ITERACION 7

For my studies, I will use two of the four character types which Kant discusses in the section titled "On

T e m perament" in the A n t h r o p o l o g y . I have chosen the

sanguine and the m e l a n c h o l y temperaments for this particular study; in Chapter 4, I discuss the choleric and phlegmatic temperaments. Although moral improvement in the latter two temperaments also involves culti v a t i n g feeling, the stories I will tell about them are more relevant to our duties

toward others than to those toward ourselves; and since the focus of this chapter has been on d i g n i t y - f e e l i n g s (which are helpful primarily, though not exclusively, for

fulfilling our duties toward ourselves), I have chosen the two temperaments which need most a c u t e l y to cultivate their dignity-feelings, namely, the sanguine and the melancholy.

Kant adopts his cla s s i f i c a t i o n of temperaments from the ancients, but gives them new descriptions. How are we to think of these t e m peraments? Do they exhaust the range of human possibilities, or are there others as well? Kant seems to think they represent the only four empirical

character types there are, since he claims that "there is no such thing as a composite temperament" and that "if someone claims a mixed one, we do not know what to make of him"

(A:156/291). But I think m a n y of us will recognize aspects of ourselves in all of them. Kant may be right about others

not knowing what to make of us in such a c a s e--after all, we often don't know what to make of ourselves!

It is important to note that Kant intends to describe only the sensible aspects of a person's character, whatever their moral implications; and that it is possible for each of these temperaments to d e v e l o p a moral character (A:151, 154). As we will see, however, the sensible aspects of a person's character have moral implications: Kant takes a person's way of sensing to Include her attitude toward her moral strengths and flaws.

Since Kant's d e s c r i p t i o n s of the temperaments are rich in d r a m a t i c value, I quote them in full. I begin by

c o n s i d e r i n g the sanguine temperament, which Kant describes as follows:

Tiia Sanguine T e mperament a i the Volatile Man

A sanguine person manifests his w a y of sensing, and can be recognized, by the following traits: he is carefree and full of hope; he attaches great importance to each thing for the moment, and the next moment may not give it another thought. He makes promises is all honesty, but fails to keep his word because he has not reflected d e e p l y enough beforehand whether he will be ale to keep

it. He is good-natured enough to help others, but he is a bad debtor and always asks for extensions. He is a good companion, jocular and high-spirited, who is r eluctant to take a n y t h i n g s e r i o u s l y (Vive la

b a g a t e l l e ! ) and all men are his friends. He is, as a rule, not a bad fellow; but he is a sinner and hard to convert, who regrets something very much indeed, but soon forgets this regret (which never becomes an

a f f l i c t i o n ) . Business wears him out, and yet he busies himself indefatigably with mere play; for play involves change and perseverance is not in his line (A:153-4). The sanguine character is o b v iously not the kind to fall prey to a tyrannical conscience, for a l t hough he may regret something "very much indeed," his regret "never becomes an a f f l i c t i o n ." A stu d y of this character type is thus not

likely to illustrate the struggle with a tyrannical

c ons c i e n c e - - b u t we shall have an a b u ndance of that struggle in our next character type. What is most notable in the sanguine character is his utter disregard for principle. He

is not evil, but he fails to see how his earnest ways, juxtaposed with his failure to keep his promises, make

others think of him as an unreliable charlatan of low moral fiber. His ways make people lose their respect for him.

When this person finally notices he has lost the respect of o t h e r s - - w h e n he find himself s u d d e n l y and

inexplicably alone--he will cer t a i n l y be puzzled by how this came to be. For he does, after all, have the morally

beneficial traits of s o c i a b i l i t y and beneficence. Even if it is only through his sense of humor that he pleases

consider him a disposable entertainer? He slowly comes to realize that loving people or their company is not enough to gain their respect: one's deeds must testify to one's love of honor. What this person needs is a sense of pride, a sense of dignity. If he had pride, he would take greater pains to stand by his word, and people would respect him-- take him s e r i o u s l y instead of thinking of him as a good- natured charlatan. By c u ltivating his sense of pride, he comes to understand what it means to live up to the demands of morality: that it is not only s o m ething one does because a universal law demands it, but also so m e t h i n g one does to preserve one's own dignity.

Since it is unlik e l y that the sanguine man will be able to bring himself to act from principle right away--his

nature isn't that way; he is too swayed by the feeling of the moment--the feeling of pride will make him stand by his word not because it is his d u t y to do so but because it marks the d i g n i t y and unity of character which wins the respect of others. Through pride, he comes to act in accordance with principle. But once he has begun to cultivate his pride, he has a l r e a d y set himself on the course to m o r a l l y w o r t h y action. For the mode of thought which a c c ompanies pride is conducive to cult i v a t i n g the motive of duty. In what follows, I will show that by using his moral strengths (notably, his love of others) in