At first, popular opinion across the categories of interviewees for this study was that NEITI is a multi-stakeholder initiative. NEITI is also often identified, both locally and internationally, as a multi-stakeholder initiative. The global EITI criteria stipulate that a multi-stakeholder initiative, independent of government, and equally the enabling law (the NEITI Act) provides for the establishment of “an autonomous self- accounting body”. However, closer observations of the governance structure of the initiative suggest that NEITI is rather implemented as a government agency established under the office of the Presidency. An obvious suggestion to this conclusion is an inscription on the sign post in front of the NEITI Abuja office, which clearly acknowledges that the NEITI is an establishment under the “Office of the Presidency”. Furthermore, a former secretary to the NEITI referred to the NEITI as a government agency during a speech at a public function organised by NEITI36. In
fact, NEITI may not be alone in this practice as it is not uncommon to find heavy
36 “NEITI: A Collective Responsibility” A Speech by Mallam Haruna Yunusa Sa’eed, the Executive
175 government involvement in many of the EITI implementing countries (Goldwyn, 2008). The question therefore is: why does the global initiative seem to accept this practice as normal, when it emphasizes that the initiative should be implemented as a multi-stakeholder initiative? Is the overwhelming control of government in the local implementation somewhat inevitable?
There are some explanations often given for the substantial control of government in the local implementation of the EITI. First, is that there is need for government to lead the initiative. The global EITI recognises that for any meaningful achievement to be made in the provision of resource revenue transparency, government leadership of the initiative is inevitable. This is more so when implementation involves some form of governance reforms (Hemmati 2002:219). A s earlier highlighted in chapter 3, t he EITI is essentially an attempt to provide a ‘globalised national public good’. The problem targeted is largely due to the inability of the national government and key stakeholders in the local environment to guarantee the transparent management of natural resource revenue. Therefore, the solution would include efforts to influence positive governance changes in the local environment. The global EITI, in recognition of the vital role of government, advocates a government-led multi-stakeholder initiative akin to what Heritier and Eckert (2007) refer to as ‘a shadow of hierarchy’. Bernstein and Cashore (2007) also acknowledge that the need for political legitimacy further justifies the inclusion of governments in collective action. The need for an international standard that codifies resource revenue transparency suggests that there are gaps in domestic regulation which need to be addressed. An example is the adjustment of national trade policies as necessary for changing the conditions for diamond trade under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). However,
176 Fransen and Kolk (2007:676) note that “in such situations, governments cannot always be expected to assist in enforcement and compliance, because they are themselves parties subject to the standard.”
Therefore, the indispensability of government leadership of the initiative raises enormous concerns about the effectiveness of the EITI in achieving resource revenue transparency. The foremost attempt at resource transparency made by the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign, was targeted at the extractive industry companies and required minimal or no participation from national governments, perhaps mindful of the challenges that government involvement could engender. Apparently, involving national governments appeared to be the next best option when the PWYP Campaign was not popular especially amongst industry stakeholders. Haufler (2010) notes that:
“Blair shifted the focus of the EITI away from company reporting, which is the target of PWYP activism, to reporting and membership by governments. This latter shift mollified many firms concerned that public disclosure of payments would create tension with host governments and potentially put contracts at risk. It remains a point of contention for some activist groups.” (2010:65).
Presently, the decision to implement the EITI and the direction of implementation seems to rest almost entirely on government leaders. Although, there may be a few other factors that play a role in this government decision (see Pitlik et al, 2009). But evidence from the NEITI example suggests that a lot of political will is required to sustain local implementation of the initiative. The influence of President Obasanjo was undoubtedly required to ensure that the initiative was first established and sustained. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo- Kwaako (2007) acknowledge that the EITI was introduced in Nigeria personally by President Obasanjo. The success achieved in the
177 first few years of NEITI implementation in Nigeria is also attributable to the influence of President Obasanjo who ensured that the right people were involved, and those people in turn took advantage of their relationship with the President, and his personal interest in the initiative, to set the appropriate momentum.
Government also provides the political and regulatory framework required for the enforcement of the agreed standards of the initiative. The provision of ‘globalised national public goods’ often times require adjustments in local institutional arrangements which can only be achieved with the political authority that resides with governments. It would be extremely difficult, if at all possible, to achieve this without the involvement of governments. However, as the NEITI example illustrates, the design leaves a lot of room for the initiative to be hijacked by government and the implication is that in an attempt to create a government-led MSI, a government agency is created instead.
Furthermore, the extractive industry is considered the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, and as such is the pivot around which all political and economic activities revolve. Expectedly, information about the management of the extractive industry is perceived as very sensitive and critical to any government in power. Therefore, it becomes important for government to be very much in control of such an initiative as the NEITI. The NEITI, with its objective of resource transparency, is perceived as a threat to both government agents and their company partners’ control of the extractives sector. Therefore, it becomes imperative for government to ensure as much control of the NEITI as possible to ensure that key interests are adequately protected (Interviewee Nos.6, 7, 11, 13, 31, and 43).
178 Another explanation for the overwhelming government influence is that the NEITI evolved at a time that the Obasanjo administration was implementing an elaborate governance reform agenda. This included major reforms in the area of anti-corruption including the establishment of the popular Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) which aims at fighting fraud and economic and financial malpractices in both the public and private sectors. The NEITI was thus perceived as part of this reform agenda albeit targeted specifically at the extractives sector. This heightened the fears of the political and industry elite considering the exploits of the EFCC, and coupled with the pedigree of the inaugural Chairperson of the NEITI, Mrs Obiageli Ezekwesili, who had become popular with her reform of Public Procurement processes popularly known as the “Due Process” mechanism.