recommend that it be considered again at the following ATCM. Those principles
related to the use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes, the special responsibility of the
consultative parties to protect the Antarctic environment and ensure that no-one
engaged in activities contrary to the Treaty and an oblique reference to the "special
48. This issue was addressed under‘Any Other Business’. No mention of this discussion was made in the final report o f the meeting.
49. One participant (Edvard Hambro, who had headed Norway’s delegation to the 1972 Meeting and would be chairman o f the 1975 ATCM) expressed his irritation with the "great hesitation and reluctance in this field. This unwillingness to face the problem" he said "cannot go on much longer" (Hambro 1974:222).
50. The British cautioned against unilateral action by any Treaty party which could "damage the working of the Treaty" (ANT/17, 1972). They also believed that the problem could be approached without going into the jurisdictional question.
51. See Wallace (1988a:6). Chile favoured an indefinite moratorium, France (ANT/2, 1972) suggested at least 10 to 15 years, a position also supported by Argentina and the USSR. The United States was opposed to any prohibition on minerals activity. The draft recommendation tabled by the UK suggested that there be a moratorium until such time as any agreed measures might become effective and it was thought that world interests would not be harmed by such a moratorium.
177 situation" of the Antarctic (regarding the territorial issue).52 Orrego Vicuna (1988:48) called it a "timid attempt to spell out the legal foundations of the competence which was beginning to be exercised on the matter".
Nansen Meeting, 1973
An informal conference on Antarctic resources was convened at the Nansen Foundation in Oslo in 1973 to facilitate an "unofficial discussion ... of problems arising in connection with the growing interest in exploration of Antarctic mineral resources and potential exploitation of such resources" (Nansen 1973:1).53 Two working groups were convened at the Nansen meeting, one to consider legal and political questions, and the other to focus on scientific and technical aspects. Experts from all twelve consultative parties attended in their personal capacities.54
Minerals activity was accepted as a peaceful purpose under article I o f the Antarctic Treaty and therefore a legitimate issue for the Treaty agenda. A collective approach by the consultative parties was favoured over unilateral action.55 There were, however, differing opinions on whether minerals activity was implicitly permitted or prohibited under the Antarctic Treaty.56 Differences on the degree of urgency with which decisions had to be made were not resolved.
The Scientific and Technical Working Group concluded that unless the Treaty Parties decided to prohibit minerals exploration and exploitation altogether, there was some urgency in negotiating regulatory mechanisms. The group suggested that the "present relatively undisturbed state of the Antarctic environment rendered its continued protection a matter of greater rather than lesser importance" (Nansen 1973:9). The severe environmental hazards of extracting Antarctic oil and gas were argued to be so great as to be out o f proportion to the small gain in energy in world terms. Some participants expressed the "philosophically attractive" view that if the prospect of a world energy crisis was as bleak as some portrayed it then the world’s scientific
52. This recommendation also referred to technological developments and the need for further study and deliberation.
53. The invitation from the Nansen Foundation to convene this meeting had been confirmed by the Norwegian delegation at ATCM-VII.
54. The meeting lasted from 30 May to 9 June 1973.
55. The Nansen meeting rejected the idea o f either a condominium or the common heritage approach (see Shapley 1985:158-160).
56. Some participants in the Legal and Political Working Group argued that, as minerals exploitation was not expressly permitted, it could not proceed. Others suggested that as it was not expressly prohibited, it could proceed but that it might well be contrary to the purposes and objectives o f the Treaty unless all consultative parties consented to any activity. Others suggested that such activity could be undertaken, without multilateral consent, as long as it was consistent with the objectives of the Treaty.
capacity would be better applied to the development o f alternative energy sources rather than a search for Antarctic oil (Nansen 1973:13-14).
While the Nansen Meeting was not a formal part o f the consultative process, the report, which summarised the views expressed but made no recommendations, was circulated to consultative party governments in advance o f the 8th consultative meeting, which was also scheduled for Oslo in 1975.57
ATCM-VIII, 1975
The question o f mineral resources was a dominant agenda item at ATCM-VIII with the potential for political instability again being emphasised.58
The consultative parties accepted that a formal instrument was essential and determined that it was within their competence to make decisions on minerals activity. They had not yet decided whether to permit or prohibit minerals activities. New Zealand pressed for a permanent moratorium on minerals activity (and for the Antarctic to be declared a World Park) on environmental grounds.59 There was some support for this suggestion, or at least for the moratorium component o f it, but the US in particular was strongly opposed.60 Indeed, the United States applied some pressure to its Treaty partners to make progress by suggesting that without an agreement "those countries who do not recognise claims to sovereignty would surely have to assert the right to commence mineral resource activities at their will, subject only to the applicable provisions o f the Antarctic Treaty" (Mitchell 1977b:96).61 Nevertheless, this was not so much the action o f a hegemon, as o f one state with issue-specific power (among many) operating in a unanimity system to protect its interests.
57. At least ten of the 29 Nansen participants were on delegations to that consultative meeting. 58. Belgium reminded delegates that this subject "by its nature, could either destroy the spirit of the
Treaty or develop and strengthen it by extending cooperation to new fields" (Final Report 1975:52). The British raised the spectre of an unregulated scramble bringing "large numbers of men [sic] swarming into the continent" (Final Report, 1975:61). The Argentinian delegation exhorted the meeting to "take up resolutely and calmly the challenge implicit in these controversial issues" (Final Report 1975:50).
59. New Zealand, at this time, had a Labour government which had taken a strong internationalist and independent foreign policy line. ASOC suggests (1989g:6) that the New Zealand proposal also suggested UN involvement in the administration of the Antarctic, and that claimants give up their claims. There was some informal support for the New Zealand suggestion for a permanent moratorium from Argentina and Chile (Wallace 1988a:6). This may have been motivated as much by concerns about sovereignty as about environmental protection and would certainly have not included support for UN involvement or a relinquishing of claims.
60. A senior US Department of State official explained later that this was because the US felt that a moratorium was not so much a delay to permit rational consideration as a decision not to examine the issue at all (Quigg 1983:194).
61. The US did support a multilateral solution in spite of attempts within the US administration, from the Federal Energy Administration and the Department of the Interior to push for US policy to support unilateral resource exploitation (see Pallone 1978 :555).
179 In the absence of a consensus, no moratorium was adopted. However the Parties urged
states and persons to refrain from actions o f commercial exploration and exploitation while, acting as Consultative Parties, they seek timely agreed solutions to the problems raised by the possible presence of valuable mineral resources in the Antarctic Treaty Area (Final Report
1975:9-10).62
Recommendation V IE -14 adopted at this meeting was marked by a degree o f caution