Libya shares a border with Darfur. Therefore, in the understanding of the political leadership in Libya, Darfur represents an important strategic interest. This is especially important since Darfur is close to the areas of south Libya which contain energy resources ranging from oil and gas fields to freshwater aquifers. In addition, the tribal and historical ties between the two countries were vital factors in the Gaddafi regime's assessment of the Darfur Crisis and its repercussions. Ibrahim Al-Sanusi (14/01/2013), the deputy of Hassan al-Turabi, the Secretary-General of the Sudan People's Congress, has confirmed this. Sanusi confirms that the relationship between Libya and Darfur is concerned with the ancient area of Fezzan since the Fur Sultanate in the fifteenth century and the Kingdom of Dai in the sixteenth century, where the populations were engaged in various activities, most importantly trade.
Libya was a conduit for Darfur towards the Mediterranean. In addition to the overlap produced by the border between the two countries, there also exists a tribal and social overlap. A number of Sudanese tribes extend into Libyan territory and vice versa, such as the Zaghawa, Mahamid, Fazzan and Al Zwai tribes. Pressure was exerted by
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some Libyan tribes from southern Libya on Gaddafi to intervene in the problems in Darfur and so to protect their relatives from the civil war and displacement there. Al-Sanusi (14/01/2013) emphasises that this pressure was led by Libyan citizens who are related to some of the Darfur tribes and have old alliances, such as Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr, the Libyan Minister of Defence under the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Also, the Libyan intervention might have been due to the pressures exercised by Osman Al Bushra and other members of the Revolutionary Committees including members belonging to the alliance of the Tabu, Bideyat, and Zaghawa as tribal cousins (Ahmed 2013, p. 44). Consequently, Gaddafi became involved in the conflict (Al Ameen 2011). Gaddafi perceived the rebellion as an opportunity to extend Libyan influence into Darfur (Natsios 2012, p. 145; Marchal 2007, p. 181).
From another point of view, the Libyan authorities feared the exodus of these tribes into Libya, and the turning of their territory into refugee camps which might lead to the conflict leaking into Libya, and therefor threatening the stability and the security on its southern border, which would act as an indirect threat to the effectiveness of the Gaddafi regime in the region.
Security
As mentioned earlier, Darfur represents strategic depth for Libyan national security, and the continuation of the armed conflict there poses a direct threat to the political regime in Tripoli. Therefore, Gaddafi developed a security obsession with Darfur, especially with the presence of tribal extensions for a number of tribes in the south of Libya. Importantly, a second fear for Gaddafi’s Libya was that the escalation of the conflict in Darfur would create an excuse for foreign intervention, which would restrict the movements of Libya in the Sahel and Sahara regions, which include Sudan, Chad and the CAR (Mamdani 2010, p. 213). In order to maintain influence over the development of the crisis and its implications for Libya, Tripoli made great efforts to prevent the entry of international forces into Darfur, despite the urgent need for these forces to protect civilians there (Rockro 2011). This Libyan attitude was evident when Foreign Minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam stated that any defect in the geo-politics and humanitarianism in Sudan would be reflected on the countries of the
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region as a whole. He pointed out that sending foreign troops into Darfur would be an insoluble disaster which would encourage radical Islamists to come from all over the world for Jihad with the people of Darfur, and that Darfur would become another Afghanistan or Iraq. So it had to be a solution provided by the AU and the Arab states so as not to give extra-regional actors an excuse to intervene (Ahram 12 Augustus 2004).
Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) confirmed that the Libyan regime had considered the Darfur Crisis from one angle only, which was that if the crisis was internationalised and international intervention occurred, then the existence of regional and international forces was likely to be seen as a siege on the Libyan regime.
Furthermore, during the same interview, Bilal also revealed that the Gaddafi regime were rejecting any USA or European intervention, whether in the form of direct military intervention or the presence of international forces to keep the peace. This rejection was not motivated by a desire to protect the people of Darfur, but through fear of turning this troubled region’s border with Libya into an international security threat to the Libyan regime. Libya has always been concerned about the potential presence of the USA in its backyard. Therefore, Libya was an active actor in the whole of Africa to protect its national security in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, Gaddafi supported liberation movements in many places in Africa, where several regimes have changed, such as Chad in December 1989 (Ismail 13/01/2013).
Economic Motives
Darfur is an important market for Libya. Each border tribe in southern Libya is heavily dependent on Darfur for trade, as Libya exports a wide variety of goods to this market. Darfur also exports all kinds of livestock, such as camels and sheep, to Libyan markets. Therefore, we find along the road from El Fasher (the capital of Darfur) to Khartoum, there are so-called Libyan markets which deal in a variety of Libyan goods, from petrochemical crafts to food commodities and petroleum products. Most of the goods that exist in the domestic market in Sudan come from Libya via Darfur. Goods that come from Europe across the Mediterranean also enter Darfur through Libya. The open-air markets of Darfur today feature more goods
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from Tripoli and the Libyan coastal plain than from Khartoum and Port Sudan (Natsios 2012, p. 123; Ibrahim 2011, p. 9).
From another angle, the characteristics of the geographical and tribal border areas between Libya and Darfur, in addition to the economic and social marginalisation practised by successive GoS’s on peripheral areas, such as Darfur, have made Libya an important market to absorb the people of Darfur as part of the Libyan economy in the form of workers (for more details see Young, Osman and Dale 2007). Azhari Tahir Ahmad (10/01/2013), the Commissioner for Voluntary Repatriation and Resettlement in the Darfur Regional Authority, spells out that more than 80 per cent of Sudanese workers in the Libyan market are from the different tribes of Darfur, and depend on Libya for improving their living conditions. They represent a significant percentage of the labour force in Libya. Thus, Darfur is important for economic growth in Libya and vice versa (for useful details see Young, Osman and Dale 2007).
Studies conducted by Helen Young, Abdalmonium Osman and Rebecca Dale (2007), and Ola Olsson (2010) summarise that Libya will remain an attractive destination for the people of Darfur as long as peace is not made and the Darfur Crisis is not resolved. They argue that the effects of the situation in Darfur cannot be seen as only economic in relation to the local context. The continuation of the crisis directly affects the Libyan local economy, allowing Libyan authorities to use the issue in its dealings and strategy to solve the problem.