From the very beginning the Awami League had been predominant� an East Pakistani party in its programme, leadership, and base of support. After Suharwardy's death, none of its leaders was nationally known and equally acceptable to both the wings.
Indo-Pak Relations 2 7
So whatever attempts were made to make it an all-Pakistan party were not successful. Its powerful secretary, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman ,
was nationally known, but due to his strong commitment to East Pakistan's autonomy he got very little sympathy and support in West Pakistan. Besides, the East Pakistan Awami League had been the champion of the Bengali rights and advocated full regional - autonomy--a goal which the leaders of the party from West Pakistan could hardly endorse wholeheartedly.
East Pakistani leaders decided against trying to be a
national party and opted· to work on ·a regional Ieve1.46 The 1 965
War with India reinforced this decision as Bengalis saw that they were defenceless in case India decided to invade East Pakistan. Shortly after the War, in. the spring of 1 966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahm a n Jaunched his famous Six-Point Movement. The Six points were as follow.s:
1 . A federal form of government would b e established.
2. ' and foreign policy, all other subjects being vested in The Federal Govenl.ment would · control only defence
the federating states.
3. Two separate freely convertible currencies would be
introduced for East and West Pakistan, or if a single
currerncy was maintained constitutional provisions would
be made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. There would be a separate banking reserve and a separate fiscal and m·onetary policy for East Pakistan.
4. The states would have exclusive authority to levy taxes,
federal expenses being met from a uniform percentage of all states' taxes.
5. Separate external trade accounts would be maintained
for each of the states, and foreign exchange earned from
external trade would be at their disposal. Federal foreign
exchange requirements would be met by the states on the basis of an equal percentage rate. Indigenous com mo dities would move between the states free of taxation or tariffs. The states would be allowed to maintain trade representatives abroad and to negotiate trade agreements with .other countries.
6 . A militia o r paramilitary forces, a n ordnance factory,
a military academy and the Navy headquarters would be set up in East Pakistan.
The party also advocated nationalization of the banks, insurance companies, heavy industries, foreign trade, t ransport,
shipping and other key industries; development of cooperative enterprise, workers ' participation in the management of industry;
exemption from land revenue tax on holdings up to 8 . L acres;
and cancellation of tax arrears on such holdings. Fundamental rights should be guaranteed by the constitution and should be limited only in war time. Pakistan should pursue an independent foreign policy, and should withdraw from SEATO, CENTO and
47 other military pacts.
This programme . of the Awami League, which got massive support in East Pakistan, was severely criticized by many West Pakistan leaders. 48 The Awami League thus became completely isolated from other parties of the West Wing with no hope for any cooperation in the future.
The election resul ts turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for the military leadership as 'well as for the oth�r political parties. AlthoLwh it had been generally anticipated that the Awami League would win a m ajority of the seats in East Pakistan, its success
in securing 75 percent of the votes and all but two of the seats ·
was totally unexpected. Even greater surprise was caused
by the success in West Pakistan of the Pakistan People's Par.ty }'lhich had been expected to win at the most forty seats.
The western leadership . found this outcome of the election results simply unacceptable. 49 It was feared that the Awami League, wl th its absolute majority in the
itself a programme for virtual East Pakistan from the control
National Assembly, would vote 50
self-government, thus removing of the central government. The weeks fo11owing the election were marked by a ·feverish contest of power that finally erupted into bloody conflict.
The East Pakistan Civil War: · The post election period in Pakistan brought three major powers to the forefront which had to dictate the course of the events in its history. The Yahya regime, the Awami League, and the People's Party were to find a solution of the problem which became difficult due to the divergent and conflicting nature of their policies. President Yahya Khan triggered ·the crisis when he announced the postponement of the National
lndo-Pak Relations 29
perceiving this as a deliberate attempt mandate for Bengali autonomy, launched disobedience.
to disregard popular a campaign of civil With the situation in East Pakistan deteriorating_ President Yahya Khan . on March 3 invited all the leaders of the parties and groups represented in the newly elected National Assembly to meet him in Dacca on March 1 0. This proposal was promptly rejected by Muj ib, who alleged that the army was shooting down unarmed Bengalis in the streets of .Dacca. 52 In response to this pressure, . Yahya Khan scheduled the date of the assembly session for March 26,53 but at the same time made arrangements for a massive
. 54
airlift of West Pakistani troops to East Pakistan. _
Sheikh Mujib at this point was under great pressure from
h 1 . d 55 H
the redicals of is own party to dec are mdepen ence. e
resisted that pressure for the time being and decided to adopt a middle course. He launched a nonviolent non-cooperation movemen t which gave him t!le opportunity to force the regi me to accept his terms. But while the regime was offering negotiating terms, violent clashes were going on between the army and the pe�ple in parts of East Pakistan, which made the acceptance of these terms difficult. Under this situation, Mujib got complete control of East Pakistan. "The whole of East Pakistani administration, even the Bengalis serving in central government agencies and in the civilian branch of the armed- forces, com plied with Mujib 's call for non-
. ,56
cooperatiOn.
Faced wi th Mujib's de facto assumption of power, Yahya Khan came to Dacca to talk with him in order to find the solution of the crisis. At this point negotiations were not easy to launch.
After five days of continuous talks, Yahya Khan and the Awami League agreed on a draft proclam ation to be issued by Yahya Khan for an interim arrangement for a transfer of power. The proposed proclam ation was according to the Mujib's four conditions:
the immediate cessation of martial law and transfer of power
to the five provinces, without such a transfer in the centre. It also provided for the division of the National Assembly into two com mittees to draft separate reports on the basis of which the
57
constitution would be formed. Autonomy was granted to East
Pakistan on the basis of the six points while the amount of autonomy for the four other provinces was left to mutual agreement. This was not approved by the People's Party and Bhutto issued very strong statements against this arrangement and considered it a great betrayal of West Pakistan. 58
Bhutto suggested direct negotia�ions with Sheikh Mujib but his request did not get any attention from the Awami League which was now under heavy pressure to declare independence as the non"'cooperation movement had completed its one month. The Awami League pressed the governmen� for quick acceptance of its draft proposal and warned that if it was not accepted within forty-eight hours it would be too late to bring peace . by
59 .
any other means. Events during the last day or so · of Yahya
Khan's stay in Dacca are still not quite known. Each side offered different versions of who betrayed whom. On the afternoon of March 25, President Yahya Khan flew back to West Pakistan. Upon his return to Islamabad, he denounced Sheikh Muiib's activities as "acts of treason. "60 He ordered the immediate arrest of Awami League leaders and directed the army to crush the secessionist movement and restore full authority to the central government. Thus was begun the civil war which led to the end of a united . Pakistan. On March 26,· 1 97 1 , a clandestine radio broadcast announced the proclamation by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awam i League of the "Sovereign Independent People's
. 6 1
Republic of Bangladesh."