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INFORMACIONES SOBRE EL ABSOLUTO EN LA ETAPA

1

There are two schools of thought in Criminal Law, and these are (a) the

CLASSICAL THEORY, which simply means that the basis of criminal liabilities is human free will, and the purpose of the penalty is retribution which must be proportional to the gravity of the offense; and (b) the POSITIVIST THEORY, which considers man as a social being and his acts are attributable not just to his will but to other forces of society. As such,

punishment is not the solution, as he is not entirely to be blamed; law and

jurisprudence should not be the yardstick in the imposition of sanction, instead the underlying reasons would be inquired into.

2

We follow the classical school of thought although some provisions of eminently positivist in tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in our Code.

General Principles; Territoriality (1994)

Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie in Singapore.

Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna. 1) Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in Singapore, hence such violation is not one of those where the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritorially. The general rule on territoriality of criminal law governs the situation.

General Principles; Territoriality; Jurisdiction over Vessel (2000)

After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel beer and taking two plates of "pulutan", Binoy, a Filipino seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V "Princess of the Pacific", an overseas vessel which was sailing in the South China Sea. The vessel, although Panamanian registered, is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman. When M/V "Princess of the Pacific" reached a Philippine Port at Cebu City, the Captain of the vessel turned over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities. An information for homicide was filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction. If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion? Why? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

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Yes, the Motion to Quash the Information should be granted. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime committed since it was committed on the high seas or outside of Philippine territory and on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines (US vs. Fowler, 1 Phil 614) It is the registration of the vessel in

accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner, which makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is in the high seas.

Use of Aliases; When Allowed (2006)

When can a Filipino citizen residing in this country use an alias legally? Give 3

instances. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1

Pseudonym for literary purposes.

2

Use of aliases in cinema and television entertainment.

3

In athletics and sports activities (RA. 6085).

4

Under the witness protection program a person may adopt a different identity (RA. 6981).

5

When he has been baptized or customarily known by such alias.

6

When authorized by a competent court (CA. No. 142, as amended by RA. 6085).

7

When properly indicated in a Certificate of Candidacy (Omnibus Election Code).

FELONIES

Conspiracy (1997)

A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill F, A and his friends, B, C, and D, armed

themselves with knives and proceeded to the house of F, taking a taxicab for the purpose. About 20 meters from their destination, the group alighted and after instructing E, the driver, to wait, traveled on foot to the house of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the group's lookout. C and D stood guard outside the house. Before A could enter the house, D left the scene without the

knowledge of the others. A stealthily entered the house and stabbed F. F ran to the street but was blocked by C, forcing him to flee towards another direction. Immediately after A had stabbed F, A also stabbed G who was visiting F. Thereafter, A exiled from the house and, together with B and C, returned to the waiting taxicab and motored away. G died. F survived. Who are liable for the death of G and the physical injuries of F?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B, C, and D was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since the former was completely unaware of said killing.

For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should be held liable therefore. Even if it was only A who actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to G, B and C are nonetheless liable for conspiring with A and for contributing positive acts which led to the realization of a common criminal intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while C blocked F's escape. D, however, although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because he left the scene before A could enter the house where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier part of the conspiracy, he did not personally participate in the execution of the crime by acts which directly tended toward the same end (People

vs. Tomoro, et al 44 Phil. 38),

In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the infliction of physical injuries upon F because there is no showing that he had knowledge of the plan to kill F.

Conspiracy; Avoidance of Greater Evil (2004)

BB and CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT. The victim's son, ST, upon seeing the attack, drew his gun but was prevented from shooting the attackers by AA, who grappled with him for possession of the gun. FT died from knife wounds. AA, BB and CC were charged with murder.

In his defense, AA invoked the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury, contending that by preventing ST from shooting BB and CC, he merely avoided a greater evil. Will AA's defense prosper? Reason briefly. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, AA's defense will not prosper because obviously there was a conspiracy among BB, CC and AA, such that the principle that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, shall govern. The act of ST, the victim's son, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence, justified as a defense of his father against the unlawful aggression by BB and CC. ST's act to defend his father's life, cannot be regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful act.

What AA did was to stop a lawful defense, not greater evil, to allow BB and CC achieve their criminal objective of stabbing FT.

Conspiracy; Co-Conspirator (1998)

Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder Joel. In a narrow alley near Joel's house, Juan will hide behind the big lamppost and shoot Joel when the latter passes through on his way to work. Arturo will come from the other end of the alley and simultaneously shoot Joel from behind. On the appointed day, Arturo was apprehended by the authorities before reaching the alley. When Juan shot Joel as planned, he was unaware that Arturo was arrested earlier. Discuss the criminal liability of Arturo, if any. [5%]

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

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Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a co- principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both will incur criminal liability. Arturo's liability as a conspirator arose from his participation in jointly devising the criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan killed Joel. The conspiracy here is actual, not by inference only. The overt act was done pursuant to that conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator. There being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore, should be liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty on him may be that of an accomplice only

(People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1; People us. Medrano, 114 SCRA 335) because he was

not able to actually participate in the shooting of Joel, having been apprehended before reaching the place where the crime was committed.

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