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L OS LUGARES COMUNES DE LOS DISCURSOS RACISTAS : LOS MITOS RACIALES

III. METODOLOGÍA Y FUENTES UTILIZADAS

3.4. L OS LUGARES COMUNES DE LOS DISCURSOS RACISTAS : LOS MITOS RACIALES

I develop Simmel’s conception of religiosity as relational by building on his notion of belief.

Simmel contrasted belief, as believing that, with belief, as believing in. He explains that believing in God does not simply equate to holding something to be true; rather “it implies a certain spiritual relationship to Him, an emotional dedication, an orientation of life toward Him” (Simmel 1912/1997, p. 166). By analogy, our belief in others does not mean that we

143 believe in their existence; but that we assume a spiritual attitude in regard to them. In this sense, we can take Laermans’ observation of religious belief in the sense of social trust (Laermans 2006). Simmel’s notion of relationality is vague. At times, following Lactantius’

etymological interpretation of religion from religare8, he seems to suggest that religion is relational for it provides unity by connecting the person to the world, which is sustained by religion’s totalising force. At other times, religion is seen as the result of social relations, which is dependent on the projection of the sentiment of pietas onto the transcendent realm.

I retain the first (epistemological) interpretation (cf. section ten), but also develop the notion of belief in as the projection of human feelings onto a ‘higher principle’, which gives legitimacy to one’s group and tradition (cf. chapter seven). I do so by linking belief in with the projection of human sentiments onto others, one’s country and “the gods”, put forward by Simmel in his work on the persistence of groups (Simmel 1898a, 1898b, and 1898c).

Accordingly, I argue that the feeling of pietas, dependency on a ‘higher principle’, is projected onto the divine, the group and the tradition through which one experiences the relationship with the divine aiding the person’s identification with the group. It is the consciousness of a relationship with something higher, such as the divine, which forms the group (Vandenberghe 2001, p. 42). Individualities are thus transcended in the spiritual bond human beings form in the social unity of the group.

8 In Divinarum Institutionum (IV, xxviii), Lactantius argues that religion derives from religare (connecting) against Cicero’s interpretation of religion as relegere (to treat carefully), as written in De Natura Deorum (II, xxviii).

http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/02m/0240-0320,_Lactantius,_Divinarum_Institutionum_Liber_IV,_MLT.pdf

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“Out of individuals existing side by side, that is, apart from each other, a social unity is formed. The inevitable separation which space places between men is nevertheless overcome by the spiritual bond between them, so that there arises an appearance of unified interexistence” (Simmel 1898a, p. 667) .

The group assumes significance superior to that of the individual. It becomes ‘immortal’. It is worth, however, consider other elements that impact on groups’ continuity. Simmel refers to groups that, whilst changing in membership and forms, maintain continuity in time. He surveys disparate forms of association such as medieval municipal corporations, kingship, and the Catholic clergy. The group goes beyond the life of the individual.

Continuity is maintained because change happens slowly and gradually. The new generation does not simply substitute the old generation causing an abrupt shift, but it is inserted into the life of the existing generation so that “the group seems as much like a unified self as an organic body in spite of the change of its atoms” (Simmel 1898a, p. 669).

This ‘unified self’ is central to the Christian tenet of the church as body of Christ. Every Christian is, thus, an essential atom in the body of the church stretching infinitely beyond itself.

Simmel highlights constitutive elements of group cohesion, of which I shall only mention elasticity, conflict, honour, and the philosophy of the group. The tendency of a group to be more or less flexible in form is, for Simmel, dependent on the level of complexity and diversity of the group. Accordingly, a conservative policy will unite a diverse group to ensure social preservation. Yet, quantitative changes need to be accommodated by new

145 structures lest the structure becomes obsolete and collapse (Simmel 1898b, pp. 831-34). A group’s “elasticity” (Simmel 1898c, p. 40) depends on the principles governing its structures. For example, the “aristocratic principle,” which can apply to the clergy, the family and other social groupings, is characterised by a “severe conservatism” (Simmel 1898c, p. 37). Further, the type of economic production is also conducive to particular forms of groups. Thus, agricultural economics is conservative for it relies on long term arrangements and is epitomised by fatalism, due to the uncertainties of the weather; whilst the bourgeoisie has an attitude of “fluctuation” and will thus be more prone to adapt and metamorphose (Simmel 1898c, pp. 39-41).

In the final part of The Persistence of Social Groups (1898c), Simmel identifies antagonism as playing an important role in cementing group unity. This is not simply true in the case of external animosity against the group but of parallel animosity between two groups or sets of individuals. This is explored more fully in The Sociology of Conflict (1904). Simmel sees conflict as an active component of social interaction. Simmel’s reflections on antagonism are relevant to the present study in reference to the ‘rigidity’ of Protestantism, which seeks to be true to ‘early Christianity’ and thus rejects established authority and reinvents religious forms (cf. chapter eight). Simmel contrasts the rigidity of Protestantism with the elasticity of the Catholic Church, which seeks to contain and subordinate antagonistic powers to the Church. By contrast, Protestantism, for Simmel, has relied on being a ‘protest’

against something. Thus, when deprived of an enemy outside, Protestantism has repeated the conflict “in its own camp and divided itself into a liberal and orthodox party” (Simmel 1904, p. 681).

146 Another important factor in binding groups is honour (which I develop further in chapter seven). Honour is a particular aspect of morality, which is not necessarily recognised as

‘good’ by the wider society. Honour, in fact, encapsulates the distinctive character of the group and forms the boundaries of conduct, but also of group membership. Thus, honour among thieves coalesces the class (Stand) of that particular social group. Honour is, for Simmel, “one of the most thorough means of maintaining the existence and specific significance of the group” (Simmel 1898a, p. 683). Honour appeals to specific ideas surrounding the essence of the group and the distinctive conduct, which form the boundaries of the group. A similar dynamic to that of honour is given by the philosophy of the group which, although deriving from the individual members, becomes the structure of the group.

Simmel’s structures are not to be intended in a ‘structuralist’ sense; rather they “represent the idea or the power which holds the group together in this particular respect, and they, at the same time, consolidate the group coherence so that it passes from a mere functional to a substantial character” (Simmel 1898a, p. 685). These structures result from individuals projecting their “spiritual content” onto an abstract level of reality, such as country, friend and gods (Simmel 1898, p. 685). The ‘gods’ are endowed with attributes of the human psyche. This process gives strength and power to the ‘gods’ and turns them into a source of moral authority.

“Think, for instance, of the idea of the gods, whom men first endowed with all sorts of qualities, worthiness, and excellencies reflected from human souls. Then

147 the same men used these gods as a source of moral laws and of power to enforce them” (Simmel 1898a, p. 685)

In chapter seven I build on this concept to construct the process of ‘sacralisation’. For the time being, it is important to recognise that a person’s belief in others transforms how that person sees them. Accordingly, the person idealises the people who are the object of belief.

She projects onto them hopes and ideas drawing on their specific characteristics. It is not a simple projection of the self onto others; rather the people around us arouse in us this spiritual attitude, which gives rise to a deeper bond. Belief in God thus shares the same process of idealisation.