Isotermas de Compresión

The attitude of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) towards the R&AW was always marked by a mix of suspicion, jealousy and skepticism. The suspicion was particularly strong during the days when Kao was the head of the organization under Indira Gandhi. Many MEA officers, except T.N.Kaul, former Foreign Secretary, who was a close personal friend of Kao, suspected that the organization was seeking to become an alternative or a covert foreign service. This suspicion increased when the organization’s overseas set-up expanded fast between 1972 and 1977. The exit of Kao in 1977 and the action taken by Morarji Desai to cut down its strength in the headquarters as well as abroad brought down this suspicion to a considerable extent, but it was never totally removed.

The jealousy was attributable to the access which the heads of the R&AW always enjoyed to the heads of Government or State of many countries through its extensive liaison network. In all countries of the world, the intelligence chiefs always enjoy the closest and the easiest access to their heads of government or State. The heads of the agencies having a liaison network among themselves are, therefore, able to provide to each other access to their respective heads of government or State. Over the years, the heads of the R&AW had close access to the heads of State or Government of the USSR/Russia, France, Iran, Egypt, the pre-1992 Afghanistan, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, Singapore and China.

As the Senior Adviser to Indira Gandhi in the Cabinet Secretariat, Kao had access even to the then US President Ronald Reagan through his Vice-President George Bush, whom he had known when the latter was the Director of the CIA for a short period in the 1970s. Other chiefs of the R&AW did not, however, have access to any US President, but they had access to the heads of State or Government of other countries. This access enabled the heads of the organization to play the role of the intermediaries of our Prime Minister on many occasions. The heads of many foreign Governments felt more comfortable dealing with their counterparts in India through the head of the R&AW than through the head of the Indian diplomatic missions in their countries or through the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India.

The skepticism related to the capability of the R&AW officers to collect sensitive human intelligence (HUMINT) of real value in foreign policy making and implementation. The heads of many Indian missions abroad----except in the neighbouring countries--- tended to remain unimpressed about the intelligence-collection capabilities of the R&AW officers posted in their missions. Often, many of them nursed doubts even about the intellectual honesty of some of the R&AW operatives. They thought they deceived the Government by feeding open source information as secret source information. The late R.D.Sathe, former Foreign Secretary, under whom I worked in Paris, used to say that many of the field operatives of the R&AW were nothing but glorified plagiarists.

However, in the case of the neighbouring countries, the Foreign Service officers admitted that the R&AW operatives had access to secret intelligence, but even in those countries, the R&AW’s capability to provide advance warnings of looming critical situations was rated low. This was

particularly so in Bangladesh. The organization’s reputation in respect of that country took a nose- dive after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1975. The organization was also caught napping in Afghanistan when the Soviet troops intervened in 1979. In 1991, despite its close relations with the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, the R&AW failed to detect or sense the feeling of unease in the KGB over the direction in which Mikhail Gorbachev was taking the country.

Narasimha Rao, who had served as the Minister for External Affairs under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, shared some of these negative feelings ---typical of the MEA--- towards the R&AW. He had also served as the Home Minister under Indira Gandhi during her second tenure as the Prime Minister. He came to share some of the mixed feelings of the IB too towards the R&AW. He graded the professionalism of the IB higher than that of the R&AW. He was aware of the contribution of the R&AW to the successful outcome of Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988. Despite this, he came to office with some skepticism about the real capabilities of the R&AW. He was a born skeptic. He had become incorrigibly so as he grew up in life. He took not only the entire world, but often himself with a pinch of salt. It was, therefore, no wonder that his initial perceptions of the organization were far from positive.

When a new Prime Minister takes over, the head of the R&AW sends him detailed notes on the on-going sensitive operations of the organization, its capabilities and accomplishments. A few days after the submission of these notes to him, the chief meets the new Prime Minister to brief him personally on all the points covered in these notes and to answer any questions he may have. As it had happened with Rajiv Gandhi, V.P.Singh and Chandra Shekhar, in the case of Rao also, these notes and the personal briefings for the first time made him aware of what exactly was the role of the R&AW and how did it differ from the roles of the IB, the DGMI and the MEA. His attitude started changing in a direction more favourable to the organization.

This change was further facilitated by the developments in the USSR, which was on the verge of disintegration after the failure of the August, 1991, anti-Gorbachev coup by the KGB. During the interregnum, when Boris Yetsin was moving to the top leadership of Russia, but had not yet replaced Gorbachev de jure, the head of the R&AW had visited Moscow at the invitation of Yevgeny Primakov, a good friend of India and the R&AW. He was appointed as the head of the KGB after the collapse of the coup. The KGB, like the IB of pre-1968 days, used to be responsible for internal and external intelligence. The Russian authorities decided to bifurcate it and create two separate agencies---one for internal intelligence and security and another for external intelligence. Primakov was appointed as the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

Primakov arranged courtesy calls by the head of the R&AW on Gorbachev, who was already on the way out, and Boris Yeltsin, who was well set to take over as the President of Russia. The two leaders received him very warmly and asked him to convey to Rao that there would be no change in Moscow’s close relations with India whatever be the changes in the political dispensation in Moscow. The R&AW chief cut short his stay in Russia, flew back to Delhi and reported personally to Rao the details of his warm meetings with Gorbachev and Yeltsin and their messages to Rao. No such message had come to Rao from the Russian leadership through the channels of the MEA. He was highly impressed.

This good impression was further strengthened in the subsequent months by two other developments. J.N.Dixit, the then Foreign Secretary, visited Moscow to meet officials and leaders of the new dispensation headed by President Yeltsin. He felt that his proposed visit was not being given the importance it deserved by the Russian authorities. He had heard of the good equation of the R&AW with Primakov. At his request, the R&AW sought the assistance of Primakov for arranging meetings for Dixit with important political leaders too. This was got done immediately by him. As the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Dixit used to be critical of the R&AW. This was because of his unconcealed jealousy over the ready access enjoyed by the then head of the R&AW to President Jayewardene. As the Foreign Secretary, he realized that the R&AW could be a valuable asset in the pursuit of our foreign policy if only the MEA knew how to use it.

The second development was the first visit of Yeltsin to India in January, 1993, after taking over as the President of Russia. His visit was preceded by a secret visit to Delhi by Primakov as the guest of the R&AW. He also called on Rao for discussions. Primakov’s discussions paved the way for the successful outcome of Yeltsin’s visit.

Among other factors, which brought about a positive change in the attitude of Rao towards the R&AW was its role in internal security. Its liaison co-operation with the Western intelligence agencies brought in some excellent intelligence about the activities of the Khalistani terrorists. The Monitoring Division of the R&AW did excellent work in intercepting the telephone conversations of the Khalistani terrorists, who had kidnapped Liviu Radu, a Romanian diplomat posted in Delhi, with their counterparts in Lahore and Frankfurt, and of the terrorists, who had unsuccessfully tried to kill Mahenderjit Singh Bitta, the leader of the Youth Congress, through a remote-controlled car bomb, at New Delhi in August, 1993. Their telephone conversations with their associates in Canada after the attempt were systematically intercepted by the Division.

Subbiah did outstanding work in detecting---through the interception of the LTTE’s communications--- an attempt by the LTTE to smuggle a consignment of arms and ammunition from Karachi to the LTTE-controlled areas in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. These arms and ammunition had been given to the LTTE by Pakistan’s Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), with the complicity of the ISI. The movement of the LTTE ship carrying this consignment was continuously monitored and it was ultimately intercepted by the Indian Coast Guard. However, before the ship could be captured, its crew set fire to it as a result of which it sank. While the arms and ammunition carried by it could not be seized, some of the crew members were captured alive. Their interrogation revealed the links between the LTTE and Pakistan. Kittu, a close confidant of Prabakaran, who was traveling by the ship, chose to commit suicide by going down the sea with the burning ship.

The contribution of the R&AW in this operation was highly appreciated by the then Cabinet Secretary and Rao. The Cabinet Secretary put up a detailed note on the operation to Rao with the following remark: “What a pity the details of this operation could not be revealed to the media!”

This is an operational dilemma faced by the intelligence agencies all over the world. For every instance of intelligence failure, which becomes public knowledge, there are innumerable instances of intelligence successes. Such successes help in preventing acts of terrorism and other threats to national security. They also often help in advancing the cause of the national interest----typical

examples being the R&AW’s role in the successful visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 and in strengthening India’s relations with Russia post-1991. These successes had to be kept a secret---at least during the time they were achieved. This was necessary to preserve the future effectiveness of the intelligence agencies’ operational capabilities.

Without an adequate knowledge of such successes, the public, the media and the parliamentarians tend to judge the agencies only on the basis of their failures. In other countries, where there is the system of congressional or parliamentary oversight, the intelligence agencies are able to share at least some knowledge of their successes with the oversight committees. In India, there is no scope for this due to the absence of a system of parliamentary oversight.

As a result, the knowledge of the successes of the agencies----whether the R&AW or the IB--- is confined to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister too in the case of the IB, the National Security Adviser, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary. Thus, one often finds the Prime Minister of the day strongly defending the intelligence agencies against allegations of incompetence levelled by the media, other sections of the public and the parliamentarians. Unfortunately, their defence does not carry conviction in the absence of knowledge. After the Kargil conflict, Vajpayee strongly asserted on many occasions that there was no intelligence failure as alleged by the Army and the opposition. Others were not convinced by his assertions. This is an occupational hazard with which intelligence agencies have to live.

Many issues relating to the pros and cons of intelligence co-operation came up during the Prime Ministership of Rao. While encouraging clandestine intelligence co-operation with other countries in India’s national interest, Indira Gandhi was more aware than any other political leader of India -- before or after her -- that such co-operation was a multi-edged sword. She realized that if not handled properly, it could damage our national security by facilitating the penetration efforts of foreign agencies in our territory. It could confuse our political leadership and induce it into wrong decisions or actions by the planting of disinformation on them through intelligence and other officers enjoying the confidence of the political leadership. If not effectively controlled and monitored, intelligence liaison could enable foreign agencies to play different government departments and agencies against one another.

She was particularly concerned over the dangers of US intelligence agencies taking advantage of their co-operation with their Indian counterparts to penetrate our setup. She was afraid that such penetration could soften our government servants occupying sensitive positions and make them amenable to US influence and favourable to US interests, thereby damaging our national security. She viewed intelligence co-operation with foreign countries as a sword that should be under the personal control and supervision of the Prime Minister.

She had laid down strict Do’s and Don’ts in regard to intelligence liaison. These were done both orally and through orders written in her own hand, without even dictating them to her personal assistants. Examples:

• Each and every instance of intelligence co-operation with a foreign country should be with her personal clearance and she should be kept informed of the action taken.

• All intelligence co-operation would be only through the R&AW, which would act as the nodal agency, maintain written records of all contacts with foreign intelligence agencies, and operate as the interface between foreign intelligence agencies and Indian agencies needing their assistance. • Foreign intelligence agencies should not be allowed to interact directly with any government

department, agency or individual officer bypassing the R&AW under the pretext of facilitating co- operation.

In pursuance of these instructions, the R&AW used to maintain detailed records of all interactions with foreign intelligence agencies in one place, periodically review the usefulness of the intelligence co-operation, and keep the Prime Minister informed. Every time a new Prime Minister assumed office, the head of the R&AW would prepare a detailed note on the history of all intelligence co- operation for his/her information and brief him/her personally on the liaison network.

Like Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao also had a good understanding of the need for a strict control through a single nodal agency over all contacts with foreign intelligence agencies, particularly those of the US, which have immense financial and other resources and are aggressive in their penetration efforts.

When Rao was the Prime Minister, a determined effort was made by the intelligence agencies of the UK and the US to weaken the security architecture as laid down by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. They started demanding that their intelligence officers posted in their diplomatic missions in New Delhi should be allowed to interact directly with the officers of the IB, the CBI and the Delhi Police, without having to go through the R&AW. They started socializing directly with the officers of these organizations, without the knowledge of the R&AW, by taking advantage of the friendships made during liaison meetings. Such meetings were often attended by officers of the IB under the chairmanship of an officer of the R&AW.

The R&AW, with the prior approval of the Prime Minister, repeatedly turned down their requests for direct contacts with the IB and other organizations. It also conveyed its unhappiness over their officers socializing with the officers of the IB without its knowledge. Despite this, such breaches of the Do’s and Don’ts for liaison relationships continued to take place. When Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary under the then Prime Minister John Major, visited New Delhi in 1992, he took up this matter directly with Rao. He told him that co-operation in counter-terrorism between the two countries could be improved further if the British intelligence agencies--- and particularly, the MI-5, their Security Service---- were allowed to liaise directly with the IB in matters relating to counter-terrorism. He claimed that no such restrictions existed in the relations of the British intelligence agencies with their counterparts in other Commonwealth countries and in the NATO countries. Rao, who had been briefed on the subject by the head of the R&AW, firmly rejected Hurd’s request.

The CIA too kept raising this issue of direct liaison with the IB from time to time. However, it must be said to their credit that the US never raised this at the political level. The MI-6 and the CIA also started pressing the R&AW and, through it, the IB for joint operations for the collection of intelligence about Iran and North Korea. Their repeated requests in this regard were rejected by the

R&AW with the prior approval of Rao. It was the policy of the R&AW since its inception in 1968 that the liaison relationships should be confined to an exchange of intelligence and assessments and that there should be no joint operations. However, before 1968, the IB had co-operated with the CIA in some joint operations for the collection of intelligence about China’s nuclear programme.

One of the problems faced by the R&AW arose from the fact that the IB itself was in favour of being allowed to have direct liaison with foreign intelligence agencies in matters concerning counter- terrorism. Successive heads of the IB felt that the procedure laid down by Indira Gandhi for all