The remaining chapters are devoted to a detailed consideration of China's relations with four specific countries: Indonesia, Pakistan, Cambodia and Tanzania. In each case the basic question that is asked is: was the relationship predominantly an 'alliance' or a
united front', in the sense in which these two terms are defined in Chapter Two.
The countries to be examined were chosen primarily for three reasons. First, these four states had
established closer relations with China than any other non-Communist states. Secondly, all four relationships developed mainly during the period 1960-1965, which the last chapter saw as the period when the united front doctrine exercised its greatest influence over China's foreign policy. Thirdly, all four countries are, in Chinese Communist parlance, governed by 'national bourgeois' regimes and hence could be expected to be prime targets for 'specific united front' policies.
The three Asian states are also important because they are the only non-Communist countries to have received from China any kind of commitment to their defence - the minimum necessary condition for a relationship to be considered an 'alliance', as defined in Chapter Two.
Tanzania has not received such a commitment but is included because of the special place given to revolutionary
prospects in Africa by Chinese statements during the early 1960 's.
The same basic format is followed in each chapter. First, a brief historical outline of the main
developments in the relationship is given, focussing, in the case of the three Asian countries, on the
circumstances which led to the Chinese commitment of support. Next, a general assessment of Chinese
motivations is made which forms the basis for the final section of each chapter, which considers the relationship from the perspective of the 'alliance' and 'united front' models.
In the case of Indonesia, the chief purpose of the historical outline is to trace the developments which took Sino-Indonesian relations from their considerably strained state in 1960 to the position in January 1965 when China was the only major country which was giving
full support to all of President Sukarno's foreign policy escapades. The outline will concentrate mainly
on Chinese motives. This will inevitably necessitate some oversimplification of an exceedingly complex series of events which involved, on the Indonesian side, many different actors. However the thesis is about China's foreign policy, not Indonesia's, and there already exist many analyses of internal Indonesian politics during
this period. In fact, most of the discussions of Sino- Indonesian relations that have appeared to date also tend to emphasise the internal Indonesian factors that brought Sukarno into the alliance, with the effect that several puzzling aspects of China's diplomacy and
objectives have been barely touched upon.
The Formation of An Informal Alliance 1961-1965
China's diplomatic activity in the Third World in the 1953-1956 period revolved around certain immediate and basic objectives: obtaining recognition, isolating Taiwan, securing admission to the United Nations, opening up trade relations and, in short, breaking out of the political and economic isolation which Washington had
attempted to impose on it. Indonesia was one of several Asian states on whom Peking's diplomatic offensive
concentrated in this period. By 1957 China had achieved some success in these endeavours and began to direct its efforts towards those states with strained relations with the United States. Once again Indonesia fitted its
requirements in several ways, especially in 1958 when the CIA was allegedly involved in several separatist revolts which broke out in Indonesia during that year. China was reported to have offered 'volunteers' to assist Indonesia in quelling these revolts but even if this
report is accurate it is unlikely that the Chinese offer amounted to anything more than a gesture.^ The essential fragility of the relationship up to this point was
demonstrated during 1959-1960 when the two states
collided over the issue of Indonesia's Overseas Chinese population. This had been a potential source of tension
2
for some time and erupted into an open quarrel in 1959, following Indonesian moves to reduce the economic power of Indonesia's Chinese population. Peking claimed that China had the right to 'protect the rights and interests of the Overseas Chinese' and accused Indonesia of
3
persecuting them. Djakarta, on the other hand,
protested against an alleged 'anti-Indonesia campaign'
being conducted by Peking Radio and also at the involvement of two Chinese consuls in inciting the Overseas Chinese
4
to disrupt the Indonesian economy. The dispute continued to sour relations between the two countries throughout 1960.
D. Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: an overview 3 1955-19653 (Rand Memorandum 4641-PR), p. 18.
2
For the background to this question, see D. Mozingo, 'The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty' , Asian Survey3 December 1961, and the same author's 'New Developments In China's Relations with Indonesia', Current Scene3 5 February 1962.
3
People's Daily 3 12 December 1959, reprinted in China Reconstructs 3 February 1960 .
4
Some observers have seen the informal alliance of 1965 as the culmination of ten years of patient diplomacy
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on the part of China. The interpretation that will be offered here is somewhat different. It will be argued that until late in 1964, the relationship between the two sides was marked by a high degree of caution on both sides and that China's willingness to enter into
potentially far-reaching commitments with Indonesia at the end of 1964 constitutes a dramatic departure from the previous course of China's policy towards Indonesia that has not been adequately explained.
Sino-Indonesian relations were certainly warmer in 1961 than they had been during the previous year but there is no evidence that suggests that either side was interested in developing a closer entente. For Indonesia, China was at this stage merely one of several states
whose support was being sought for the West Irian
campaign against the Dutch, and whose attitude towards the West Irian question was far less crucial than that of the Soviet Union, which financed the campaign, or the United States which was in a position to influence the Dutch. Similarly Peking, while anxious to end its quarrel with this major Third World state at a time
when the Sino-Indian dispute was growing more acrimonious, did not appear to regard either Indonesia or West Irian as areas of vital concern. Some of Sukarno's policies, in particular his call in March 1961 for a second Afro- Asian Conference, did coincide with Chinese interests but Sukarno was not yet acting in collaboration with the
Chinese on this issue.
In March 1961 China's Foreign Minister, C h 'en Yi went to Djakarta for a visit that was designed mainly to
symbolise the end of the quarrel between the two states.
5
In his first statement in Djakarta C h 'en Yi hinted that Indonesia should not allow its obsession with West
Irian to prevent it from supporting liberation struggles elsewhere in the world that were clearly thought by
China to have a more far-reaching significance: We not only have our own tasks - China and
Indonesia both have territories, Taiwan and West Irian respectively, not yet liberated; we also have greater tasks: the national
liberation movement waged by our brothers in Asian, African and Latin American
countries need our help.^
Ch'en secured a friendship treaty at the end of his visit but if he had been looking for support of China's line on the struggle between the national liberation movement and 'US imperialism' he must have been disappointed. The joint communique issued after his talks with
Indonesian leaders stated that both countries supported 'each others anti-imperialist stand', but qualified this statement by linking it specifically to the Taiwan and West Irian issues. Indonesia gave its backing, as before,
to China's claim for admission into the United Nations and the communique vaguely denounced 'foreign
interference' in Laos and the Congo, but did not mention Algeria, which was also on the Chinese list of 'important
liberation struggles' at this time. However the two sides were able to agree on the one issue in which both had a
special interest: the convening of a second Afro-Asian conference. The Chinese press after the visit asserted that it heralded a 'new stage' in Sino-Indonesian
7
relations, but this was a standard formula and signified very little. One Chinese newspaper sounded a more
realistic note when it suggested that there were no
g
'insurmountable' differences between the two sides.
6 NCNA, 29 March 1961, SCMP 2470.
7 People's Daily3 4 April 1961, SCMP 2473.
g
A North Vietnamese newspaper thought that the Sino- Indonesian treaty added up to 'another defeat of US
9
imperialism in its attempts to isolate China' , which was in a limited sense true, but was also about the sum
of advantage that did accrue to China. In any case the Americans could not have been too alarmed by the visit. Foreign Minister Subandrio had earlier in 1961 expressed his belief to American Ambassador Howard P. Jones that China was the only real threat that Indonesia faced - a remark that he repeated on several subsequent
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