INFRAESTRUCTURA, SERVICIOS Y DOTACIÓN DE RECURSOS

1.2.8 Islam, Islamism, and Democracy

Some argue that democracy and Islam are not compatible. This proposition, though, is derived solely from a special focus on the thoughts of radical Islamists who believe that “in Islam sovereignty comes from God, whereas in democracy it comes from human beings,” and that

“human beings cannot pass legislation that infringes on the moral principles of Islam and its

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traditions (Fuller, 2005: 39). In short, human beings cannot “make law” (ibid). Rather than asking whether Islam is compatible with democracy, the more appropriate question is to be: Is any heavenly religion compatible with democracy? All heavenly religions lack democratic foundations and are dogmatic when it comes to what the Truth is (ibid).

In their defence, modernist Islamists note that while all sovereignty is derived from God, God does not impose a certain form of state on people. Human beings are granted reason to choose the public policy that suits them, and to then formulate their state according to their understanding of how the teachings of Islam translate into practice. This is a process that is always open to interpretation (ibid: 40).

To be able to understand the phenomenon of Islamism in the Arab World, it is necessary first to understand what the term Islamist refers to. Fuller (2005: 38) defines an ‘Islamist’ as

“anyone who believes that Koran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet’s life, actions, and word) contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, and who tries to implement these principles in some way.” Islamists, however, vary in theory and practice. The definition given by Fuller may involve a wide range of Islamists that include both radical and moderate, traditional and modern, democratic and anti-democratic, Salafist (fundamentalist) and Ikhwanite (members of the Muslim Brotherhood) (ibid).

In the early twentieth century, democracy was viewed as a Western concept that is alien to Islamic thought. Initially, it was promoted by a limited group of Westerners who were criticised of lacking credibility and acceptability among ordinary people. Democracy, therefore, was seen as a “colonial” importation that threatened Muslim values and heritage (ibid: 43). Political thought in Islam, however, has always appreciated justice and considered it a precondition for good and stable governance. Islamists in the twentieth century were the first to criticise the idea that oppression is preferable to anarchy – a principle that dates back to the Mongol invasion of Muslim lands. They started to ask rulers to be just and fight corruption. They believed that the “tyrannical state should be resisted” and that if a ruler was unjust, he would lose legitimacy to rule and should be overthrown, even by force (ibid: 44). In fact, Islamists have developed a parallel order to Western democracy – a system that includes some democratic values including checks and balances, establishing an intellectual mechanism to expel unjust and illegitimate rulers.

Islamist acceptance of democratic values has been enforced by the realisation that Islamists themselves would benefit from the consolidation of democracy and human rights. After all, they are, like other political forces, “victims of arbitrary authoritarian rule and extralegal punishment by the state” (ibid). The Muslim World in the twentieth century was ruled by autocratic regimes that formulated a certain model for political life – a model aimed at

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weakening and marginalising alternative political positions. Such a model included methods like holding presidential referendums instead of elections, dishonest elections, arbitrary banning of Islamic parties, frequent detention of leading Islamist politicians on the eve of elections, media censorship, and “government denial of airtime to opposition elements on government-controlled” channels (ibid: 46). For Islamists to be part of the political game, they had to abide by the rules designed by the oppressive state. Some radical movements, however, rejected the methods imposed by the state and resorted to armed struggle against oppression.

Many Islamist movements demonstrated a willingness to establish political parties in order to participate in the political process where permitted. Although they have always remained in opposition, Islamist parties since the 1940s have participated in parliamentary elections. They have formed coalitions with secular, pan-Arabist and left-wing parties, and have taken part in several governments in some Muslim countries such as Sudan, Jordan, and Yemen (Khanfar, 2011).

The oldest and most influential of all Islamist movements and parties is the Muslim Brotherhood. They have been cited as leading “the way with the establishment of political parties in most Arab countries, under a variety of different names” (Fuller, 2004: 49). In Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Yemen, and other Arab countries, the Muslim Brotherhood has shown interest in working with other parties. In order to reach their goals, they have shown interest in working with communist and socialist parties, regardless of disparity in ideology.

Another important experience has been the political activity of the Turkish Justice and Development party (AKP) which has won every parliamentary election since 2002 onwards, managing to form the government. The AKP has been a source of inspiration for Islamic parties in the Arab World, leading a successful model based on three characteristics: “a general Islamic frame of reference; a multi-party democracy; and significant economic growth” (Khanfar, 2011). Although they remained restricted, these participations by different Islamic parties have enriched the political experience of Islamists. They have had a profound impact on the flexibility of Islamism and its ability to play politics.

Fuller (2005: 52) observed key developments within Islamist political thought in the Arab World:

 Understanding the relevance of democracy and the benefits available to Islamists when they call for a democratic system

 Readiness of many Islamist parties to cooperate with other parties to achieve “common goals”, regardless of ideological considerations.

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 Growing awareness of political, social and economic realities as well as the realisation that Islamic slogans alone will not suffice in finding “concrete answers to concrete questions”

 Greater intellectual, theoretical and ideological development within Islamist thought itself

 An increased pragmatism and realism due to accumulation of experience

 Renunciation of violence by the majority of Islamist parties

Political Islam faced relentless pressure from dictatorships in the Arab World, resulting in profound bitterness felt by Islamist activists who were suppressed, imprisoned, and tortured.

Despite this, some of those activists actually became members of parliament, ministers, and even presidents (as in the case of former Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi). Shortly after a promising, yet temporary, democratic transition was achieved in some countries of the Arab Spring, namely Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, Islamist parties made their way to parliament and government. With 42 female members, an-Nahda, the most prominent Tunisian Islamist party, represented a progressive model for women’s participation in the National Constituent Assembly. Its leaders reassured Tunisian citizens that the party “will not interfere in their personal lives and that it will respect their right to choose” (ibid).

For any political process to have a meaningful impact in the Arab World, many argue that Islam should be included. Excluding Islamists will not lead to a fair and sustainable political process. The reality is that Islamism is widely popular among the Arab people. This was evidenced in the results of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly election shortly after the revolution. An-Nahda won 41% of the seats in 2011, and then won the parliamentary elections of 2011 and 2014. Islamists even won the Egyptian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012. The region has suffered as a result of excluding Islamists and denying their right to participate in the public sphere.

Although Islamist participation in governance has given “rise to a number of challenges” on both domestic and external levels, Islamists have shown willingness to make concessions (ibid). Arab societies need the participation of all political powers, regardless of their electoral weight. It is the “interplay” between Islamists and others that can “guarantee the maturation of the Arab democratic transition ... and stability that has been missing for decades” (ibid).

Nevertheless, the Islamist participation in the democratic process unfortunately experienced a setback following what was labelled by many political forces in Egypt and the world as a military coup against the first freely elected President Muhammad Morsi. The coup was led by the then Minister of Defence Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Even the outbreak of a new civil war in Libya was a result of the deep-rooted conflict between the Islamists and secularist powers.

40 1.3 Towards an Arab Spring

Although an Arab spring seemed unattainable in the early 2000s, it became inescapable ten years later. A number of factors influenced the peoples’ awareness in the region and changed popular attitudes: lack of political reform, socio-economic decline, and the media revolution.

1.3.1 Lack of Political Reform

While most of the Arab leaders before the Arab Spring came to power by promising democratic initiatives, they eventually fell back on the instruments of full or liberalised autocracies. For decades, they failed to develop genuine democratic systems. Their security forces and intelligence agencies widely and extensively violated human rights. Civil organisations were systematically undermined through inclusive and/or exclusive strategies. Although in some Arab countries, civil and Islamist organisations were allowed to play an active role in the political process, any participation remained under the control of the state. The Arab autocrats found themselves dealing with the negative consequences of partial political reform.

Ideological confusion, weak legitimacy, increased civil conflict, and “transitions to nowhere”

all developed as a result (Brumberg, 2005: 29).

These Arab dictators, however, sustained their rule by manipulating different groups and adopting ever-changing ideologies. They played different roles: rich businessmen, liberal thinkers, army officers, tribal sheikhs, and imams (religious leaders). This confusion resulted in an “ideological mishmash” that had “no single direction” (ibid). In fact, all they sought was blind and absolute obedience by all the society’s components. They “demanded that all groups – secular, liberal, Islamist, leftist, or ethnic – accept the king or the president’s ultimate authority” (ibid).

Mubarak’s regime in Egypt permitted the activism of Islamist Salafists and Sufis. At the same time, it paved the way for the control of businessmen by a number of pieces of legislation that facilitated their activities. The Alawite-dominated Assad regime in Syria has aligned itself strategically and politically with the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran, despite previously boasting its secular Arab nationalist ideology. At the same time, it has paradoxically favoured loyal Sufi Sunni scholars in Damascus and Aleppo.

The Arab regimes repeatedly worked to nurture civil conflict within society. They generated weak parliaments that lacked political maturity and rarely represented the electorate. These institutions were thus not able to fairly represent existing ideologies and political forces, including Islamists. Instead, they followed the autocrats’ choices. The only way to solve the

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dilemma was to “have a real democracy – one that would force the population to choose between competing identities,” or compel rulers to “offer a new vision of national unity” (ibid:

30). The Arab autocrats, however, chose to hold onto the life raft of partial inclusion, or even worse, full exclusion. This was preferred over taking a bold move towards full democratisation.

They failed to adopt a power-sharing pattern that would bring a measure of stability. As a result, they often de-liberalised political life by “using the many tools of repression at their disposal” (ibid). These choices, of course, only widened the gap between regime and opposition, further undermining the legitimacy of the Arab autocracies and paving the way for an Arab Spring.

Lack of political reform led to “transitions to nowhere”, as argued by Brumberg (2005: 30).

The Arab regimes went through an “unstable cycle of opening and closing, liberalization and deliberalization” (ibid). The bumpy progress of this cycle depended on the amount of external or domestic threats they received. Whenever their national security was under threat, they retreated and gave up all reform initiatives they had previously made. Bashar Assad’s advent in Syria was initially promising; he opened the door to political forums and allowed political opposition activists to hold assemblies and make statements in what was called Rabīᶜ Dimašq (“Damascus Spring”) which, according to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015), was “characterized by the establishment of informal political forums that were held to encourage the open discussion of political and civil society issues and reforms.”

These “salons” or muntadayāt (“forums”) “along with the formation of the Committees for the Revival of Civil Society in Syria demonstrated the popular demand for political and judicial reform” (ibid). However, once his rule was threatened following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Bashar Assad ended the Damascus Spring and arrested its members. This constituted a major setback for political and economic reform and a revival of the father’s repressive policies.

In fact, the Arab regimes did not show a willingness to cooperate with the opposition to form a genuinely democratic system based on a common set of experiences and aspirations. The Arab regimes were snared in “marḥala intiqāliyya mustamirra (endless transition)” that eventually robbed the young Arab generation of all hope of a new era of reconciliation, openness, and real reform (Brumberg, 2005: 31).

42 1.3.2 Socio-Economic Decline

For three decades before the Arab Spring, the Arab World distinguished itself by remaining largely authoritarian, spurning the global trend towards democracy. At the same time, it had languished in economic stagnation and lassitude. While global economies increasingly adopted the logic of “market-driven reform” and “export-oriented growth”, the Arab economies before the revolutions seemed unenthusiastic about enacting genuine reform. They excluded themselves from the benefits and advantages of economic globalisation, falling behind other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia with regard to economic growth (ibid: 131).

Economic decline and recession have plagued the Arab World since the mid-1980s. The Arab economy has turned into a “global loser”, falling behind other economies that were previously classified as less developed in growth rates (ibid: 132). In most Arab countries, overall growth rates have stagnated and gross national products have hardly coped with population growth.

Unemployment has continued to climb. The governments have failed to create enough jobs to cope with demographic demand. This has resulted in the unemployment rate exceeding 25 per cent region-wide (ibid). Investment levels have dramatically declined. Fiscally strapped economies have gradually returned to relying on the public sector, and private investments have not been sufficient to compensate for the shortfall.

Capital flight has become a ceaseless chronic disease. Not feeling secure, Arabs held an estimated “$100-500 billion in savings abroad”. Governments have been unsuccessful in attracting foreign capital to invest in the region (ibid). Productivity levels have decreased.

Lacking in motivation, Arab products and labour have become less competitive in the global market. This has resulted in “rising international indebtedness” and increasing debt overhang (ibid). Poverty has constituted a challenge. By the end of the twentieth century, above 30 per cent of the Arab population was estimated to live below the poverty line, despite the reputation of the Arab World for extensive family and state-sponsored social solidarity. In short, the Arab World before the uprisings was a “region of deteriorating living standards and persistent economic anemia” (ibid).

The Arab regimes tried to carry out partial reforms that often exacted long-term costs. They opened the door to the private sector to make investments. They, however, left “public sector industries largely intact,” thus creating a “dualistic economy” whose arguably incompetent public sector employees and bureaucracies have continued to cost the state millions of dollars (ibid: 28). Bureaucrats were left in charge and the subsequent hike in administrative and

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financial corruption hindered the private sector from investing more in productive forms of trade and industry.

The Arab autocrats established and/or supported new private businesses that became the real money-makers. These businesses made quick profits from the real-estate sector, telecommunications industry, “import (or smuggling) of luxury and consumer goods, and currency speculation” (ibid). In most cases, they partially or completely owned these businesses. In fact, partial economic reform in the absence of democratisation cannot ensure transparency or even lead to economic development. The cronies of the Arab ruling elites denigrated capitalism.

Such explicit profit making only fed the general public’s resentment, thus stoking the flames of revolution against repression and injustice. This provides an insight to the story behind a slogan that was inscribed on many banners held up by the Egyptian protests in al-Tahrir Square during the January 25^th Revolution: ᶜayš (“bread”), ḥurriyah (“freedom”), ᶜadālah ‘ijtimāᶜiyyah (“social justice”).

The overwhelming feeling of social injustice was nurtured by nepotism in the case of Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia. The fact that they had ruled for so long was a catalyst for the protests. Mubarak’s plans to follow in the footsteps of Syria and have his son Gamal become his successor was especially vexing. Social injustice, unemployment, and underemployment created masses of young, mostly educated, people prepared for action, moved by general frustration. The motivation behind the revolution had never been too clear or foreseeable. The initial act of self-mutilation in Tunisia was perhaps triggered by economic reasons, but the development into a popular uprising with political demands was an underlying social issue.

The outcome of the Palestinian question, and the American invasion of Iraq, along with many other disappointments, swelled “the wave of dismay” and turned it into a strong “agent of change” (Pappé, 2005: 309).

1.3.3 The Media Revolution

Since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, it has been obvious that electronic media and its repeated innovations have been the sphere where Arab political activists, journalists, and even ordinary people could interact and express their views and opinions. Radio and television, however, were strictly controlled by government censorship.

They were monitored carefully to not touch upon political and social sensitivities. With the

“relative stabilisation” of the regimes in the region, these media outlets were permitted to

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expand and allowed “satire and comedy in their programmes as well as more open debates on current issues” (Pappé, 2005: 295).

In spite of widening the margins for more creativity, as well as the privatisation and capitalisation of channel ownership, government monopolies and state supervision over the news industry continued. While the Arab governments regarded the seizure of media outlets as a means to confront external and domestic security challenges and a necessity to protect national security, the opposition considered the media as “a tool in the hands of oppressive regimes” (ibid).

The introduction of satellite TV in the 1990s was a quantum leap in the media industry that changed the face of the Arab World. By the end of the twentieth century, telecommunication technology invaded cities as well as the countryside in the Arab World; satellite dishes covered building rooftops, even entering local households in rural areas. Official media outlets were subject to strict state control as the state seemed unable to cope with a rapidly globalising Arab World. The media were restricted in their news coverage, presenting mostly official ceremonies and news bulletins that solely reflected government views (ibid: 296). In 1996, al-Jazeera was launched in Qatar as the first twenty-four-hour news station. It hosted “forum debates on democracy and broadcast[s] from everywhere in the Arab World” (ibid: 297). Civil society and human rights organisations in the Middle East now had a platform. In his article

The introduction of satellite TV in the 1990s was a quantum leap in the media industry that changed the face of the Arab World. By the end of the twentieth century, telecommunication technology invaded cities as well as the countryside in the Arab World; satellite dishes covered building rooftops, even entering local households in rural areas. Official media outlets were subject to strict state control as the state seemed unable to cope with a rapidly globalising Arab World. The media were restricted in their news coverage, presenting mostly official ceremonies and news bulletins that solely reflected government views (ibid: 296). In 1996, al-Jazeera was launched in Qatar as the first twenty-four-hour news station. It hosted “forum debates on democracy and broadcast[s] from everywhere in the Arab World” (ibid: 297). Civil society and human rights organisations in the Middle East now had a platform. In his article