The conceptual-contextual divide that characterises SSR indicates that this field shares common ground with the liberal critique of peacebuilding, and with a body of sceptical literature on a variety of other policies within the security-development nexus (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 48). This commonality is unsurprising given that, as is similar in emergent areas of knowledge and international policy initiatives, most SSR literature has been highly normative, subordinating reality to a desire to reform the world (Carr quoted in Griffiths 1999: 7). This prescriptive stance, despite being infused with the notion of
‘doing good’, has proven to be prejudicial because it relies on principles that are not (all) shared or awarded the same value by the actors implementing SSR. In addition, normative initiatives tend to be vulnerable to co-option by powerful actors that dominate the setting of international agendas (Pugh 2000:
6) and by domestic agents that define ‘national interest’.
6 The ‘Liberal Peace’ reflects an ideology that aims at the establishment of sustainable peace, with democratisation and economic capitalism as the pillars of stability that resolve and/or prevent armed violence. Development is the end-result of the liberal peace, which is advanced through a western-centered global governance system that implements a kind of internationalism based on institutionalism and state-building as tantamount to peacebuilding. The peacebuilding enterprise in the framework of the international liberal peace encompasses a series of ‘packages’ to be delivered, such as humanitarian aid, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, elections, human rights, transitional justice, rule of law, free trade and market economies (Richmond 2006, MacGinty and Richmond, 2007, Heathershaw, 2008).
The liberal peacebuilding critique focuses in particular on the contradictions and shortcomings of the current liberal peace model contribution to building post-war societies with the rights, freedoms, plurality and equality claimed by liberalism (Cooper et al 2011: 13). Whilst the liberal peace critique has roots in IR studies that questioned the nature of power and the way it shaped global structures (Cox 1981, 1987, Boulding, 1989), it also draws on contributions from peace and conflict studies, and adopts an interdisciplinary approach.
Therefore, a systematic understanding of the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding is offered, and the theoretical and power assumptions guiding such interventions are questioned. This framework is useful for Mozambique’s case study because it supports the unpacking of the neoliberal and modernisation canons that underpinned the country’s triple transition from war to peace, from a one-party state to a multi-party state, and from a centralised economy to a market economy.
Despite these strengths the liberal peace critique encompasses an exclusionary stance with regard to institutionalism.7 This is because institutionalism in its IR interpretation remains embedded in the analysis of the establishment, management and outcomes of organisations and regimes at the level of the international system and how these play out in light of state interests (Long 2002: 40-41, Duffield 2006: 642). Therefore, it does not confer
7 Institutionalism emerged from a variety of social science traditions. As rooted in liberal IR theory, it is grounded in the understanding that institutions and the norms accompanying them offer regularity and constancy, building predictability and confidence through the sharing of valuable information (Snyder 1999: 103-104). The theory further holds that institutions ought to be based on legitimacy instead of coercion, reducing transaction costs and helping to promote coordination and cooperation rather than conflict, by regulating distributional gains (Lynn-Jones 1999: 56, Duffield 2006: 643-645).
adequate attention to the agency of individual actors in the shaping of institutional structures. IR Institutionalism also misses the interactions that take place within the realm of the state when creating or reforming institutions.
Yet, elements of a dynamic approach to institutionalism are required to understand sequencing of institutional security reforms at the meso and micro levels in the case of Mozambique. As such, and within the spirit of an interdisciplinary approach, additional concepts were identified to guide analysis of the case study. These concepts are critical juncture and path-dependence, derived from historical institutionalism, and institutional bricolage, borrowed from sociological institutionalism.
This framework combining the critique of liberal peacebuilding with critical juncture, path-dependence and institutional bricolage provides for a nuanced investigation of security reforms in Mozambique. On the one hand, the framework enables the examination of historical circumstances and of the interaction of actors at both the national and international levels, mediated by power dynamics shaped by the global political economy. On the other hand, it facilitates analysis of the reactions of actors on the ground to a mostly internationally driven agenda such as SSR, and their capacity to shape outcomes at the local level. This is crucial because the results of the interactions between international, national and sub national actors deeply affect the coherence and sequencing of institutional security reforms that are at the core of this research.
The review of literature begins with a brief overview of SSR as it is presented in different IR paradigms, before engaging in analysis based on the liberal peace critique. Finally, the analytical framework drawn upon the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage is discussed with regard to its suitability to the case study on Mozambique.
2.1 SSR in the context of IR theory - A brief overview
The older paradigm of IR - realism - influenced by an objectivist worldview views SSR as a foreign-policy instrument utilised by strong states to either foster pro-status quo positions (Dalby 1997: 11) or to promote change in countries undergoing transitions. For example, engagement in SSR represents a way of displaying power through the build-up or maintenance of a prominent position as a player in global peacekeeping. Such endeavour is undertaken in the strong states’ own national interests as a means to keep instability at bay, and to legitimise a self-serving global configuration of power (Cox 1981: 127). In the multi-polar post-Cold War context SSR support follows intervention in countries involved in security and ethnic-related turmoil.
In such environments, the security dilemma is transposable to the reality of civil war (Posen, 1993), where internal state anarchy developed as a result of the loss of central authority. Hence, a major goal of support to SSR is to re-establish the monopoly of the use of force by the state, a logic that underpins the prevailing implementation of SSR through programmes centred on the provision of military training and equipment.
However, the conceptual origin of SSR can be placed within an IR liberal theory, more concretely underpinned by a pluralist approach. From this approach stem three main assumptions underlying SSR. The first underscores the relevance of other actors beyond the state, relinquishing the realist construct of a unitary state that rationally maximizes strategies for gathering power and political-military security in an anarchic environment (Krause and Williams 1997: 40-41, Lynn-Jones 1999: 54). In SSR this is materialised by acknowledging the existence of a tripartite state, including executive, legislative, and judicial components, while also recognising the role of non-state actors such as civil society, traditional authorities, and even private security companies.
The second assumption refers to a normative concern with the improvement of conditions of peace, including boosting global security and development (Keohane and Nye, 1977), for which ‘good’ states are required. Hence, the monopoly of the use of force by the state is maintained as a central and desirable outcome, explaining why many SSR programmes accommodate the train and equip approach with other institutional reform components.
The third assumption is the notion that interdependence leads to cooperation and that progress is achievable if solutions to conflicts are obtained through institutions, especially those multilateral in character (Keohane and Nye, 1977, Keohane, 1987). SSR as an instrument used in conflict resolution and
peacebuilding by multilateral organisations (and certain bilateral donors) incorporates a legacy of these assumptions.
Nonetheless, the underpinnings of the SSR concept in liberal theory do not translate into practice, and liberal theorists noted that implementation has been influenced by a neo-realist ideology, carried out in partial continuity with past practices. A central role continues to be accorded to the state in programming, with limited consideration awarded to the participation of non-state actors (Baker and Scheye, 2007, Abrahamsen and Williams 2008).
Furthermore, the fundamental importance given to oversight in the SSR discourse does not cohere with the current prevalence of technical military and defence assistance (Ball and Hendrickson 2006: 3). Hence, given the notorious dissonance between donors’ SSR rhetoric and implementation, liberal analysts call for finding alternatives to improve liberal peacebuilding (Paris, 2004, 2010).
Constructivism8 questions the possibility of improvement of liberal