MODULO REGISTRO DEL DUEÑO

To get a more definite sense of what Kant takes to be the main features of a m o r a l l y good character, it is helpful to begin by asking why he thinks that a good will is the on l y u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y (absolutely) valuable thing in the world. A good will, at its barest minimum, is defined as the will which intends to act as d u t y commands and to do so for the sake of duty. I'll return to why the concept of d u t y holds a special value, for Kant; here the question is w h y a good will is the most basic moral value.

A good will is the o n l y thing in the world which is good without qualification. A good will is good

u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y because unlike gifts of nature and of

fortune (e.g., health and wealth) which, though they do have a c e r t a i n value in themselves, are m o r a l l y good only under c ert a i n qualifications (wealth is good only if put to a good use), a good will is m o r a l l y good in itself because it wills the right thing for the right reasons (G:437; 393-94).

The value of the good will, I take it, is that it alone shows a direct concern for the moral rightness of its conduct. The good will manifests itself s u b j e c t i v e l v (in the P h e n o m e n o l o g y of good willing) in a w i llingness to be truthful about one's c o n dition as it relates to the moral sphere: a desire to know oneself while at the same time

a c k n o w l e d g i n g one's limitations and one's moral fallibility. This can only stem from the awareness that one is bound bv the moral law and not s p o n t a n e o u s l y inclined to follow it. The latter feature also reveals what is valuable about the good will. In imposing on itself a unive r s a l l y valid

obligation, the good will embodies the valuable state of autonomy, the c o n dition of g o v erning oneself according to reasons which are u n i v e r s a l l y acceptable. Thus the good will cannot go wrong in its willing; its willing is good in

itself. Having considered the nature of the good will, ve can now turn to the concept of morally w o r t h y action (action from a good will) and how the emotions relate to it.

1 B I take Kant's use of "good" in this section to refer to the m o r a l l y good, since all the qualifications he makes are qualifications which are relevant only when we are thinking in moral terms. See also Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, Part I for some remarks about the good will and its value.

At first glance, it appears inconceivable, from the point of view of Kant's moral system, that moral worth

should be able to attach to the c u l tivation of the emotions. The chaotic behavior of emotions seems antith e t i c a l to the rule-go v e r n e d a c t i v i t y of the good will issuing forth

mo r a l l y wor t h y actions. In order to see how a c t i n g from cultivated emotions can take on moral worth, we need to understand Kant's conc e p t i o n of m o r a l l y w o r t h y action; we can then go on to ask how the cult i v a t i o n of select emotions can have moral worth as well as whether acting from emotions which have been so c u l tivated can have moral worth.

A m o r a l l y w o r t h y action, Kant says, must be done not only in a c c ordance with duty, but also from duty: the

thought of the moral law, and the sense of constraint that its duties entail, must be the incentive of the action

(MM:218-19). M o r a l l y wort h y action is thus action done from the special feeling of constraint or obligation which the thought of d u t y imposes on us (DV:381-2, 389). This sets three requirements on the type of w i l l — the good will

{G:387-8, 4 3 9 )--which produces m o r a l l y wor t h y action: (a) that we freelv adopt the end which we seek to realize through the action,

(b) that the end be o b l i g a t o r y , 1*

1*At G:403 and 437, Kant suggests that permissible maxims can also produce m o r a l l y w o r t h y actions, as long as they have been tested against the moral law. P r e s u m a b l y the motive of duty would here operate in c o n junction with the (uncultivated)

inclination which gave rise to the maxim before it was tested for

(c) that ve adopt the end not (solely) because ve desire it, that is, not (solely) on the basis of a natural inclination, but because it is our d u t y to adopt the end.

These c o nditions require some elaboration. I begin vith (b), then move on to (c); and finally, to (a).

To adopt an end because it is our d u t y to do so

requires, first of all, that the end fes. an end vhich it is also a d u t y to have. To de t e r m i n e vhether our end is

obligatory, ve submit our m a x i m (our subjective principle of action; G:422n) "to the c o n dition of its qual i f y i n g as

universal lav" (MM:214). We here impose a formal condition on our maxim, namely, that it be a ma x i m to vhich ev e r y other rational agent could in principle consent. This condition, hovever, obtains both for permissible and for o b l i g a t o r y maxims. The diff e r e n c e betveen obli g a t o r y maxims

(e.g., "I vill strive to cultivate my talents") and

permissible maxims (e.g., "I vill alvays eat vhite rather than red meat") lies in the formal implications of their n e o a t i o n s . The negations of o b l i g a t o r y maxims yield con t r a d i c t i o n s when universalized; those of permissible maxims do not (see footnote 11 for a closer desc r i p t i o n of vhat u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n involves and vhat sort of

c o n t r a d i c t i o n is generated by impermissible maxims).

its p e r m i s s i b i l i t y against the moral lav.

Acting in a m o r a l l y wort h y way requires not only that our maxim, have c e r tain formal features, but also that we have a certain motive. The motive from which an action is performed can be thought of as a second-order component of a maxim, expr e s s i n g the attitude with which we will the

m a x i m . ao The attitudinal difference between willing permissible and o b l i g a t o r y maxims can be expressed as

follows. When I hold a permissible maxim, I think of my end X as follows: "I want to bring about X, and I am permitted to do so because the moral law allows it.” When I hold an ob l i g a t o r y maxim, by contrast, I think: "I have to bring X about because the moral law requires it." Even if I should at the same time desire X, I cannot, in the latter case, hold the following attitude: "I want X, so I'm going to do what I can to bring it about; and X also happens to be my aoA motive is not the (first-order) purposive clause of a maxim, as some Kant commen t a t o r s think (see, e.g., Onora O'Neill (then Nell), Acting on Pr i n c i p l e . p p . 84, 97ff), since the purposive clause is reserved to reflect the end of the act i o n and not the m o t i v e . whi c h is something quite different. Ends (Zwecke ) cannot be equated with motives (B e s t i m m u n a s q r u n d e )--and it is important to notice that Kant himself never makes this eq u a t i o n - - b e c a u s e one can will the same end from different motives. This is e s p e c i a l l y clear in the case of willing o b l i g a t o r y ends (ends wh i c h it is a d u t y to have, and so, which can be acted on in a m o r a l l y w o r t h y way). For I can will the end, say, of other people's happiness from the motive of duty, from warm fellow-feeling, from pity, from the ae s t h e t i c s a t i s f a c t i o n I get when I see others enjoying themselves, from a thirst for popularity, and from a number of other motives. The actions I undertake to realize the end of other people's happiness can be the same in all cases, and the realization of my end is also the same, namely, that some of ends of the person whose happiness I will are furthered or realized. But I can act toward that end from a v a r i e t y of motives, and that is why motives must not be identified with ends.

duty." Rather, I must think: "X is my duty, and I am going to bring _it about for that reason. I also happen to desire X, but I know I would have to realize X even if I did not desire it--and it is always possible for such a situation to occur, because I am a finite being, and, as such, will

a 1wavs have inclinations which can oppose the law" (see DV:397, 409, 4 4 1 ) . 21 Acting from the a w a reness of duty, then, requires that a certain thought process ac c o m p a n y one's w i l l i n g - - a thought process c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a feeling of c o n straint and an a w a reness of one's f i n i t u d e . This is the attitudinal, or motivational, dif f e r e n c e between willing p e r m i s s i b l e maxims and will i n g obl i g a t o r y m a x i m s . 22

2iThe phrase, "I realize I would have to do X even if I did not desire it" should not be interpreted as a counterfactual clause indicating what an agent would & g in different circumstances. It should not be confused with a (misguided, because irrelevant) measure of a her o i c a l l y strong will which would br i no about the acti o n even in the face of the most g r u e l l i n g obstacles (e.g., extreme pain resulting from torture).

(For an illuminating d i s c u s s i o n of why counter factual claims about what an agent would & g in different c i rcumstances are irrelevant to the moral worth of her maxims, see Jay Wallace, "Kant on Moral Worth and Moral Luck" (unpublished), esp. p p . 30- 31.) The c o u n t e r f a c t u a l clause in question does not indicate what an agent would £ & under different circumstances, but expresses an attitude toward the moral law and our standing in re l a t i o n to it: the awareness that it binds us regardless of what we happen to feel or desire. This t h o u g h t - - e s s e n t i a l l y the thought which Wallace, at p . 20 in the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d paper, d e s c r i b e s as "an uncondi t i o n a l commitment to duty," a pr e p a r e d n e s s to act d u t i f u l l y regardless of what one's inclinations are or will be in the future--must a c c o m p a n y every m o r a l l y w o r t h y action, and is c a p tured by the sense of constraint we feel when we think of the law and the duties it imposes on us.

2 2 I here differ from Onora O'Neill, who suggests that moral worth can attach also to the a d o p t i o n of permissible maxims (see O'Neill, CR, p . 141). Her reason for claiming this depends on Kant's thesis of the insc r u t a b i l i t y of our motives: we can never

Having clarified conditions (b) and (c), I now turn to c o n dition ( a ).

Freedom of choice, says Kant, is the c o n dition of

p o s s i b i l i t y of any kind of willing, that is, of our setting a n y end whatsoever (DV:385, 389). Were we to lose our

freedom of choice, we would not be w l 1 1 inq anything, but would only be responding to stimuli. This would reduce us to the level of the beasts, who are d e termined only by sensible stimuli (DV:392, 444-5, MM:213). Free d o m of

choice, then, is our "independence from being determined by sensible impulses," even though we are still affected by them (DV:213).** It is in virtue of our freedom of choice that we can be motivated by the formal considerations

inherent in the moral law. Without freedom of choice, we would always need an object of desire in order to act, and

be sure of our underlying ma x i m or motive, but it is always our business to ensure that our act i o n conforms ou t w a r d l y with duty or is at least permissible. Our actual motive, which is always hidden from us, may even in the case of permissible action be that of duty. This is where I differ from O'Neill. I believe that Kant's inscrutability thesis is not as severe as O'Neill makes it sound, and that in fact there are several indicators of moral worth a v a ilable to u s — a s i g nificant one being the types of thought processes I just noted. It is fairly clear that the thought process a c c o m p a n y i n g the a d o p t i o n of permissible ends is incompatible with the awareness of constraint essential to a sense of duty. Kant thinks we can measure this sense of c o n straint through the obstacles we are able to overcome in our willing. This gives us a rough, albeit mer e l y s u b j e c t i v e . measure of moral worth. I discuss this later in Part II.

23Kant c h aracterizes freedom of choice as "negative" freedom in order to dist i n g u i s h it from the "positive" or "inner" freedom which we realize only when we act from the motive of d u t y (see D V : 213-14).

would always be determined by our s t r ongest desire. But because we have free choice, we do not need to act on our strongest desire, and can also be motivated by n o n - s e n s u o u s , rational considerations. It is because of our freedom of choice, then, that we can act on the moral law even when all our desires seem to oppose it.

We are now in a position to s u m marize Kant's conception of moral worth as well as the more basic notion of a good will. To have a good will is to freely set an obligatory end out of the awareness of c o n straint inherent in the

thought of duty. Actions which are u n d ertaken through such w i l ling have moral worth. Having c l a rified Kant' conception of moral worth, I now turn to the d i f f i c u l t i e s of claiming that moral worth can attach both to the c u ltivation of