I beg to say that my observations regarding information were general. I have never received any that was of use. That given me regarding the roads was decidedly wrong. It was told me at Auckland that there was a capital dray road to Waimate. I found it execrable. I never could obtain the slightest correct information regarding the localities of the pah itself, either of its internal form or its defences, or even of the probable number of its defenders.Lieutenant Colonel Henry Despard 1
A brief overview of the war
The Northern War was a series of battles fought over a ten month period between 11 March 1845 and 11 January 1846. The war began when the Nga Puhi chiefs Hone Heke and Kawiti attacked the flagstaff above Kororareka, and the town itself, on
11 March.2 The precision of the Maori attack was in sharp contrast to the ineptitude of the British defence of the town. After a morning of fighting which saw the British lurch
1 Henry Williams, Plain Facts Relative to the Late War in the Northern District of New Zealand,
Auckland: Phillip Kunst,1847, p.21.
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from disaster to disaster, Kororareka was abandoned, and most of it was subsequently looted and burned by Heke and Kawiti’s men on a drunken rampage.3
Heke had only intended to make another gesture by felling the flagstaff for a fourth time, and he and his followers watched in amazement as the towns-folk abandoned their shops and homes. He had not reckoned on starting a war, but that is exactly what he got. The British response was to undertake offensive operations in an effort, initially at least, to capture Heke.4 A force of 470 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hulme sailed from Auckland to the Bay of Islands in April 1845, and after some confusion about routes and locations, Hulme decided to attack Heke’s pa at Puketutu near the eastern shores of Lake Omapere (see Fig.3.1). The battle fought on May 8th 1845, was a victory for Heke and Kawiti, and showed that Maori pa and their defenders were more formidable adversaries than the British had previously imagined.
A minor and unsuccessful operation against the Kapotai tribe by Major Bridge was followed by the battle of Ohaeawai on 1 July 1845. Colonel Despard attacked Kawiti in his brilliantly engineered but lightly defended pa in a display of asininity which confounded all observers and participants. A period of peace negotiations which followed proved fruitless, and on 18 November 1845, Governor Grey arrived to replace Governor FitzRoy, whom the British Crown had dismissed in the belief that he had mismanaged the colony.
Grey had the good fortune to bring a great increase in money and military resources with him. He immediately asserted his authority as Governor over the neutral and pro-government Nga Puhi chiefs, and put an end to the procrastination of peace talks with the rebel chiefs. A force of almost 1200 troops and 450 Maori allies attacked Kawiti’s pa at Ruapekapeka on 11 January 1846. The pa was taken under controversial
3 James Cowan, The New Zealand Wars and the Pioneering Period, Wellington: Government Printer,
vol. 1, 1922, p.33: James Belich, The New Zealand Wars, and the Victorian interpretation of Racial Conflict, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1986, p.37; Chris Pugsley, ‘Walking Heke’s War, Kororareka’, NewZealand Defence Quarterly, No.1, Winter, 1993, p.16. All agree that it was not until the citizens abandoned the town that the looting began. Williams points out that under Maori lore, the abandonment signalled that the town’s treasures now belonged to the attackers, see Henry Williams, Archdeacon. Fall of Kororareka in 1845, Auckland: Creighton and Scales, 1863, p.5.
4 Cyprian Bridge, Maj, ‘Journal of Events on an Expedition to New Zealand, commencing on 4 April
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circumstances still debated today.5 All parties were now war weary, and the issues which inspired Heke and Kawiti to take up arms, essentially economic and sovereign, seemed far removed as British troops marched across their lands and Royal Navy men o’war dominated the bay. Heke had lost his stomach for war6 and Kawiti too had had enough of war although his reputation remained intact.7 The British had not eaten those who were slain so there was no call for retribution:8
To continue would have meant a struggle to the point of extermination. Reckoning up the costs in lives lost during the fighting everyone appeared to have arrived at the same conclusion, that an honourable peace should now be concluded.9
And so the Northern War which had been fought in such a chivalrous way was concluded in an equally gentlemanly manner. No recriminations were made and both sides withdrew from the field with honour more or less intact. The fighting was concluded in a way that ensured the peace would be lasting. But what was the impact of military intelligence? How much had those battle field enemies known about each other? To what extent had the combatants used military intelligence, and how did it influence the course and outcome of the war?
British knowledge of the geography of the area of operations
The Northern War was fought in a geographically small area measuring only 20 by 30 kilometres. Heke’s tribal area and power base was to the western side of the area of operations in the region of Lake Omapere (see Fig. 3.1). Kawiti’s power base was to the eastern side in the vicinity of the Kawakawa River. Travel and communication throughout the region was not difficult for the local Maori and consequently there was a rapid flow of information and manpower throughout the area.
European knowledge of the physical geography of the Bay of Islands in 1845 was far from complete, being limited mainly to the major communication routes and the
5 The traditional ‘Sunday Prayers’ explanation for the fall of the pa had been persuasively dismissed by
Belich who maintains that the pa was intentionally abandoned, not accidentally lost. He further argues that Kawiti’s plan was to fight the battle behind the pa from ambush positions. His argument here is less convincing. In reality the pa had become untenable and Kawiti was forced to abandon it, possibly covering his retreat with an ambush which allowed his main body to make a clean getaway; a
common military tactic.
6 K. Martin, ‘Kawiti Te Ruki’, The Dictionary of New Zealand Bibliography, vol.1. Wellington: Allen
and Unwin and Department of Internal Affairs, p.220.
7 Cowan, p.4. 8 Kawiti, p.41. 9 Kawiti, p.45.
83 F ig .3 .2 . Ma p dr aw n by J oh n A rr ow sm it h of t he D is tr ic t of t h e B ay of I sl ands , s ur ve ye d a ft er t he N or the rn W ar a n d pu bl is he d i n 18 53. I t s ho w s l ar g e t ract s o f t h e ar ea as ‘une x pl or ed ’ w hi ch i n di ca te s t he l im it ed E ur ope an know le d ge of t he a re a a t t he t im e. A uc kl and W ar M em or ia l M us eum .
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coast. It was the region of New Zealand which had had the longest and most intensive contact with Maori, but even so, few Europeans could claim to know the area well. The waterways of the bay were more familiar for obvious reasons. European shipping had used them for over 50 years, and charts and local knowledge provided enough information for reasonably accurate navigation. European trading activities were based around the coastline in major settlements or small enclaves, and the residents of these had some knowledge of the surrounding countryside. Similarly, the few European farmers had a tolerable knowledge of their surroundings, but this group was not great in number and, as with the traders, they still tended to be located near the coastline.
Several missionaries had settled inland in what was known at the time as the ‘interior’. The Church Missionary Society had a station in the Bay of Islands at Paihia and the French Catholics had one at Kororareka, but it was the inland CMS stations which really took the Europeans into the heart of the Nga Puhi domain. The two inland stations were at Kerikeri and Waimate, and they were linked by a rough cart road. Other communication routes in the interior were primarily Maori foot tracks. The Waimate station had been established on fertile soil as a food basket for all of the northern CMS mission activities. It was deep into Heke’s territory and close to Okaihau where Nene established a pa as the base for his operations during the war.10
Arrowsmith’s 1853 map of the area (see Fig 3.2), drew upon contemporary survey and sketch information, and provides an indication of the European knowledge of the interior at this time. Even by 1853, seven years after the Northern War, large areas of the map were labelled as unexplored. Only major geographical features such as inlets, lakes and large volcanic cones are shown, and even the shoreline is generalised in many places. The communication routes drawn were essentially those used by the British troops to move to and from the battle sites. The route to Ruapekapeka is instructive. It shows the dotted line of the route of march and only very generalised information to either side of it; presumably obtained by viewing the surrounding countryside from the track itself. So even by 1853, it appears that European knowledge of the interior was substantially restricted to those routes which had been used in the war seven years earlier.
10 The missionaries were familiar with certain parts of the interior within their parishes. Reverend Robert
Burrows from Waimate for example, appears to have visited his flock and journeyed as far as Kaikohe for that purpose. French Catholic priests also travelled the interior and were (continued on next page)
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The limited European knowledge of the interior, particularly for military purposes, is confirmed by two further sources. The first concerns the reports of two British officers. Captain Bennett, a Royal Engineer officer reported in 1844 that the country around Waimate was so difficult as to be impracticable for the troops then in New Zealand.11 Bennett’s opinion was corroborated by Captain Collinson, another Royal Engineer officer, who visited the Northern War battlefields in 1853 and was surprised that Lieutenant Colonel Hulme attempted the expedition at all through country, ‘utterly impracticable for the evolutions of disciplined troops’.12
Secondly, it had been Hulme’s intention to open the British campaign in early May 1845, by attacking Kawiti in the Waiomio area. Hulme and the naval commander, Sir Everard Home, were devising plans for the operation, using a map drawn on the deck of HMS North Star by Maori informants. The plan to attack Kawiti was hurriedly dropped when Archdeacon Henry Williams, the head of the CMS, was invited to comment. He pointed out that the lines on the map that the officers understood to be roads were in fact rivers, adding, ‘you may go to Waiomio but you will never get back.’13 The officers had expected to find roads through an area which was essentially impassable to British troops. Homes’ response summarised this first salutary experience of their knowledge of the physical geography of the area, ‘Colonel you are going you know not where; you had better re-embark the men.’14
Edward Meurant who was aboard HMS North Star as an interpreter witnessed the incident. He noted that Nene later confirmed Williams’ observations, and that the plan for operations was subsequently changed, and the decision was made to attack Heke’s pa at Puketutu, instead of Kawiti.15 Nene provided two vital pieces of information during this process. Firstly, he confirmed Williams’ observations by explaining the physical geography of the area, particularly the routes in the interior which were tracks and rivers. Secondly, he provided information about Heke’s location,
seen as far inland as Ruapekapeka. It is probable that government officials travelled inland to the main centres of Maori population from time to time, but only on the existing foot tracks.
11 Robert FitzRoy, Remarks on New Zealand in February 1846, London: W. and H. White, 1846, p.33. 12
T.B. Collinson, Capt. Remarks on Military Operations in New Zealand, London: John Weale, 1853, p.56.
13 T. Lindsay Buick, New Zealand’s First War, or the Rebellion of Hone Heke, Wellington: Government
Printer, 1926, p.109.
14 Buick, p.109.
15 E. Meurant, ‘Diary kept between 17 April – 24 December 1845’ (AIML, NZMS 205), entry for 1 May
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information that the British command had been unable to obtain from any other source. As Quartermaster Sergeant Richardson of the 58th Regiment noted:
…no European could give us any information about Heke’s position, it was ultimately ascertained by our allies (Tamati Waka and his followers), that Heke was at Okaihau a pa belonging to Kawiti some eighteen miles distant.16
This change of plan no doubt suited Nene who had established his base at Okaihau in order to campaign against Heke. Nene had been engaged in military operations against Heke since early April 1845, and had sent the chief Paratene to Auckland to urge FitzRoy to send troops against Heke as soon as possible.17 It seems quite possible that Nene may have used the British officers’ lack of knowledge about the physical geography of the region as an opportunity to manipulate them to fight the war to his agenda and against his principal foe.
The British really had very little idea where they were going and the whole campaign strategy was based on flimsy shreds of information. As much as anything else, the campaign was a punitive action to punish Heke and to recover plunder. Their need for military intelligence placed them heavily into the hands of the two main agencies that could provide it; their Maori allies under Nene and the CMS missionaries under Henry Williams. In so doing, they laid themselves open to the possibility of manipulation, for, as the age old dictum suggests, knowledge is power.
As one would expect, information about the cultural geography of the region came from the same sources that supplied information on the physical geography. As the war progressed, the Governor and the British commanders relied heavily upon a small group of missionaries, one or two government officials, and Nene’s loyal chiefs to provide the raw information that they required, and often for interpretation of it as well. The missionaries had a reasonable feel for the political climate within Nga Puhi and in theory as ‘neutrals’ they were able to move around the theatre at will. Reverend Robert Burrows and Henry Williams had tried to use their influence to deter Heke from attacking the flagstaff, and thereafter they tried to prevent the continuation of the
16
J.R. Mitchell, ‘Diary’, (AIML, NZMS 1060), p.2. Quartermaster Sergeant, 58th Regiment. Richardson was wrong about the ownership of the pa. Puketutu was built by Heke. He had built the pa, not as Belich suggests as an inland fort designed to draw the British attackers into the interior, but because it lay at the heart of his home area. Situated next to Hongi’s historic Mawhe Pa, it provided spiritual and political credibility for the young chief. Heke had simply chosen to make his stand in the area which offered him the greatest chance of success.
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hostilities. At the same time they kept the authorities aware of developments. Burrows sent information to Williams, who kept in close touch with the British command. He also wrote to Governor FitzRoy, and later George Grey, as he had done previously to Governor William Hobson.18 The local government officials, primarily the Police Magistrate Thomas Beckham and his successor James Clendon, had a direct and official line of communication with the Governor and the military and they too supplied advice and information.
At a wider level, the same process was occurring throughout the whole North Island. By 1844 land, for example, had become a major problem and the government purchasing agents and other official sent back a flood of information about the political situations they encountered in the course of their travels. FitzRoy was kept aware of major developments in Wellington, Wanganui, New Plymouth and even the South Island settlements of Nelson and Otago through a variety of means. His information came primarily from government officials and missionaries such as Reverend Hadfield at Otaki.19 But there was no clear delineation of a command chain, or an understanding about who was responsible for what and this was the case in the Bay of Islands. The missionaries had a kind of moral authority by virtue of their role and time in the place, but only indirect channels to government, and of course no legal authority. Beckham and Clendon were not qualified to do their jobs and represented very much a settler- trader mentality. The military officers, as the new boys in town, had little understanding about how things worked or where things were, and their relationship with the police magistrates was unclear.
The political climate within Nga Puhi
The political climate within Nga Puhi was extremely volatile in 1844–45 and the war was largely a product of that tension. Dissatisfaction with their post-treaty circumstances was widespread, but finding an appropriate response to the new problems they faced caused a split within the tribe along traditional and geographical lines. The British were fortunate to have a major ally in Tamati Waka Nene, chief of the Ngati Hao hapu of Nga Puhi from Hokianga. Nene had fought alongside his cousin Hongi Hika throughout the musket wars and was considered to be the leading Nga Puhi chief
18 Robert Burrows, Rev. Governor’s Papers, Miscellaneous Inwards and Outwards Letters. (ANZ,
G/13/1).
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at the time of the signing of the treaty.20 Nene had been relatively constant in his support of the treaty and the British, and his actions in the Northern War can be seen as an extension of that policy.21 However, his involvement introduces another theme to the