tions, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB, or Committee for State Security), was the chief Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence entity during the COLD WAR. It was the largest espionage organization in world history. It was established in 1954, and before it was disbanded with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the KGB’s reputation as a ruthless secret police force achieved almost mythic proportions. In his book Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World, Loch Johnson describes the KGB as “fearsome in [its] aggres- sive capabilities,” exampled by countless instances of murder, torture, and threats of both. Fearsome it was; as the organization’s presence was felt it every level of Soviet society and in practically every region of the world that experienced political unrest.
Like the CIA, the KGB was tasked with maintaining a vast network of spies and information analysts. Unlike the CIA, the KGB’s jurisdiction was both domestic and foreign. The committee maintained internal political-enforcement officers, security forces, assassination squads, and border troops, equipped with tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, ships and boats, and specially trained combat units.
The KGB was vast in size (estimated at over 750,000 personnel at peak strength in the late 1980s), and its responsibilities extended far beyond those of its counter- part organizations in the West. The KGB was tasked with all of the primary functions of the CIA, but it also carried out the duties required in the United States of the NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA), the Secret Service, and the Marshals Service, as well as many functions of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), the Customs Service, the Parks Service, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE and security units of the armed forces; the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the state police agencies of all 50 states.
As a committee with ministerial status, the KGB oper- ated on the basis of a statute, or polozhenie, approved by the Soviet Council of Ministers (the equivalent of the U.S. cabinet). The polozhenie set forth the KGB’s authority and responsibilities, but it was never published. Over time, however, the functions of the KGB were revealed by
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defectors to the West, Soviet DOUBLE AGENTs, and field officers working for the CIA and Britain’s MI6. Informa- tion on KGB projects and capabilities were also revealed through official Soviet publications, which either gleaned information through their own sources or secretly released it as a means of instilling in others a respect for the committee’s power.
Generally speaking, KGB tasks lay in four broad areas: 1. Addressing the problem of foreign spies and agents 2. Exposing and investigating the political and eco-
nomic crimes of Soviet citizens 3. Protecting Soviet borders 4. Protecting Soviet secrets.
Officially, the KGB was directed by a chairman, one or two first-deputy chairmen, and five to six deputy chair- men. The chairman of the KGB, the equivalent of the CIA’s DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI), was selected by the Politburo (the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, the premier poli- cymaking body of the Soviet Union) and formally appointed by the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet legislative assembly).
Key decisions of the KGB were made by the Collegium, a panel consisting of the KGB chairman, first deputy and deputy chairmen, select chiefs of directorates, and selected chairmen from individual republic KGB organizations.
The KGB was organized into five chief directorates, sev- eral unnumbered directorates, and various departments, including:
• The First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence). This directorate was the committee’s primary espionage arm. As such, it was the directorate most often intended when outsiders refer to the KGB. This directorate was tasked with collecting and analyzing all political, scientific, and technology-related foreign intelligence; foreign counterintelligence; recruiting and training covert operatives and foreign agents; disseminating foreign propaganda and disinforma- tion; and providing support for international terror- ism. Simply put, all international clandestine activities—with the exception of the military intelli- gence gathered by the GLAVNOYE RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVLENIYE, or GRU—were under the umbrella of the First Chief Directorate. This directorate also maintained an elite Spetznaz (Voiska Spetzialnogo Noznochenia, or special-mission troops) commando unit, comparable to U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Teams or Great Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS). • The Second Chief Directorate (COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE). This directorate was responsible for all domestic counterintelligence and internal security, including hunting for foreign spies and domestic
traitors, as well as working with the other agencies to defeat organized crime and drug trafficking. • The Third Chief Directorate (Military Counterintel-
ligence). This directorate was responsible for ensur- ing the loyalty and security of all armed forces personnel in the armed forces, as well as providing physical security for nuclear weapons.
• The Fourth Directorate (Transportation). This direc- torate was responsible for all transportation security matters.
• The Fifth Chief Directorate (Ideological). This direc- torate, also known as the “Directorate to Defend the Constitution” and as “Directorate Z,” was responsible for monitoring and repressing Soviet dissidents, and eliminating threats of sedition. Special operational departments within this directorate specifically addressed religious dissent, ethnic minorities, the artistic community, and the intelligentsia, as well as the censorship of any literature that failed to toe the party line. Many of its tasks overlapped the responsi- bilities of the Second Chief Directorate.
• The Sixth Directorate (Economic Security). This directorate was responsible for enforcing financial and trade laws, as well as guarding against economic espionage.
• The Seventh Directorate (Surveillance). This direc- torate provided to other chief directorates and directorates personnel for physical surveillance pur- poses. Much of this work was centered around Moscow and Leningrad, where tourists, diplomats, foreign students, and members of the Soviet intelli- gentsia were concentrated. It also maintained an antiterrorist team.
• The Eighth Chief Directorate (Communications). This directorate was responsible for intercepting, monitoring, and analyzing foreign communications; designing CODEs and safeguards to secure Soviet communications; and running the telephone system used by the highest levels of the Soviet government. Some of these tasks overlapped the responsibilities of the 16th Directorate. The Eighth Directorate also maintained a subdirectorate (the Communications Troops Directorate) of 16,000 communications sol- diers. It was considered the counterpart of Amer- ica’s NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY(NSA).
• The Ninth Directorate (Guards). This directorate was responsible for guarding high-ranking party offi- cials, government leaders, and foreign dignitaries. It also provided uniformed security details for Lenin’s Tomb, the Kremlin, and other key state posts. • The 10th Directorate (Archives). This directorate
was responsible for maintaining KGB archives. • The 12th Directorate (Electronic Surveillance). This
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maintaining, and monitoring electronic eavesdrop- ping and telephone bugging devices within the Soviet Union.
• The 15th Directorate (Bunkers). This directorate was responsible for providing security at government installations and administering Soviet underground command and control facilities, as well as nuclear- weapons storage sites.
• The 16th Directorate (Communications Security). This directorate was responsible for providing Soviet communications security. Its tasks often overlapped the responsibilities of the Eighth Chief Directorate. Several other directorates and departments (some last- ing only briefly) existed under the KGB umbrella, includ- ing the Information Analysis Directorate (which reported directly to top KGB officials) and the Border Guards Chief Directorate (nearly 250,000 troops, with an array of boats and aircraft, organized into nine frontier districts).
The KGB traces its lineage back to the Cheka (or Vse Cheka), a Russian acronym for Vse-Rossiyskaya Chrezvy- chaynaya Komissiya po Borbe s Kontrrevolutsiay i Sabo- tazhem—the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage. The Cheka was created on December 20, 1917, during the early period of the Bolshevik (predecessor of the Russian Communist Party) government. Earlier that year, Marxist revolutionary leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had ordered the elimination of the Okhrana, the czarist intelligence and security service. Under Lenin’s supervision, most Okhrana officers were arrested and executed without trial. Some were recruited into the fledgling Cheka.
Not long after, Leon Trotsky, Lenin’s fellow Bolshevik and occasional political rival, formed a military intelli- gence service known as the GLAVNOYE RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVLENIYE (GRU), the Chief Intelligence Administra- tion. The Cheka, which viewed the GRU as a rival, demanded and won the right to screen all potential GRU officers and agents. The Cheka was also allowed to place its own officers in the GRU. Trotsky and the Soviet gener- als objected to the arrangement but were overruled by the party leadership.
In 1918, the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD, the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was established. This agency was responsible for provid- ing police officers and detectives, border troops, prison guards, and firefighters. On February 8, 1922, the Cheka was incorporated into the NKVD, which itself was reorga- nized and renamed the Gosudarstvennoy Politicheskoye Upravleniye (GPU), the State Political Administration.
When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was officially formed in 1923, the GPU was removed from the NKVD, organized as an independent directorate, and renamed the Obedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politich-
eskoye Upravleniye (OGPU), the Unified State Political Administration.
In 1934, the OGPU was returned to NKVD control and renamed the Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (GUGB), the Chief Directorate of State Security. In early February 1941, the GUGB was removed from the NKVD and given people’s-commissariat status, thus creating the Narodnyi Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (NKGB), the People’s Committee for State Security. This organization was responsible for conduct- ing foreign intelligence gathering and domestic counter- intelligence, seeking out and eliminating sedition, and protecting top party and government officials.
In an odd transitional period that clearly demonstrates the former Soviet government’s internal instability, the NKGB’s people’s-commissariat status was removed in June 1941. The organization was again named the GUGB and placed under the direction of the NKVD. The justification for this was that the German army had attacked, and the very existence of the Soviet government was threatened. By returning the NKGB (GUGB) to the NKVD, the party and the government gained tighter control over internal security.
In the spring of 1943, when the war’s tide turned in favor of the Soviets, the GUGB was once again removed from NKVD control and renamed the NKGB. In 1946, the Soviet government underwent a major structural reorgani- zation. All people’s commissariats were elevated to ministry status. Consequently, the NKGB became the Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (MGB), the Ministry of State Security, while the NKVD became the Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD), Ministry of Internal Affairs.
On March 6, 1953, the day after the death of Soviet premier Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, the MGB and MVD were combined as the MVD. On March 13, 1954, the organization was again split into two bodies. The MVD retained its original “NKVD” internal security responsi- bilities. The MGB lost its ministerial status but was desig- nated a “state committee attached to the Council of Ministers” and renamed the KGB. Despite its subordina- tion to the council, the KGB was granted far more auton- omy than most other state entities and, to a large degree, was able to operate independently of the council.
Twenty-five years later, on July 5, 1978, the KGB was renamed the “KGB of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” and accorded ministerial status.
On August 21, 1991, the KGB attempted to overthrow the Soviet government. KGB Spetnaz units were ordered to storm the Russian parliament building and seize a number of key Soviet leaders. Several senior commanders refused to obey the order, the operation failed, and the instigators were arrested. As a result, on October 24, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed a decree that abolished the KGB.
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The activities of the First Chief Directorate were immediately reestablished as the Tsentralnaya Sluzhbza Razvedkyi (TsSR), the Central Intelligence Service. The Eighth Chief Directorate and 16th Directorate were folded into the Federalnaya Agenstvo Pravitelstennoy Svayazi i Informatsii (FAPSI), the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (the equivalent of the NSA). The Ninth Directorate was folded into the new Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrani (FSO)—the Federal Protective Service—and the Prezi- dentskaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (PSB). The PSB, the Presidential Security Service, is the equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service.
After falling under two short-lived government entities, Second, Third, and Fifth Chief Directorates and the Sev- enth Directorate were combined to form the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), the Federal Security Service.
On December 18, the TsSR was dissolved, and the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossii (SVR), or Russian For- eign Intelligence Service, was established. The former TsSR’s activities were folded into the SVR. The SVR is the equivalent of the American CIA, Great Britain’s M16, and Israel’s MOSSAD.
Unlike its KGB predecessor, the First Chief Direc- torate, the SVR is an independent agency. As such, it reports directly to the Russian president.
Kryptos
Located in the northeast corner of the new CIA headquar- ters building courtyard at the GEORGE BUSH CENTER FOR INTELLIGENCEis a sculpture entitled Kryptos.
The sculpture, by Washington, D.C.–based artist James Sanborn, incorporates a number of themes, from Native Americana to North American geology to the art of information gathering and the science of cryptology. The piece consists of a large S-shaped sheet of copper emerg- ing from a red granite slab. A “special message” of some 2,000 encoded letters has been cut into the sheet, sug- gesting a paper printout from a computer.
Kryptos was dedicated on November 3, 1990.
KUBARK
KUBARK is the CIA cryptonym for the Agency’s head- quarters in LANGLEY, VIRGINIA.
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