noted, however, that Naess makes an exception for the fulfillment of so-called human basic needs. 63 According to Arnold Gehlen (1940/2009) humans are ‘Mängelwesen’, deficient beings.
2
H5: Complexity of life increases Self-potentials. N4: Complexity!
H6: Life resources of the Earth are limited.
H7: Symbiosis maximizes Self-realization potentials under conditions of limited resources. N5: Symbiosis! (p. 76)
However attractive this ideal scheme for a symbiotic ecosophy may be, Loland also points at potentially controversial consequences of the deep identification with the Self-realization potentials of all creatures, from upright walking mammals with an oversized neo-cortex to the smallest of insects.65
For example, we might, under certain circumstances, reach the conclusion that human beings ought to recommend their own withdrawal as the dominant life form on earth66 to promote other
life forms to live and blossom; this withdrawal may contribute more to the Self-realization for all. Such norms, critics could argue, cannot serve as a common basis for society at large (p. 76). A brief turn to everyday life illustrates that the withdrawal-stance is not very likely to happen in a man-made world. Due to a tsunami of technological innovations we increasingly tend to see nature as malleable; as more or less co-evolutionary with our uncontrollable desire to conquer planet earth. We have taken over control on planet earth in a very un-ecosophical, consumptive and speciecist way. Rather than staying at home and close to our little den, our personal Walden, we try to develop cleaner ways of long distance travelling. Rather than restrain ourselves we employ the contradictio in adjecto of ‘sustainable growth’. And eventually, rather than caring for other biological species, we exterminate them.
The persistent habit of solving problems by un-problematically applying external τέχνη (techné, art, craftsmanship) instead of exploring the internal potentiality of φύσις (phúsis, nature)67 seems very hard
to break, all in all. Even more, contemporary elite ‘record sports’ seem to confirm the logic of unbridled technological progress (Loland, 2001). The hunt for records equals the adage of un-satiability: enough
65 Recent ethological studies (e.g. De Waal 2016) show that the mind and self-consciousness are a matter of evolutionary degree rather than uniquely human. Stephen Jay Gould even has argued (Scientific American, October 1994) that “[o]ur impression that life evolves towards greater complexity is probably only a bias inspired by parochial focus on ourselves.” Over time ‘the wall of simplicity’ (bacteria) has proven to be more adaptive and more resistant to changes such as the meteorite impact on Yucatan, some 65 million years ago, which caused the Triassic-Jurassic extinction. The life-style of bacteria therefore has remained the most common and most successful. “We must understand that little twigs [e.g. homo sapiens sapiens, rw] are contingent nubbins, not predictable goals of the massive bush beneath” (p. 91).
66 This might seem quite appropriate considering the current state of affairs (sea-level rising due to carbon emission, large scale deforestation, human-induced extinction of species that exceeds the Triassic-Jurassic extinction by far, over-population etc.) But the pivotal question than is: who is in charge of the human plant planet earth meanwhile has become? Who will control the control-panel? There seems to be no way back, thus ludditism will not help, eventually.
67 I here refer to Aristotle’s idea that phúsis is its own source of bringing its potentiality to actuality, which perfectly fits into Naess’s ecosophical scheme. Techné ,on the other hand, requires a source of motion outside itself, thus is at best shallow ecological. This resembles Sloterdijk’s distinction between nature-friendly homeo-technology and alienating allo-technology already referred to in the introductory Chapter 1 Prologue: The Good Life, Asceticism and Sustainable Cycling. Vincent Blok (2014) points at the more intricate relation between phúsis and techné in Heidegger. “As a representation of the phúsis, techné has to be understood as an addition or supplement to the original phúsis. Why? Because phúsis has the tendency to conceal itself, only a technical supplement or re-presentation of the phúsis is able to give us access to the original phúsis. It is in this respect, that we can say that the techné is demanded by phúsis in order that it can reveal itself” (p. 324). A Heidegger-inspired take on (sustainable endurance) sport will be developed in Chapter 5 Ascetic Practices, Hermeneutical
is never enough. Records need to be broken, if need be by thousandths of seconds. At a closer look, this insatiability, this ruthless hunt is the ultimate example of the law of diminishing returns. Loland stipulates that because of this unrelenting attitude of progress at all costs Naess is sceptical towards high end competitive sport, “with its focus on specialization, achievement, and standardization of play areas and play actions” (p. 77). The fixation on quantification, the habit of reducing quality and beauty to sheer numbers, makes elite sport prone to shallow and instant hedonist satisfaction, rather than enjoying the deeper delights of true eudaimonism.
Nevertheless, Loland still thinks that experiencing “what we may call ecosophical joy” in sport is