Born into a conservative middle-class family, Abolhassan Banisadr was a son of a middle-rank cleric in Hamedan. Despite his father’s wishes for him to study at Qom’s seminary, Banisadr went to the Tehran University were he began his higher education in both the faculties of law and theology. At university he became politically active in the student branch of the National Front. His acquaintance with the French Marxist sociologist, Paul Vielle at the university-affiliated school of social research was said to have greatly influenced his intellectual formation. Banisadr left Iran for Paris to pursue his doctorate thesis on “the destruction of Iranian society under the impact of the Shah’s absolutism and Western domination”, a doctorate that he never completed. He began writing essays and books that were showing Islamic government and Islamic economy as a solution for Iran’s “dependency” on foreign countries such as the “Imperialist” America. He saw in the teachings of the Shia Islam an answer to the despotism and absolutism of the Shah. Soon he
became famous for his works.Banisadr was first captivated by Khomeini’s strong opposition to Shah’s policies in 1962-63 an opposition that resulted in Khomeini’s exile. Later on, while in Iraq for his father’s funeral, he had his first encounter with Khomeini.252
According to Bakhash,
He saw in Khomeaini a spiritual leader devoid of personal ambition and the means through which the Shah could be overthrown. He came to regard himself as Khomeaini’s disciple, his “devoted son.” He sent copies of his writings to Khomeaini, urged him to speak out more openly, and to make known his views on Islamic government. He worked to promote Khomeaini’s reputation abroad and to buttress his position as the leading religious authority at home. 253
According to Milani “he [Banisadr] was an obscure figure in Iran until becoming Ayatollah Khomeini’s adviser in Paris in 1978.”254
Imam’s emigration to Paris provided Banisader a chance to become closer to the Ayatollah. Soon after, Banisadr, Dr.Ebrahim Yazdi and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh became Khomeini’s closest advisers in Paris. Khomeini called Banisadr his “spiritual son” and it is said that Khomeini’s last-minute withdrawal from a power-sharing deal that was proposed by Shahpour Bakhtiar was based on Banisadr’s advice.255
Banisadr arrived in Tehran together with Khomeini and upon arrival was appointed by Imam as a member of CIR. His pro working-class activities in CIR such as the engineering of many early nationalisations in the post-revolution Iranian industry had gained him a reputation with many low- income Iranian people. Ironically his character as a western-educated Islamist and intellectual made him popular among many middle-class intelligentsias.
However his reputation alone could not make him president. Other major factors were involved, such as Khomeini’s unofficial endorsement of Banisadr and IRP’s failure to find a popular replacement for their original nominee Ayatollah Beheshti. Beheshti gave up running for president when it became clear that Khomeini would not support a “cleric” candidate running for president.256
As a result, on 25 January 1980 Banisadr was elected as the first president in the history of the Islamic republic. He was also appointed as the head of the CIR an organisation he was once criticising. When he saw himself chairing this institute he ceased his criticism against CIR directing his attacks to IRP instead.
252 Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 92-97. 253Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 95. 254
Milni, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution from Monarchy to Islamic Republic, p. 281.
255 Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 96. 256 Jomhourie eslami, January 02/ Dey 12, 1358
Banisadr’s first real confrontation with IRP after becoming elected as president occurred in the juncture of his affirmation. Banisadr was really hoping to be able to name his prime minister and appoint his cabinet prior to the first Majles elections. In the absence of Majles, Banisadr argued, he can take the oath of office in before Khomeini. This is while the IRP clerics were insisting on “respect for the constitution” and to wait for the Majles elections to be held so the president can take the oath in front of the Majles. Banisadr refused IRP’s argument on the grounds that the country was in an exceptional situation and in unusual situations extraordinary measures must be taken.
It seems that Banisadr feared that IRP’s sweeping victory in the Constitutional Assembly election would repeat itself in the first Majles election, thus leaving him with less power in choosing members of cabinet after the election. When he realised that negotiation with IRP clerics was ineffective, he started focusing on Khomeini’s son Ahmad. He knew that the IRP clerics would not dare to defy Imam Khomeini’s decision. Therefore, with the help of Ahmad Khomeini he could finally secure an affirmation ceremony. Finally on 4 February 1980, Banisadr took the oath in Reza’i hospital257
where Imam Khomeini was recovering from a mild heart attack.
Banisadr was appointed as the chairman of CIR on 7 February 1980. Although Khomeini did not allow him to appoint a prime minister until the Majles was convened, nevertheless he transferred to Banisadr his powers as the commander-in-chief of armed forces and allowed him to propose ministers and legislations to the Revolutionary Council. Moreover Banisadr was permitted to appoint the head of the national radio and television.
Banisadr did not have a Party supporting him and although the Combatant Clergy Association endorsed him during the presidential election, they were not in the form or shape of a proper party nor were they in agreement with Banisadr’s liberal mentality to continue their backing of him during his presidency. Therefore he decided to build an organisation that would fulfil some of the functions of a political party, if not all of it. The solution for Banisadr came in the form of the Office of President and People Cooperation. He actually managed to secure a budget for it from CIR.