This is a timely point to pause for a moment to deflect a potential misunderstanding or criticism of the position I am taking. As I have said in the above aside, we are no more special than any other creature or life form. An evolutionary theory of man is neither a demotion nor a promotion – it is a ‘leveler.’ Being animals neither constrains nor endorses us in any particular course. Origins do not limit or define us – this is the basis of what is known as the ‘genetic fallacy.’
It is not that human beings are just animals or are only animals. I am not intending at this point to conclude anything (beyond the minimal claim we are animals) about what we are. Mainly I am building a case for what we are not. What we are is a more vexed question. Even hard-core, naturalisitic ‘biologians’ (as opposed to ‘theologians’) such as E.O. Wilson concede that human nature is malleable. He says, “Human nature exists, and it was self-assembled.” (2006, p 1482) The question/point I wish to raise here is: just how relevant to our interest in the nature of belief is the origin of human nature? And, furthermore, and to the point of this section, can we conclude anything about our nature from our origins?
The genetic fallacy refers to the claim that facts about origins tell us something concrete and inescapable about present nature. (Baggini 2003, p 90)18 However, I would argue that one can go too far in the other direction and claim that origins have
nothing whatever to do with present state or purpose. This is to commit another and opposite fallacy – the modal fallacy. (Fuller 2003, p 184) Origin or original function doesn’t tell us what something is or is not, nor how it must function, nor, least of all, how it ought to function. A screwdriver can, afterall, be used to pry lids off! But I submit that origin, or original purpose, may still be relevant to our understanding.
This is an ongoing pitfall in evolutionary psychology in discussions of human behaviour. It can easily be taken that an attempt to explain ultimate evolutionary causation amounts to an explanation and a justification of a present idea, attitude or behaviour. For example speculation about the requisites of sexual behaviour in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness has lead some to incautiously suggest that
18 Also discussed by Daniel Dennett (1995, p 470) who said that both Darwin and Neitzsche
34 this is why men today are promiscuous and women are cautious and ‘choosey.’ This is especially worrisome when this claim is advanced to justify the behaviour. This is clearly not correct. But still, the inferential slide from ‘is to ought’ is a somewhat tempting danger zone, and many of us fall prey to it at times.
In terms of my argument that we are not special – I am not saying we are not special
because we are animals. There are two differences between what I am saying and that position. First: There is no entailment intended. We are not special AND we are animals. I clearly think there is a relevance relationship, but it is not an entailment. It is entirely possible that someone could accept that we are animals and still think we are special.19 Second: My emphasis is certainly not that animals in general are ‘ordinary.’ Mine is an equalising or balancing argument. It is not intended as a rebuttal of any form of non-naturalism or ‘mysterianism.’20 Its purpose is to affirm a
family-like view of the community of life. In this community, every being is special in its own way, but no one species is more special (in the normative sense) because it has more of some trait or feature (e.g. intelligence) or less of something else (e.g. hair).21
I would say that we are ‘first of all’ animals. I am not claiming that biology is ‘destiny.’ But I do believe that, it is of great interest and potential relevance. We would be wise to pay close attention to and have great respect for our ‘animalness.’ I think that it is an important way of understanding ourselves, and a perspective which offers many potential insights. In Daniel Dennett’s great work on evolution, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), the subtitle is “evolution and the meanings of life.” Is there any reason why evolution and our origins should not be a source for thinking about meaning and value? Studying ourselves just as non-human animals are studied must be part of the picture of understanding human nature in all its fullness. It isn’t the whole story, but it is surely an illuminating part of it.
19 In fact, this is almost precisely the position of the Catholic Church’s encyclical ‘Humani
generis’ (1950) which held that primeval man descended from the ape family, but that he
acquired an immortal soul by ‘divine afflatus’ in the early Pleistocene period – about 800,000
years ago. (Hass 1972, pp 18-19)
20 Based on Daniel Dennett’s somewhat pejorative use of the term, “mysterian” (1995, p 471)
I mean it descriptively – of those who relish and revel in the notion that we don’t know everything, and who seem to think that science can never tell us much about what’s important to know. They therefore prefer explanations in which ‘mystery’ is an important component.
21
I’m reminded of the lampoon of communist ideaology in George Orwell’s Animal Farm –
something like, ‘all animals are equal but some are more equal than others.’ Is it possible to be ‘more special?’
In your skin
It’s where we start, like a baby – in our biological body, which is also not
just a body.
I would also say we have a biological self in our brains. Brains are a part of body. Whatever else a brain is or does, or contains, or gives rise to, it is still unmistakably part of body. And as far as reliable evidence seems able to support, we stay and reside in this physical brain/body. When anyone wishes to allow that we are like other animals, it is usually the physical and perceived body they refer to. I see no point, no advantage in denying that evidence of our senses and experience. Take off your clothes and have a good look in the mirror. Don’t look at your ‘eye-self’, look at your ‘body- self’ as a whole. In spite of the obvious physical similarities with ‘the brutes’, some supporters of Darwin’s thesis, like American botanist Asa Grey, still wished to retain a notion of ‘soul’ – a soul that itself may evolve, and through which we are ‘immeasurably exalted.’ (Rachels 1990, p 85) In general, however, it is our physical, bodily being which is the least
controversial sense in which we are not special. (DH)
Origin is not destiny, but it is relevant to our practical understanding.