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One of the initial expectations is the idea that China serves as a role model for the African states to follow for their own economic development. Such a construct has been one of the recurring features of the Chinese literature as illustrated by Bo’s (2009, pg. 29) depiction of the Chinese model. This was expected to promote the Chinese experiences of economic development as a reference point for Sudan to follow, which serves as one of the potential means for the Chinese constructs to spread themselves beyond their original context as well as reflecting the system that they seek to promote. In addition, it is also expected that the shifts in administrations will also influence the constructs present in the two corpuses. Initial examples include the assumption of development leading to the rise of democratic norms alongside the more exceptionalist stance taken by Xi in recent years (Shambaugh, 2015, pg.

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102). These shifts are expected to interact with each other along with the developments within Sudan.

Since the Chinese constructs of China in Africa seek to promote the benefits of Chinese policies for the African states, it was also expected that the concept of mutuality and ‘win-win cooperation’ will also be present in this case (Sheng, 2012 pg. 297). Due to the comparatively recent nature of China’s deeper ties with Sudan, it is expected that this construct will seek to depict China as an equal partner and that Chinese policies are of mutual benefit rather than being utilised to refer to any shared experiences. This serves as part of the image of Chinese foreign policy that the Chinese constructs seek to promote.

The construct of cultural soft power was expected to be another feature of the Chinese discourse on China’s policies towards Sudan as well as serving as one of the potential means to spread the Chinese constructs of China’s identity. China’s cultural diplomacy has been one of the primary tools in China’s foreign relations, with it being of equal if not more importance to the traditional notions of hard power in Chinese strategy (Warall, 2012, pg. 149-51). The potential presence of this construct is expected to serve as a reflection of the developments in Chinese foreign policy and the perceptions of China’s identity as well as one of the vessels to spread these perceptions.

Due to both the established literature and Xi’s continued endorsement of this concept, the construct of the China Dream is also expected to be present in this case study. As with the construct of cultural soft power, this construct is expected to reflect the shifts in Chinese foreign policy and identity in recent years (Zhang, 2013, pg. 51). Should this construct be present, it will further reinforce the idea of the case of Sudan as a reflection of the more recent developments in China’s African policies as well as serving as part of the Chinese projections of China’s image, something that the Chinese narrative is expected to spread beyond the context of its origin.

I also expected that many of the constructs outlined in the Anglophone literature to be present in the American corpus on Chinese engagement in Sudan. As outlined in the introduction, China’s assistance to the Sudanese regime is an example of the apparent facilitation of authoritarian norms and human rights abuses in the continent. This has largely manifested itself in the form of Chinese military assistance to Sudan. This is particularly appropriate for the perception of China as an enabler of the worst excesses of Africa’s dictatorships as well as the apparent rise of authoritarian norms in the continent on the back of

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Chinese policy. Such a notion has been prevalent in the form of the criticism of China’s non- interventionist policies such as Hollslag’s (2008, pg. 80) assertion that China is willing to sacrifice its citizens for economic objectives.

As with many resource rich African states, it was expected that the construct of China as an exploitive power will also be present in the American corpus on Sudan as well. This is due to China’s pursuit of African natural resources which also raises another common claim made against Chinese policy in the region. In this case, it is the assertion that China is willing to pursue its economic goals regardless of the potential political costs that this may bring, a notion that has led to the common depiction of Chinese foreign policy as being little more than the pursuit of economic objectives with little beyond it, as symbolised by Alden’s (2008, pg.6) claim that China’s African policies are chiefly motivated by access to natural resources.

In keeping with much of China’s foreign policy, the question over China’s apparent lack of political intervention is also expected to be present in the American discourse on Chinese engagement in Sudan. In this case, it is possible for both elements of the critique of non- intervention to be present. At first, the lack of Chinese intervention can be interpreted as tacit support for the Sudanese regime’s abuses as well as the facilitation of autocratic norms, which appears to be connected to the construct of China as a facilitator (Taylor, 2009, pg. 943). It was also possible to perceive this as a lack of will on China’s part to become a more formal power as Chinese interests come under attack, partially because of this lack of intervention being perceived as support for Khartoum, which raises the construct of China as a reluctant empire. Both constructs are indicative of the possible causative and normative factors behind the creation of the American image of China’s African policies

Regarding the possible structures of experience that may influence the creation of the American discourse on Sudan, the legacy of the Cold War may have the greatest influence. Just as China supports Khartoum, the United States has also been accused of supporting the SPLA, which echoes the proxy conflicts of the Cold War era, as depicted by Patey’s works on China’s approach to Sudan. In this regard, the American discourse presents China as a rival to American interests as well as an exploiter and facilitator of authoritarian rule. The security challenges to Chinese interests in Sudan can also be an example of the shift from informal to formal power in the continent as well, which is expressive of the legacy of European imperialism’s influence upon the creation of the American narrative on China in Africa.

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The factors behind the creation of the American discourse on Chinese engagement with Sudan are primarily a mixture of causative and normative factors. The former is a result of Chinese facilitation of the Bashir regime’s excesses, particularly towards Darfur, as well as the exploitation of Sudan’s natural resources (Cardenal and Araujo, 2014, pg. 140). The more normative elements come from the idea that Chinese engagement presents an authoritarian challenge to the established American discourse via these excesses. The same phenomenon can be perceived in both causative and normative terms. While the former serves as the American narrative’s reaction to Chinese policies in the African continent, the latter is the wider phenomena that the competing narratives are symbolic of.