It has been stated that ‘the Cypriots know that they cannot become a World Power; but they have succeeded in becoming a World Nuisance, which is almost as good’.2 Cyprus is a small island, which, with its grievous history, has always been on the agenda of the international community. Its geopolitical position turned this small island into a desired place for various civilisations all through its history. Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, and is located to the south of Turkey, west of Syria, north of Egypt and east of Greece. It functions as a bridge between East and West, being at a crossroads of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. Its strategic position accounted for it being taken over and controlled by numerous civilisations. The vital importance of Cyprus arose
2 George Mikes, Eureka! Rummaging in Greece, London: Andre Deutsch (1965) p. 1.
when the Venetian maritime navy extended its boundaries of commerce to the Levant in the 15th century. The Byzantines’ sovereignty over the island was followed by that of the
Ottomans for more than 300 years. Following British power, which lasted for 40 years, the RoC was finally founded in 1960 by the Cypriots.3
After the opening of the Suez Canal, Cyprus became the stepping stone to it. At the crossroads of British and French interests en route to India, the island gained renewed importance.4 This turned the ‘perfectly useless island’5in to a captivating place and its occupation became worthy of British rule at that time. In 1878, with the rise of the Crimean War, a golden opportunity for taking part in the ruling of the island had arisen. During this war, when the Russian army reached Istanbul, the fear that Istanbul might fall carried Cyprus to the bargaining table. It was agreed that Britain would provide military support to the Ottomans in return for the administration of Cyprus. Following negotiations between the British Ambassador, Henry Layard, and the Ottoman Sultan, a secret agreement called the ‘Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey’ was signed in Istanbul, on June 4, 1878. As a result, the control of Cyprus was granted to Great Britain in exchange for its support for the Ottoman Empire.6
Although there was no discretion for Britain to decide the annexation of Cyprus under the aforementioned Convention, the island was annexed unilaterally from Turkey by the written command of Britain on November 5, 1914 with the adoption of an Order in Council on the grounds that the Ottoman Empire had decided to enter the First World War on the side of Germany.7 At the same time, the government of Greece, under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos, known as the ‘maker of Modern Greece’,8 maintained good relations with Britain. Joining the war on the side of Britain was
3 Clement Dodd, Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A Briefing, Cambridgeshire: Eothen (2001) p.1; Ahmet C. Gazioglu, “Bi-Communality in Cyprus”, Perceptions, vol.10, no.4 (2005) pp.89–113.
4Rıfat Uçarol, 1878 Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Osmanlı-İngiliz Anlaşması, Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi (1978); Eyup Ozveren, “Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends & Prospects”, Journal of International Affairs,vol. VII, No.4 (December 2002–February 2003) p. 39.
5 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper & Row (1942) p. 275. 6 Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey. Signed at Constantinople, 4th June, 1878; Ahmet Aydogdu, Kibris Sorunu Cozum Arayislari ‘Annan Plani ve Referandum Sureci’ 1stedn, Ankara, AsinYayin Dagitim Ltd. Sti (2005) p.5.
7 UK Parliament SIs 1786-1949/1914/1601-1650/[R] Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council 1914 (SI 1914/1629).
8 John W. Duffield, The New York Times, Sunday 30 October 1921.
considered as a way through to achieve the Greek ideology of Μεγάλη Ιδέα (the Great Idea). The fundamental objective of this ideology was that the Greek nation would encompass all ethnic Greeks who had lived in the Mediterranean area. Accordingly, the unification of Cyprus with Greece for Greeks and G/Cypriots would be achieved by the Allies’ support and with the annexation of Cyprus.9
With the ending of the First World War, a new period started on the island. The defeat of the Ottomans by the Allied powers resulted in the loss of its control power over Cyprus. Finally, the Treaty of Lausanne, which finalised the war, was signed between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Turkey on July 24, 1923, effectively partitioning the Ottoman Empire. Two of its articles determined the new power holder on the island. According to Articles 16 and 20 of this treaty, Turkey relinquished, de jure, its rights to Cyprus and the island became a Crown Colony of Britain in 1925.10
Indeed, there is strong evidence that the Treaty of Lausanne not only led to the annexation of Cyprus but also empowered Britain to make a decision over the nationality of T/Cypriots living there. This was contained in the provision concerning the acquisition of nationality in Article 21. According to this article:
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.11
9 Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece, London: Hurst & Company (2002) p.28; Zenon Stavrinides, Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood, Nicosia: Stavrinides Press (1999) p. 12.
10 Renée Hirschon, “‘Unmixing Peoples’ in the Aegean Region” in Hirschon, R. Crossing the Aegean, vol.12, Chapter 2, New York, Berghahn Books (2004) p.9.
11 Article 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne; Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, in UN, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II, Part 2, (emphasis added) p. 132.
According to this provision, T/Cypriots had to choose between British or Turkish citizenship within two years after having opted for it. It is worthwhile emphasising that the T/Cypriots were allowed to choose between repatriation to Turkey or settlement in Cyprus in return for relinquishing their nationality. Not surprisingly, this situation was not without consequences. Approximately 4,000 to 8,500 T/Cypriots left the island and moved to Turkey between the years of 1921 and 1925.12 In essence, it can be stated that the indirect approach of Article 21 was the compulsory movement of Turkish people from Cyprus.
At this juncture, it is reasonable to state that, although the issue of displacement occurred in Cyprus in the 1960s, as a ‘temporary’ remedy in order to stop violence among Cypriots as a consequence of civil strife, repercussions appeared at a global level. The act of forcing people to choose between their nationality and their motherland has not received same level of reaction from other states. Even without taking into account, the mass movement of T/Cypriots, a new era was launched with the British rule on the island.
The British colonial administration, which lasted for forty-six years, established the basis for a rise in the nationalism of both G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots with the ‘divide and rule’ British policy. The pursuance and encouragement of this policy diminished the emergence of a Cypriot nationality.13 The cooperation of the two communities on
significant aspects of social and political life interfered with this policy. The religious- based division, through the ethnic dimension, was disseminated among Cypriots in accordance with this ‘divide and rule’ policy.14 Indeed, there is strong evidence of this situation in that ‘Muslims’ became ‘Turks’ and ‘Christians’ were determined as ‘Greeks’, which paved the way for a politicisation of differences. The educational systems of the
12 Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus: Volume IV: The Ottoman Province, the British Colony, 1571–1948, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1952), pp. 412–413; Sabahattin Ismail & ErginBirinci Ataturk Doneminde Turkiye-Kibris Iliskileri, Akdeniz Haber Ajansi Yayinlar (1989) p.79; Vergi Bedevi Tarih Boyunca Kibris-AnadoluIliskilerineBirBakis, Lefkosa (1978) p.37
13 Georgios Kyris, “An ‘Unrecognised’ Case of Europeanisation: European Union Enlargement and the Turkish-Cypriot Community” (DPhil Thesis, University of Manchester, 2011) p. 77.
14 Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, London: Verso, (1997); Stavrinides (n9) p.12; Hubert Faustmann, ‘Cypriotness in Historical Perspective, in: German- Cypriot Forum (Deutsch Zyprisches Forum) (ed.): ‘Culture in Common-Living Cultures in the Cypriot Communities’ Proceedings of German-Cypriot Forum Conference, in Berlin/Üdersee (22–24 May 2003), pp.11–12; Dan Lindley, ‘Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus’, International Studies Perspectives, vol. 8 (2007) pp. 224–241; James Ker-Lindsay & Hubert Faustmann, ‘The Government and Politics of Cyprus’, Bern et al: Peter Lang, (2008), p.46.
Muslim and Orthodox populations were differentiated and the representation of the two communities in various advisory bodies was separated.15 The underlying reason for
promoting the ethnic polarisation was to prevent combined action against colonial rule.16 In light of this, the policy had a remarkable impact on the rise of nationalism on the island, which ultimately invited Greece and Turkey to become involved in the politics of Cyprus, which in turn sowed the seeds of the Cyprus question.
The rise of Greek nationalism under British rule provoked an ambition for the political union of Greece and Cyprus, called enosis (Ένωσις in Greek). The demand for the union with Greece was presented by the G/Cypriot members of the Legislative Council, and soon after, with the launch of widespread riots, the Council was abolished.17 Not surprisingly, this campaign was not without consequences and, as a response to the idea of union with Greece, Turkish nationalism emerged. The reaction to the Greek campaign was embodied by the promotion of awareness and by the identification with the ‘motherland’ of Turkey.
After joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with Greece, Turkey maintained the right to join the decision-making process, like Greece, in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne in case of any changes in the colonial status of Cyprus.18 Meanwhile, Greece also applied to the United Nations (UN) in order to discuss the denial of the right of self-determination to Cypriots under the UN Charter by Britain. However, this was refused by the UN since the discussion of the Cyprus debate was inadmissible under the terms of Article 2(7) of the Charter.19 This refusal triggered violent attacks by Greek demonstrators in Greece and then was taken to Cyprus by enosis supporters.20 According to T/Cypriots, the attainment of the right of self-determination would have rendered the achievement of enosis possible since large numbers of G/Cypriots would vote for it. As a reaction, the T/Cypriots subsequently raised the ideology of partition (taksim in Turkish). At the heart of this ideology was the belief that the assimilation of
15 Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, New York: Quarted Books (1982) p.192.
16 Vassillis Foukas & Heinz A. Richter, Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back, Bibliopolis, (2003), pp.77–81–164; Kyris (n13) pp.77–80.
17 Stavrinides (n9) p.19. 18 Aydogdu, (n6) pp.18–19.
19 Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, London, George Allen & Unwin (1978) p.83. 20 ibid.p.89.
T/Cypriots, due to the G/Cypriot majority, should be prevented and the Turkish presence on the island should be guaranteed. With the idea of achieving enosis, a clandestine organisation called the National Organization of Cypriots Fighters (EOKA) was formed by the G/Cypriot army officer, George Grivas.21 It was an instrument to respond to the requirements of right-wing political extremism. In 1955, EOKA launched a campaign. For the British, this action constituted a terrorist movement against British rule;22 however, for Greeks, it was an armed insurrection.23
In order to resolve the Cyprus crises, Sir John Harding was sent to Cyprus as the governor for negotiations with the G/Cypriots. A constitutional plan, based on the self-government of the Cypriots, was proposed, and subsequently rejected by the Greek leader due to the fact that the right of self-determination was not included under this plan.24 This rejection was followed with violent demonstrations and gradually increased to assassination level. As a response to these developments, the T/Cypriots formed an organisation called ‘Turk Mukavemet Teskilati’ (TMT) in order to take action against these attacks. The TMT supported the ideology of taksim.25 Taksim constituted the partition of Cyprus between G/Cypriots and T/Cypriots in order to prevent the assimilation of the latter due to the Greek majority and aimed to guarantee a Turkish presence on the island. Grievous clashes and violent attacks were engaged by these organisations and formed an unforgettable wound in the memory of Cypriots. As a result, this period was finalised with the launch of negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Britain, which paved the way for the independence of Cyprus.
21 Kyris (n13) pp. 79–82.
22 Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies –US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, (1992), p.25.
23 Andreas Neocleous and others, Neocleous’s Introduction to Cyprus Law, 3rd edn, Andreas Neocleous & Co LLC, (2011), p.8
24 Aydogdu (n6) pp. 25–26.
25 On 21 March1956, an assassination attempted by EOKA on Harding’s life took place, but which failed as the time bomb was found before its activation by Guard Commander, Michael Buckley, who “…took the time bomb outside and placed it in a sandbagged dugout. Ten minutes later its gelignite charge exploded with a force that would have demolished half of the Government House itself.” Therefore, Makarios was exiled to the Seychelles for a year. See: Time Magazine “Cyprus: The Field Marshal’s Pea”, vol. LXVII, No. 14, 2 April 1956,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601560402,00.html>accessed 29 November 2013.