Obligaciones de los Intermediarios

with a group of Japanese socialists in which he declared 'There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union' and pointedly said, in reference to Soviet possession of former Chinese territories: 'We have not yet presented

81

our account for this list' was the most forceful Chinese contribution. Although America's increasing involvement in Vietnam ensured that it would not lose its position as

'principal enemy' of the united front, the expanding area of conflict between Moscow and Peking now placed Moscow in China’s enemy camp alongside US 'imperialism' and

Indian 'reaction'. The latter categories could be easily justified ideologically, although, as explained earlier, in at least the case of India Peking's stance was clearly a rationalisation of its border dispute with New Delhi.

However, there were two principal reasons why it was less easy to write the Sino-Soviet dispute into united front formulations. 'Reaction' had been a valid

secondary target of an international united front, since it emphasised the revolutionary objective of a united front dual policy and could easily be related to the

'struggle against the diehards' in the united front with the KMT. Attacks on 'revisionism' could not be justified in this way since the avowed objective of a broad united front policy was not to unite only those who agreed with every facet of Peking's world view but all forces except the principal enemy. Moreover, by the criterion of a state which did not feel itself threatened by Moscow, the USSR would belong to the 'progressive' or at least to the

'middle' section of the united front. Peking at first tried to explain the necessity of struggle against 'Soviet revisionism' by arguing that this weakened international

communism which was the core of the united front. Therefore, struggle within the Communist movement was essential if

8 2 the united front was to receive the correct guidance.

ibid. , p . 21. 82

A Comment on the Maroh Moscow Meeting, (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965), p. 31.

By February 1966, this had become a dogmatic assertion that struggle against Moscow virtually had priority for all over opposing the US.

Only by drawing a clear cut line of demarcation between oneself and the Khrushchev revisionists and by carrying the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism through to the end can one wage a successful struggle against US imperialism.

Since Peking was now urging opposition to a triple-headed monster - 'imperialism, revisionism and reaction' - this

tended to discredit its simultaneous appeal for the 'broadest possible' united front.

A second problem for Peking was that opposing

'revisionism' was of somewhat limited interest to the none 'core' members of the united front. To some of the

'progressives', such as the national liberation movements, it appeared counterproductive - a theme on which Moscow

84 played in its later calls for 'united action' in Vietnam. To the 'national bourgeois' and other 'middle forces', it was even less likely to appeal as a basis for unity than opposition to 'US imperialism'. It was this last factor which was most of all responsible for prompting the first significant 'adaptation' of the united front

doctrine.

Up until 1963, Peking had attempted to base its

foreign policy on a united front conception which allocated the leading role to Third World armed struggle and

secondary positions to radical Third World leaders, with any other forces involved in 'contradictions' with the US

Confessions Concerning the Line of Soviet-US

Collaboration Pursued By the New Leaders of the CPSU3

(Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966). 8 4

For Peking's reaction to the 'united action' proposal,

see Letter of Reply Dated March 1966 of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union3

envisaged as having supporting roles. This image had the chief advantage of being easy to reconcile with the dual purposes of a united front policy. It had the

difficulties of being unlikely to win support from the more conservatively minded Third World leaders,

particularly since they were liable to object to their transitional' status, and of being unable to cope with the new Soviet problem. The majority of Chinese

references to the international united front continued to employ this image until the start of the Cultural Revolution but from 1963 they were joined by a second line of argument. In February 1963 Liu Ning-yi, in a speech at the AAPSO Conference at Moshi, declared:

All countries, whether big or small, are equal and independent. The problems of the world must be solved jointly by all

countries of the world .... The attempt to decide major problems of the world and to manipulate the destiny of mankind by one or

two countries runs counter to the trend of times, and is against the interests of the people .... The countries of Asia and Africa as well as all peoples are firmly opposed 'to the big powers bullying and

oppressing and giving orders to the smaller countries.^ (Emphasis added)

There are several points of interest in this

statement. First it suggested as a possible 'principal enemy' of a united front not 'US imperialism' as such but a hierarchical international order dominated by a great power hegemony. Secondly, it implied both a

different basis for unity - opposition to hegemony - and a new emphasis on the role of nation states, rather than revolutionary movements in an international united front. Thirdly, although Liu specified only Afro-Asian countries, the phrase 'smaller countries' could of course have a far wider application. Fourthly, as the reference to 'one or two' great powers clearly implies, this was an attempt 85

to find a united front formulation which included the Soviet Union as a target. Fifthly, although the

conception of an international united front in terms of small state antagonism to great power hegemony could perhaps be explained as 'making use of contradictions' it was nonetheless an 'adaptation' of the united front doctrine in two ways. First it had the effect of giving the revolutionary objective of a united front dual policy a less prominent place in the united front's order of

priorities. Secondly, it suggested China's 'socialization' within the international system in the sense that it

reflected a concern with the traditional problems of the sovereign state and a tendency to look for their

solution in the conventional patterns of operation of the state system.

It should again be emphasised that, until 1969 when Liu's line was revived, it remained very much secondary to the formulation which saw 'US imperialism' as the

'principal enemy' and the national liberation movement as the key component of the united front and allocated a place to revisionism only as the 'collaborator' of US imperialism. It is possible that these two lines

reflected a basic disagreement amongst Chinese leaders over foreign policy issues, with, to use a somewhat hackneyed but in this case appropriate terminology, the latter position representing a 'radical' fundamentalist position and the former a 'moderate' adaptive one. As will be seen, these appeared to be the lines drawn in

Peking's foreign policy debate after 1969. For the moment, we shall return to Liu's line as it developed after

February 1963 until its temporary demise during the Cultural Revolution.

In July 1963, an article by 'Shih Ch'un' - a pseudonym also used by the author of an important

'moderate' series of articles on China's foreign policy 86

in 1972 - reintroduced the concept of the 'intermediate

"Shih Chun", On Studying World History (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1973).

zone' that had not been much employed since Lu Ting-yi's 8 7

1947 article. He wrote that the US was attempting to control the intermediate zone, 'a zone that also includes

88

the United States allies'. This was amended in January 1964 - in another 'adaptation' of the united

front doctrine - by a People's Daily editorial which announced the existence of two intermediate zones. The first consisted of 'the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America', while the second contained countries with a

'dual character' since their ruling classes were

simultaneously 'exploiters and oppressors' and striving 89

'to free themselves from US control'. Western European developments had been receiving continuous attention from the Chinese press throughout 1963 with, unlike the Soviet position, a note of guarded approval

for efforts towards Western European unity appearing in 90

many comments. The immediate context of the

'intermediate zones' thesis was the recognition of the PRC by France on 27 January, a few days after the

editorial was written.

It appears that the advocates of the new line had at least the partial support of Mao Tse-tung. On

12 January 1964, in a statement supporting the

'Panamanian people', the following call for an international united front was made:

"Shih Chun", 'Kennedy's "Peace Strategy" Conspiracy Exposed', Shih Chieh Chih Shih3 10 July 1963, SCMM, 12 August 1963.

88

ibi d .

Peking Review3 24 January 1964. 9 0

For example, in March 1963 Red Flag argued that the EEC should not be seen as a coalition of monopoly capital but as a coalition of governments and that it was primarily directed against the USA rather than the socialist

The people of the countries in the socialist camp should unite, the people of the

countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should unite, the people of all the

continents should unite, all peace-loving countries should unite, and all countries subjected to US aggression > control

intervention or bullying should unite, and so form the broadest united front to oppose the US imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace.91

(Emphasis added)

Two points may be briefly noted about this statement. First, it called for unity only amongst 'the people' of the socialist camp. Secondly, the phrase 'US aggression, control, intervention and bullying' indicates an attempt to establish a broader basis for the united front. The anti-Soviet implication of the new united front

formulation was even more strongly suggested when Mao was quoted as saying to a French delegation: 'If the

Americans quit Formosa, there is no reason why they should 92

not be our friends'. That this was probably an accurate report of what Mao said and that it was genuinely

intended to signal Peking's readiness to negotiate with the US may be inferred from a People's Daily editorial of 1 July 1964. This, after criticising US policy, claimed:

However, China at all times exercised the greatest forbearance and restraint in the interest of relaxation of tension between the two countries. 9-^

and added that China had 'again and again' proposed that the two governments reach an agreement, on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence, on a US

'guarantee to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan'. No demands were made for US recognition of the PRC or for

oT

Peking Reviewj 17 January 1964. 92

New York TimeSj 21 February 1964. 93

American withdrawal from everywhere in Asia. Moreover, the US was only required to guarantee the eventual

94