SPIONs allow the selection of effectively transfected cells

If both equivocal and univocal descriptions are not viable forms of God-talk, as has been claimed by many critics, there remains only one alternative—analogy. But, as has already been indicated, analogous concepts reduce to agnosticism or else to univocal concepts. Where, then, does this leave us? In skepticism? As we will observe, skepticism is not the inevitable answer.

The Meaning of Analogous God-Talk

The answer seems to be a combination of univocal concepts and analogical judgments (or predication). That is, terms used of God must be defined the same (univocal) way but cannot be applied the same (univocal) way. In fact, before the terms can be appropriately applied to God, all finitude must be negated or purged from them. In short, the characteristic signified by the term is univocally understood, but the mode of signification (that is, the finite context in which we know the term) cannot be applied to an infinite God. For example, goodness as we know it is in a finite form (mode). Only when we purge from our concept of goodness the finite form or context in which we know it can we apply goodness as such to God. In short, what goodness is by its very nature can be appropriately applied to God, but how goodness is known by us cannot be applied to Him. Since we know goodness only in a finite mode, we must negate the finite

“package” and apply the pure perfection to God in an infinite way.

Criticisms of Analogy

The contemporary philosopher Frederick Ferre has laid down the basic criticisms of the use of analogy in religious language. He gives five arguments against it.

First, says Ferrë, why do analogists select some qualities from creation and reject others? Why not assume God is responsible for all characteristics found in creation? That is, why apply only goodness and truth to God? Evil and ugliness are also found in the world He made.

Second, Ferrë points out that any word torn from its finite context becomes entirely empty of meaning. Meaning is inseparably linked to the limited circumstances from which it arises. Therefore, no term can be applied to an infinite God without losing all of its significance.

Third, Ferrë argues that analogy rests on the unjustified philosophical assumption that an effect must resemble its cause. However, effects often do not resemble their causes.

Broken glass, for example, does not resemble the hammer that breaks it. Those who argue for a similarity between cause (God) and effect (world) overlook the fact that “cause” as understood in this world is finite and as applied to God means infinite. This is an

equivocation.

Fourth, Ferrë contends that analogy is based on an alleged similarity of beings. But since the similarity cannot be expressed univocally (for this would depart from analogy), and it cannot be expressed analogically (for this would launch an infinite regress, as Scotus showed), there is no basis for the alleged similarity of beings.

Others have stressed similar points against analogy. The most common objection is refutation by counter-example. It is argued that many effects obviously do not resemble their causes. Why, then, should we assume God is like the world He made? Mosquitoes cause malaria but do not resemble malaria. Hot water causes eggs to harden, but water itself is not hard.

Qualifications of Analogy

Before addressing the specific objections to analogy it may be helpful to note the limitations placed on analogy by some theists.

First, they insist that there is only a basis for analogy when there is an intrinsic causal relation, not simply an extrinsic one. Hot water has only an extrinsic relation to the

hardness in the boiled egg, but it has an intrinsic relation to the heat in the egg. Heat causes some things (such as eggs) to harden, but causes other things (such as wax) to become soft.

Since these are opposite effects, it is obvious that the relationship is only extrinsic, since a cause cannot possess opposite characteristics essentially. But since heat does communicate heat there is an intrinsic relation between the heat in the water and the heat in the egg.

Second, there is a basis for similarity between God and creatures only when the characteristic caused is essential and not merely accidental to the effect. For instance, musicians give birth to non-musicians (per accidens, that is, accidentally), but humans generate humans (per se, that is, essentially). It is accidental to one’s humanness whether he is tall or short but it is essential to humanness that one is a rational being. Therefore, there is no reason to attribute to the cause what is accidental to the nature of the effect, but it is necessary to attribute to the cause what is essential to the nature of the effect.

Third, according to some theists, an effect need not resemble an instrumental cause (that through which the effect comes to be). It does resemble, however, the principal

efficient cause (that by which the effect is produced). For instance, the student’s exam does not resemble his pen (instrumental cause), but it does resemble his mind (the principal cause).

Finally, an effect need not resemble the material cause (that out of which something is made) but only the efficient cause (that by which something is made). The sun causes clay to harden into bricks, but the sun is not a brick. Electrical energy produces light in a bulb, but the same energy produces motion in a motor. The result in each case depends on the material on which the cause operates.

Theistic Response

In view of these qualifications, the theist answers the objections as follows.

First, only some, not all, characteristics found in the world can be appropriately applied to God, because only some characteristics flow from the principal, efficient cause in an essential way. Other characteristics derive from instrumental or material causes, or else are merely accidental.

Similarly, God is spirit, but He creates matter. Matter is not like God (although it derives its reality from God), for it is limited in form and extension. Its physical limitations are essential to the very conditions of its creation.

Second, contrary to Ferrë’s claim, words do not lose all their meaning when abstracted from their finite conditions. Goodness as we know it is finite, but goodness as such is not. It is possible to define goodness (univocally) as “that which is desirable for its own sake,”

without any implications of finite limitations. That is, the quality signified can be unlimited, even though the mode of signification, or context, is limited.

It may be true, however, that some words do lose their meaning when all finite limitations are negated. An infinite rock, for example, seems impossible; the term rock appears to be empty and vacuous when all limitation is removed. The key to discerning which characteristics may be appropriately applied to God and which may not is this:

those positive qualities in the world that are not by their very nature limited can be applied without limitation to God. Since evil, ugliness, and the like are not positive qualities but the absence of good, beauty, and so on, these cannot be applied to God. Also, since material extension, limitation, and change are not by their very nature unlimited, neither can they be applied to God. However, truth, beauty, goodness, oneness, and so on, are not

necessarily limited. Hence, these may be applied to God.

Third, many theists argue that the effect (creation) does resemble the cause (God). The psalmist said, “The heavens declare the glory of God” (Ps. 19:1). Man was made in God’s

“image” and His “likeness” (Gen. 1:26). “Does He who implanted the ear not hear? Does He who formed the eye not see?” (Psalm 94:9, NIV). How can God give what He does not have to give? Can something come from nothing? Quite the contrary. If God has created intelligent beings then He must be intelligent. A transcendent Cause is more perfect than His effects; He cannot be less perfect. God is beyond human goodness, intelligence, and so on.

In short, if God is an actuality and if He actualizes (creates) the existence of other

things, then there must be some similarity between the actuality of God and His effects. For act communicates act; the cause stamps its “form” (that is, determinative perfection) on the effect. Everything in creation bears one or more of the perfections of God. The higher forms of creation (such as men) are more like God, and have more godlike perfections, than the lower forms (plants).

In all these alleged counter-examples, there is a confusion between some accidental characteristics of the effect (or the material condition, or the instrumental cause) and the essential nature of the effect. Mosquitos, for example, are not the cause of malaria, but only the instrument through which the parasite is passed. There is an essential similarity,

however, between the malaria parasite in the mosquito and the one in the malaria victim.

Malaria parasites do produce malaria parasites that resemble their progenitors. Likewise, the moving hammer communicates motion to the glass, which breaks. Motion creates motion. There is an essential similarity here, too, even though the broken glass does not look like the hammer. All causes stamp their “form” on their effects in some way.

Therefore, theists look around in the world to behold its perfections. Whenever one is found, it is stripped of its limiting connotations and applied to the infinitely perfect Creator of all good things (James 1:17).

Fourth, theists contend that they do not use the word cause in an equivocal way, as critics claim. Cause may indeed mean either infinite cause or finite cause. “Cause” as such, simply is “that which can produce or actualize something.” If the cause is itself in some way actualized, then it is obviously not an Uncaused Cause (or God). The Uncaused Cause, the theist claims, is infinite. All other causes are limited in some way. Only God is pure

actuality; He has no potentiality in His essence to become anything that is not already. All other things have the potentiality to not exist. For they are created and, hence, they can be annihilated.

In short, there is no equivocation on the term cause. There are simply different orders or kinds of causes. God is an unlimited cause; all other causes are limited. The word cause has the same meaning (univocal) in all cases, but is simply qualified as “unlimited” when used of God in contrast to man, who has only limited causal power.

Fifth, theists claim that the similarity of beings can be expressed or defined univocally.

All beings exist. The term existence is always defined the same way, namely, “that which

is,” or “that which is actual.” Beings are not held to be identical by theists (that would be pantheistic), for they believe that there are many beings, and these differ from each other.

Finite beings are similar to but different from the infinite Being, God. However, the term being (or more properly, “existence”) is univocally defined. The difference comes in the way the term is applied to God and creatures. God is Being in an infinite way, and creatures have being only finitely.

Other objections to meaningful God-talk have been expounded in contemporary

philosophical analysis. Two of them are worthy of note here. First, some object to applying action predicates to God, such as, “God caused Lazarus to rise” on the grounds that one cannot act without a body. This objection, however, is built on the unproven assumption that all causal action is exactly like physical causal action. On the contrary, there is

mentally caused action. Psychosomatic studies, as well as our own experience, would seem to indicate that our minds do cause action in physical objects.

A second objection from contemporary philosophy comes from the tradition of logical positivism. Some thinkers claim that the principle of empirical verifiability eliminates all meaningful God-talk (see chap. 2). The principle of empirical verifiability would limit all meaningful statements to empirical matters of fact. But since God is by definition a trans-empirical Being, this would imply that all God-talk is literally nonsense. There are many objections to this principle. Some have pointed out that it is too restrictive: it eliminates statements that are obviously meaningful even to empiricists (such as empirical

generalizations of science, like “all swans are white.” This is not empirically verifiable unless one observes all swans, a practical impossibility). Others have objected that the principle attempts to legislate meaning and not listen to it.

Conclusion

There are three basic views of the meaning of religious language. Some hold that terms applied to God have a totally different meaning (equivocal) than those applied to creatures.

Many within this group stress the negative nature of religious language. Others emphasize the symbolic and evocative role of religious language, as opposed to a purely descriptive function.

The second major position claims God-talk is univocal. Here the positive aspect of understanding God is stressed. Analogy, on the other hand, insists that no term can be predicated in a one-to-one, univocal way of an infinite God.

It appears that there is an element of truth in all these views. First, it seems clear that if we are to avoid total agnosticism about God, then all knowledge of God cannot be purely negative. There must be a positive element which is univocally defined. On the other hand, those stressing analogy are correct when they contend that no term can be taken from the finite context and conditions of human experience and applied to an infinite being in entirely the same way. This is where the truth of the via negativa comes in. Unless we negate all finite limitations of these terms and apply only the univocally understood context to God in an analogous way, we engage in verbal idolatry.

Finally, there is more to religious language than the purely descriptive; God-talk must be evocative. It must be not only talk about God, but talk from God that calls us to respond to God. The language of revelation must involve prepositional descriptions of God, or else we would not know to whom we are responding. But it must involve more than the mere prepositional; it must evoke a response to a Person (God). In short, adequate God-talk is

both talk about God (positive and descriptive) and talk which elicits from us a response to the transcendent God. In order to perform all these functions it must have both positive and negative elements as well as both descriptive and evocative functions.

Suggested Readings

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa contra Gentiles, book 1 Ferre, Frederick. Language, Logic and God Flew, Antony. The Logic of God

Geisler, N. L. Philosophy of Religion, part 3

Mondin, Battista. The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology Ramsey, Ian. Religious Language

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The Problem of Evil

Perhaps more controversy has been generated over the problem of evil than any other issue surrounding the question of God’s existence. Some claim evil disproves God’s

existence; others insist it proves His absolute perfection. We will proceed in our discussion with a survey of the various answers to the question of evil.