IRP leader’s endorsement of state socialism and state-controlled economy was a political necessity more than a principle-based policy, since obviously it was the Bazaaris and not the impoverished who were the main allies of the clerics throughout the history. Over the last 200 years the Bazaaries were the main supporters of the clergy in Iran. The Bazaar-Clergy alliance had demonstrated itself in incidents such as the tobacco protest of 1890. The protest came after exclusive tobacco concessions were granted to a British company for buying, selling and manufacturing of all tobacco in Iran for fifty years. Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi disputed the Qajar king’s decision and called for a religious ban on the product. The Bazaaries predominantly followed the ruling of their esteemed
marja’ and before long the Qajar shah was forced to cancel the contract. Another case in point was
the migration of Ulama from Tehran to Shah-Abdulazim that came after well-known Bazaaries were beaten by the orders of Ain-ol-Doleh, the governor of Tehran. The two high-status Bazaaries were accused of stockpiling large quantities of sugar and causing a massive shortage of the material in the market. This migration played a great role in the constitutionalist movement that eventually convinced the ailing Mozafar-ol-Din Shah of Qajar to sign the decree of constitutional monarchy.307
306
Jasbi, Tashakole faragir, Tehran, pp. 115-116.
307 for an extensive study of the role of Bazaar in the modern Iran see Arang Keshavarzaian, Bazaar and State in Iran,
During the reign of the second Pahlavi the Bazaaries continued their strong relation with clergy by sponsoring many clergy-initiated endeavours. For instance Haj Ali Haghani a wealthy Bazaari had conferred a building to Ayatollah Beheshti so the latter could establish a new religious school that was named Haghani School in remembrance of its donor.308 Another case in point was sponsoring seminary periodicals such as Maktabe Islam which was funded by famous Bazaaries such as Haj Mohammad Kolahi, Haj Mousa Abrishamchi and Seid Mostafa Aliinasab.309
Moreover the Motalefeh, a radical Islamic group which was the organising force behind the unrests of 15 Khordad (equivalent to 3 June 1963) consisted of Bazaaries and clerics who mostly were regular attendees of three Bazaar associated heyats, namely 1. The heyat of Amin-ol-Douleh mosque, 2. The Esfahanies heyat, 3. The heyat of Sheikh Ali mosque.310
The Motalefeh Bazaaries were instructed by Khomeini to arrange a council of clerics within their party. The aims and objectives of this council were
1. in the event of Ayatollah Khomeini’s arrest the council would act to fill the gap in Khomeini’s directions
2. To present theological lessons for the pious Bazaaries who were members of the party and 3. To provide jurisprudence for the matters that were in need of a religious ruling
4. To ensure that Motalefeh as an organisation does not deviate from the Islamic path that was set by its founders.311
The members of this council who all were approved by Khomeini were Ayatollah Motahari, Ayatollah Besheshti, Ayatollah Anvaari and Hojatoleslam Ahmad Molaie. Hojatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani and Bahonar, although being closely associated with the council of clerics, never officially joined it.312
Three of the five clerics who later founded the IRP were either members or closely associated with the council of clerics in Motalfeh. Hashemi was acting as a link between the Hawza and Motalefeh; Beheshti and Bahonar were two Motalefeh clerics who consecutively became the leaders of the IRP party before being killed in terrorist actions. Rafsanjani, another high ranking IRP cleric was also associated although to a lesser extent with the Motalefeh cleric council.
308 Rasul Jafarian, Jaryanha va sazmanhaie mazhabi siasie Iran (1320-1357) [Religio-Political Currents and
Organisations in Iran] (1941-1979)], Qom, Movarekh, 2007, p. 324.
309
Jafarian, Jaryanha va sazmanhaie mazhabi siasie Iran, p. 341.
310 Asadollah Badamchian and Ali Banaie, Heyathaie mo’talefeie eslami [The Allied Islamic Heyates], Tehran, Oaj
Publichers, 1983, pp. 136-157.
311
Badamchian and Banaie, Heyathaie mo’talefeie eslami, pp. 177-184.
312 Asadollah Badamchian, Ashnaie ba jamyiate motalefeh eslami [Introducing the Allied Islamic Association], Tehran,
In summary, the Bazaars and especially the Tehran Bazaar were the financial pillars that kept the political clerics from falling. It was the Bazaar’s Zakat, Khoms and gifts which sustained the livelihood of Khomeinist’s networks. Moreover the heyats which were situated in the Bazaar of Tehran were places where messages of Ayatollah Khomeini were spread, initially to his devotees and finally to the public. In the protests and demonstrations of 15 of Khordad (June 1963) many of those involved in the riots were Bazaaries.313 For years Khomeini and his clerics were receiving
Khoms and Zakat from the Bazaar and most of the bills of the revolution were cleared by the
Bazaaries. It was only natural if the IRP clerics decided to protect the interest of the Bazaaries. However if they were a Bazaar party, they were going to narrow down their social base. This was while the IRP clerics wanted to expand their support base, not only because they needed to win elections but also because they were in need of foot soldiers who could win them the battle of the streets.
The ruling clergy, seeking a reliable social base, made the mustaz’afin the champions of struggle for Islam and the Islamic revolution. Within this broad category, urban marginals, or koukhnishinan (literally hut-dwellers, the destitutes), acquired a central position. “This Islamic revolution is indebted to the efforts of this class, the class of shanty dwellers,” declared Ayatollah Khomeini. “These South Tehranies, these footbearers, as we call them, they are our masters [vali- ne’mat] . . . They were the ones who brought us to where we are”.314
The IRP clerics were caught in a dilemma; if they had favoured the Bazaar over the impoverished, the urban poor were going be alienated from the party. On the other hand if it reduced itself to the party of Mostazafin it was going to upset the Motalefeh who for long had supported Imam Khomeini and had very good relations with him.
In a crucial speech in which Ayatollah Khomeini promised to “comeback to Tehran and act revolutionary”, Khomeini made his strongest public endorsement of the Mostazafin calling for the formation of the hezbe jahanie mostazafin [International Party of the Impoverished] to empower the impoverished people worldwide.315 A day after that, IRP announced the formation of the Mostazafin Islamic Front.316 This “Front” of course existed only on paper. However the Mostazafin discourse was so popular that even Khomeini could not go without it, let alone the IRP. Therefore the IRP had to follow suit, ostensibly at least, to be able to appeal to this politicised lower strata that was called the Mostazafin. The IRP was looking at these “footbearers” as a constituency for the upcoming elections, as a social base for its expansion and a recruitment pool of club-wielders that it was desperately in need of.
313 Arang Keshavarzaian, Bazaar and State in Iran, p. 239. 314
Asef Bayat, Street Politics, p. 99.
315 Jomhourie eslami, Mordad 1358/ Aug 18, 1979 316 Jomhourie eslami, Mordad 1358/ Aug 19, 1979
In the IRP’s published manifesto called Mavaze Ma and in Beheshti’s lectures in the IRP headquarters the discourse of Mostazafin was dominant.317 Beheshti’s clarification classes on
Mavaze ma continued until he was killed in a terrorist attack on 28 June 1981. During these
seminars Beheshti clearly praises the stratum of Mostazafin and encourages the party cadre in general, and the IRP clerics specifically, to mingle with the masses and avoid selectiveness.318 In his seminars and debates he always refers to verses from the Holy Quran, however on top of being a cleric, Beheshti had received an Masters degree from the University of Tehran. In addition, during his stay in Germany, he became acquainted with the works of Western philosophers. In his lectures Behesti gave references to Hegel, Heidegger and Karl Marx, and explained the determinism in Marxist theory.319 He offers a philosophical account of realism and idealism which is similar to the Western philosophy point of view and then goes on to explain a Maktabi view of realism and idealism which brings the two concepts together. In one of his speeches he claims “whoever is well-versed in Mullah Sadra’s philosophy, if he reads an accurate translation of Hegel, can understand Hegel very well and whoever knows Hegel will understand Mullah Sadra very well”320
In his discussions on IRP’s worldview, he explains how a human being is prone to his own
Takaathor(a term borrowed from Quran, basic translation of which is the desire to have more).
Accordingly, the deriving force of human race throughout the history from the invention of a simple boat to the pioneering of civilisations is his takathor. Beheshti had the opinion that all humans are, by nature, prone to takaathor but while recognising this as a basic instinct in the human nature, he divides between good takaathorand bad takathor. The bad takaathor is when an individual or a political party is striving for possession of power and wealth for bad intentions. The good takaathor on the other hand is when an individual or a political party strives for more wealth and power to promote the ideal Islamic Maktabi society. In addition, according to Beheshti
takaathor exists even in the spiritual realm and the desire to acquire oneself with more spirituality
is most of the time a positive and virtuous phenomenon. Giving precedence to the promotion of Maktab and adopting a Mostazafin discourse clearly this is not serving the Bazaari interests. The irony was that these words were coming from a man who owed his life to the Bazaar.
317
For a collection of Ayatollah Beheshti’s speeches on the topic of Mostazafin see Mohammad Hossein Beheshti,
Hezbe jomhourie eslami: Mavaze’e tafsili [ Islamic republic party: detailed positions], Tehran, The Foundation for The
Safeguard and Publication of Martyr Ayatollah Beheshti’s Works, 2009.
318
Beheshti, Hezbe jomhourie eslami: Mavaze’e tafsili, pp. 304-307.
319 Beheshti, Hezbe jomhourie eslami: Mavaze’e tafsili, pp. 219-220. 320 Beheshti, Hezbe jomhourie eslami: Mavaze’e tafsili, pp. 181-182.