Pragmatism was a dominant force in American philosophy during the first half of the
twentieth century. While there are few philosophers today who call themselves pure pragmatists, the movement has left an indelible mark on American philosophy. We will examine a distinctive theory of truth which grew up with pragmatism. It will be helpful in dealing with this theory of truth if we build our discussion around the three central figures in pragmatism—Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910), and John Dewey (1859–1952).
Charles Sanders Peirce
Peirce’s view of truth. Peirce (pronounced Purse) sought to relate truth to observable practices;
his understanding of truth was in contradistinction to that of Descartes. Descartes thought that a proposition was true when we had a clear and distinct idea of it. Peirce reacted to this
subjectivism, and rejected Descartes’s view. He felt that a proposition could seem to be clear and distinct without really being clear. Peirce’s theory of meaning, sometimes called the pragmatic maxim, bases the meaning of a proposition on the bearing it has on the conduct of our lives.
Peirce called his approach pragmaticism, and argued for a public understanding of truth. Truth could not be conceived apart from its practical relationship to doubts and beliefs within the framework of human inquiry. Metaphysical visions of truth such as those set forth by Spinoza and Leibniz were, for Peirce, in violation of Ockham’s Razor (p. 183).
Men and women search for belief; the search for truth is, in practice, the search for belief.
Truth is the consequence of the experimental method, and will ultimately be agreed upon by the scientific community.
Evaluation of Peirce. We shall say more about the identification of truth with practice in our discussion of William James. Suffice it to say here that a number of key notions in Peirce’s view of truth lack practical consequences; thus they too would presumably fall when examined under the principle of Ockham’s Razor. What is the experimental or practical difference between Descartes’s “absolute fixity of truth” and Peirce’s “opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to”?
These, however, are minor objections when viewed in light of the criticisms to be made of pragmatism’s central thesis that truth is related to practical consequences.
William James
Both William James and John Dewey sought to apply the pragmatic notion of meaning to truth. There was, however, a decided difference in the application and results achieved by each man, and in James’s hand Peirce’s method undergoes crucial transformation.
James’s view of truth. When Peirce talked about practice bearing on truth, he was talking about the results of the scientist or the experimenter. He claimed that only this sort of experience is important for our understanding of truth. Furthermore, said Peirce, experience is very general in nature, not particular. Given the scientific flavor and the public nature of his views, Peirce was interested in experience stated according to general rules or regularities for a group of observers.
Both of these views of Peirce were modified by James. First, James was interested in the particular and the concrete, as opposed to the general and abstract. Second, James’s
understanding of what constituted experience was quite different from Peirce’s. Rather than the results of the scientist, James was concerned with the effects of a belief in the private and personal life of the individual.
James defined the role of thinking in light of these concerns. The function of thought is not to imagine reality, but to produce ideas that will satisfy an individual’s needs and desires. Thought functions primarily as a problem-solver. In the area of science, truth is determined by verification, for such ideas are necessary to predict and to cope with experience. Thus, scientific truth meets the criterion of practical interest.
However, James said that scientific truth gives us no criteria for metaphysical and theological beliefs. Since meaning and truth are related to consequences, James argued that an individual could regard metaphysical and religious beliefs as true if they provided him with what James called “vital benefits.” Vital benefits are consequences that help an organism survive in its environment. Thus, according to pragmatic principle, if belief in God “works” satisfactorily for us, then we will be justified in believing it, and it will be true. James’s famous statement is that the true is “the expedient in the way of our
thinking,” just as the right is “the expedient in the way of our behaving.” In other words, truth is determined by consequences.
Objections to James’s view of truth. Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873–1962) were two of the most severe critics of James’s pragmatic theory of truth. First, both Russell and Lovejoy argued that the notion that something is true if it “works,” which is central to James’s view of truth, is ambiguous. Lovejoy pointed out that a belief may
“work” in two very different ways. We may say it works if predictions we make on its basis are in fact fulfilled. On the other hand, we may say that a belief works if it contributes to our motivation and effort.
But a belief may work in one of these ways and not in the other. Let us consider a
particular belief, that an extremely rich uncle loves us. On the basis of this belief we predict that we will receive great wealth upon his death. This belief may motivate us to do things for this uncle that we would not do otherwise, such as mowing his lawn. Likewise, it may help us in times of great poverty to endure the lack of earthly goods. But when this uncle dies, he may leave us out of his will, and we may not receive a penny. Thus our belief
“worked” to motivate and encourage us, but it did not “work” to benefit us financially.
Russell makes a similar point. When a scientist claims that a hypothesis works, he means that he can deduce a number of predictions that are confirmed in experience. However, these predictions or their results may not necessarily be good, and so may not “work” to benefit mankind.
Second, Russell claimed that James’s view of truth ignores the way we usually understand truth. Consider the following two sentences: “It is true that it is sunny out”;
and “It is useful to believe that it is sunny out.” If James is correct, then these two sentences are identical in meaning. When we believe one, we believe the other. There should be no transition in our mind from one to the other—but there obviously is. Therefore, the two sentences cannot be identical in meaning.
Moreover, on pragmatic grounds we will be bound to declare certain sentences true that we know on independent grounds to be false. Consider the case of a patient who comes to a doctor. The patient suspects cancer and is emotionally unstable because of this fear.
The doctor examines the patient and finds overwhelming evidence that there is cancer.
However, because the doctor feels that the patient either will refuse the needed surgery or will not do well in surgery, he tells the fearful patient that nothing serious is wrong.
Reassured by the words of the doctor, the patient goes through the surgery and recovers.
Telling the patient that nothing serious was wrong “worked.” But was it true? On pragmatic grounds we must say yes, but on independent grounds we know that it is not true.
Third, Russell argued that James’s notion of truth was, in practice, useless. To say that belief is true in light of the consequences, is to say that the results of holding it are better
than the results of rejecting it. But how can we be sure of the results of holding any belief?
We may underestimate or overestimate their effect.
John Dewey
Dewey developed a theory of truth which was in keeping with his pragmatic method, and may be identified with the phrase, “warranted assertibility.”
Dewey’s view of truth. Dewey began by pointing out that it is easy to subscribe to the belief that truth is a correspondence between an idea or statement and a fact. However, this can also be understood outside the context of inquiry, reflective thinking, and problem solving.
What does “correspondence” mean in practice? What is the relationship between ideas and facts in practice, that is, in the context of investigation?
According to Dewey, an investigation is always instigated by an initial state of doubt.
The doubt is real, not theoretical. One is uncertain about the surroundings. It is impossible to understand the use of ideas and facts unless we first understand the purpose in
undertaking the inquiry, that is, to answer doubt and uncertainty.
Serious inquiry begins with the formulating of one’s doubt into a problem. Within this context an idea is a possible solution to the problem. An idea is more than simply that which is directly perceived. It extends beyond what is perceived to what is (as yet) unperceived.
Facts, said Dewey, are used in inquiry to mark off or set what is secure and
unquestioned. Facts guide inferences by prompting new ideas, and new ideas promise new facts, which in turn verify the ideas. Facts are not abstract, and they always occur in the context of inquiry. Thus, the correspondence between ideas and facts comes from their working relationship in the context of inquiry.
Ideas, then, become true when their “draft upon experience” is verified by the promised facts. According to Dewey, truth is not antecedent to a context of inquiry. Furthermore, truth is a mutable idea. It “happens to an idea” when it is verified, or “warranted.”
Objections to Dewey’s view of truth. There are a number of problems concerning Dewey’s view of truth. First, it is argued that truth is certainly antecedent to its verification. Truth is not something that “happens” to an idea. It is not a time-dependent, acquired property.
Suppose, for example, that a crime is committed on Tuesday. On Friday we have enough evidence to place the guilt on Jones. The statement “Jones committed a crime” cannot be true on pragmatic grounds until Friday, but we know good and well that it was true on Tuesday. As a matter of fact, on Dewey’s interpretation we should not be able to convict Jones. “Jones committed a crime” is not true until Friday, and the crime was committed on Tuesday.
Both Rudolf Carnap and G. E. Moore attacked Dewey’s view of mutable truth. Carnap pointed out that there is a distinction between truth and confirmation. It does make sense to say that a statement is confirmed today, but not that it may be true today and not
yesterday or tomorrow. Dewey has merely confused truth with confirmation. To accept his view will ultimately lead to the surrender of the law of non-contradiction.
G. E. Moore, on the other hand, stated that there is only one way we can make a belief true. We will make the belief, “It will rain tomorrow” true only if tomorrow we have a part in making the rain fall.