H UMANIZAR AL BLANCO , DESHUMANIZAR AL NEGRO : LA SINGULAR BATALLA ENTRE LA VOZ Y LA IMAGEN EN LOS

The implicit or explicit ‘ethics of authenticity’ not only fails to provide an adequate conception of the conditions and norms to facilitate moral consensus; it also normativises a particular understanding of being human, as an intellectualist inward pursuit, which pays lip service to dialogue with other ‘selves’. This might be suitable for philosophers, but it will not serve the needs and wants of the general population. My intent is to formulate a concept of authenticity that is not inherently ethical, but that can be informed by ethical concerns. One that is in relation to one’s interpretation of tradition, but also to wider society and culture. Thus, before I begin to construct my conception of the subject and of

169 authenticity, in the next chapter, I wish to motivate further my disagreement with the ethical perspective of communitarian philosophers, such as Taylor and MacIntyre. This is a concise ‘normative comment’ to clarify my ethical standpoint.

The only ‘normative comment’ I allow myself to express is a disclaimer rather than the exposition of an argument. MacIntyre is right in reaffirming the importance of tradition.

However, what constitutes tradition is a very selective account of events, norms, and practices and is exclusive of dissenting voices and experiences. My interest lies in individual agency and how individuals interpret what they understand to be tradition, how they redefine its boundaries, and how they innovate it. This is based on a broadly liberal stance, which respects particularism as long as it does not deny the fundamental rights of the individual. I consider the value of individual freedom of conscience over and above the value of ‘communities’. I feel communitarian thinkers take for granted their ability to be individuals and free, which is still denied to many, especially to women, including in Western liberal democracies.

For Simmel, heightened individuality was a blessing of modernity rather than a curse. In Sociology (1908/1950), he argued that people are more closely involved in small groups, while larger groups require structures. The distant character of the larger group frees the individual from the control of other members. Thus, the larger entity enables diversity. I value the internal diversity of groups and societies, whose interests, needs and desires compete, clash, but also coalesce. I consider liberal societies agonistic, a position similar to that of Chantal Mouffe and Norberto Bobbio. Following Bobbio (1984/1991), Mouffe

170 (2005) accepts that liberal institutions are essential for pluralism and that total pluralism is not possible and that the exclusion of some points of view is necessary for groups to be able to co-exist peacefully. In an agonistic society, individuals as well as communities pursue their own interests, including the search for truth. This can certainly lead to antagonism and outright conflict. It is the ‘art’ of political compromise that seeks to accommodate divergent interests, visions of the good, and freedoms.

Compromise, as Simmel wrote, “especially that brought about through exchange, no matter how much we think it is an everyday technique we take for granted, is one of mankind’s greatest inventions” (Simmel 1908/1955, p. 115). I believe that it is in the controversies, debates and exchanges that we come to have a view of the good, question it and refine it.

The ‘good’ is not a static category, but the fruit of what we make of our existence. Even what we may call ‘shared values’, as human rights might be, are interpreted differently by different people, groups and cultures. Yet, this diversity should not be taken as a sign of impoverished communities, insurmountable conflict, or a lack of a universalistic framework. Taylor’s, Ferrara’s and MacIntyre’s promotion of particularism, be that of individuals or of groups, detached from an overarching universalistic framework, relativises all conceptions of the good (Insole 2004). This very problem is at the heart of Simmel’s distinction between 18^th century quantitative (universalistic) individualism and 19^th century qualitative (particularistic) individualism. In the post-Enlightenment era, qualitative individualism has become a pre-eminent value. Modernity has accentuated individual’s consciousness. This has resulted in the internalisation of the universal Kantian

171 duty and its translation into a personal conscious choice to make life meaningful, and to grow morally and spiritually.

The Christian evangelicals, in the present case study are refashioning their identity around the notion of authenticity against the background of pluralistic values, multi-faith and multicultural diversity. Christian authenticity, observed in the fieldwork, is undoubtedly ethical (cf. chapter ten). Nevertheless, the conception of authenticity I formulate avoids ethics for two reasons: firstly, to eschew the same normativism and essentialism of the thinkers mentioned in this chapter; secondly, to account for a wider meaning of authenticity. In the first instance, it needs to be reiterated that authenticity, as ‘being true to oneself’, includes being true to one’s character, one’s wellbeing, one’s ideals, which is not necessarily ‘good’ for others. One could conceive one’s authenticity in opposition to others.

One could even conceive of authenticity, as informed by the ‘good’, but a particularistic good that might be in conflict with other conceptions of the good.

In the second instance, a wider formulation allows us to appreciate that there may be things people value, which are not necessarily concerned with ethics, or solely with ethics.

For example, although Christian evangelicals, in the study, practise an ethical authenticity, they do not deem ethics as exhaustive of authenticity. Indeed, evangelicals are conscious of the fact that ethical behaviour can be found outside of religion. Authenticity, more than ethics, identifies the attempt to be true to truth, which in the present case study is identified with the example of Jesus. The truth of Jesus is, for research participants,

172 universal in that it can or, indeed, should be recognised by all. It is transcendent, although experienced in the immanence of everyday life.

Accordingly, my conception of authenticity develops Simmel’s notion of immanent transcendence: “transcendence reveals itself as the immanent condition of life” (Simmel 1918/2010, p. 17). I interpret it, perhaps reductively in order to apply it to my empirical work as a person’s sense of truth, which takes the person beyond “this one-sidedness”. The concept of authenticity, here proposed, refers to a process of identity construction that is informed by one’s understanding of the truth, which may or may not include a conception of the good. Truth, whilst embedded in culture, enables the person to transcend her social and personal identity. Thus, actors construct their identity in relation to a meaning-system, which may include ethical norms, but that is not exhausted by them. It follows that there cannot be authenticity outside a tradition. The human condition is one of situatedness, as MacIntyre might argue. However, contrary to MacIntyre, I do not believe that modernity has left us a fragmented society where it is impossible to hold shared values. Pluralism, with its acceptance of particularistic viewpoints, implies mutual respect, which rests on a liberal universalistic conception of the polity. It entails an agonistic conception of culture and society that need not degenerate into antagonism.

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5. Conclusion

The chapter reviewed the most prominent formulations of authenticity, namely those of Taylor and Ferrara, as well as MacIntyre’s thought on tradition and ethics to highlight some of the recurrent assumptions on the individual, society and ethics in much philosophical reflection. These assumptions, as mentioned in chapter two, are recurrent in sociology as well as in philosophy. They are central to a particular understanding of modernity, which, however, lacks historicism and betrays normative concerns. Normative conceptions of authenticity are underpinned by an understanding of ethics that is seemingly non-conflictual and by a teleological view of human beings. This can lead to a hierarchy of goods and qualities with little room for interpretation.

A view of the ‘good life’ as part of one’s identity neglects the fact that not all people might be concerned with developing and pursuing an ethical ideal. Further, the conflation of character with ethics may lead to conflating moral responsibility with moral quality. In other words, without external moral norms, one’s conduct might be judged simply on the basis of one’s consciousness rather than actions. A ‘mature’ understanding of moral questions does not necessarily lead to moral actions, as many philosophers of morality have shown in their own lives. Schopenhauer (cf. chapter seven) was acutely aware of the value of compassion; yet this did not stop him from mistreating his landlady, being scornful of people around him, and being disliked by his own mother.

174 The concept of authenticity, I propose in the next chapter, therefore eschews ethical assumptions to avoid essentialism, but also to provide a more faithful account of the notion of authenticity, observed in the field. Authenticity is thus a process of identity construction, which is articulated in relation to tradition and one’s community, but also wider society. It is a practice of being true to – what is understood to be – truth. One’s identity is thus not only defined by one’s social relations and individual character, but also one’s understanding of truth, which, contrary to Taylor’s “commitments,” is not necessarily ethical or universal. This conception of authenticity rests on a tripartite systematisation of the ‘self’ as ‘social’, ‘individual’ and ‘authentic’, which is explored in the next chapter.

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