A ttem pts to deepen cooperation am ong the A SEA N m em bers have re fle c te d in te rn a tio n a l eco n o m ic circu m stan ces. T his re la tio n sh ip has been d em o n strated by the p ractice of jo in t lobbying. F aced w ith the realization that, in d iv id u ally , they carry very little econom ic clo u t, the A SEA N states have banded to g eth er to secure trade and other benefits from third parties. In effect, a p o litical response has been used to seek econom ic concessions.
Such a m o d u s o p e ra n d i has been m ost appropriate for the level of regional c o o p eratio n involved in the A SEA N . It involves little if any sacrifice by m em bers and involves no transfer of pow er to any supranational entity
A prime case of this was when the ASEAN states joined together to op p o se th e ex p an sio n of Jap an ese sy n th etic ru b b er p ro d u c tio n .27 Such an ex p an sio n w ould have h u rt A SEA N p ro d u cers o f n atu ral ru b b er such as M alaysia, though Singapore w ould rem ain relatively unaffected. The ASEA N’s jo in t lo b b y in g w as su c c e ssfu l in secu rin g a Ja p a n e se p led g e to lim it
p ro d u c tio n .
E xternally oriented cooperation am ong the A SEA N states was also ev id en t in the In tern atio n al C ivil A viation P olicy (IC A P ) d isp u te.28 In late 1978, A u stra lia attem p ted to in tro d u ce a new p o licy fo r in tern atio n al air traffic. O ne of the resu lts o f this policy w ould have been dam age to the p o sitio n of S ingapore as a sto p o v er d e stin atio n on the long haul flight betw een A ustralia and Europe. Singapore was able to invoke the aid of the A S E A N m em b ers to m ake a jo in t re p re s e n ta tio n to th e A u stra lia n G o v e rn m e n t. T his e ffo rt w as ab le to e x tra c t som e a lte ra tio n s to the A u stralian positio n , though it did not produce all of the changes that the S in g ap o rean s had desired.
The significance of ICAP was that it constituted a case of the ASEAN m em bers jo in in g together to support the econom ic in terests o f one member, when four of the ASEAN countries had little to gain from such lobbying. In fact, it w as likely that som e o f the other ASEAN m em bers w ould actually
have profited from the introduction of ICAP. It should be noted, too, however that the A SEA N p o sitio n w as put as a cooperative, in tergovernm ental effort. T he A S E A N does n o t h av e the su p ra n a tio n a l m ac h in e ry to p ro v id e a representative w ho can function along the lines of say an EC delegation.
A sid e from jo in t lo b b y in g d irec te d e x te rn a lly , the lin k betw een econom ic stim ulants and A SEA N cooperation has been evidenced with regard to the in tern atio n al econom ic clim ate. Such a relatio n sh ip was illustrated by the Bali Sum m it. This m eeting cam e on the back of the m ajor shake-up of the w orld econom y stem m ing from the first 'oil shock'. Though, security concerns played a large part in m otivating the econom ic m easures adopted at Bali, it is also true th at eco n o m ic issu es w ere in stru m en tal in m oving the hands of ASEA N leaders.
E conom ically, there was the shared perception that the ASEAN must increase the level of cooperation. The ASEA N had been in existence for more than e ig h t y ears b u t had p ro d u ce d very little ta n g ib le ev id en ce of its co m m itm en t to re g io n a lis m .29 T he D eclaratio n of A SEA N C oncord w hich em anated from the B ali Sum m it included a decision to 'intensify cooperation in eco n o m ic and so cial d e v e lo p m e n t'.30 The stream lin in g of the ASEA N econom ic com m ittees was another resu lt of the D eclaration.
T he B ali S u m m it also ag reed upon the e s ta b lis h m e n t o f the P re fe re n tia l T rad in g A rran g em en t (PT A ) schem e. U n d er th is, the A SEA N m em ber states w ould agree to n o m in ate lists o f item s upon which they w ould im pose reduced tariffs if the goods originated from another country
w ith in th e A s so c ia tio n . A lth o u g h im p re ss iv e lis ts o f PTA item s were p ro d u c e d the sch em e had little p ra c tic a l b e n e fit. In tra -A S E A N trade co m p rised only seventeen to tw enty per cent o f the m em bers' to ta l trade and even this figure was boosted by S ingapore’s entrepot role. Further, there was an u n w illin g n ess to include 'sen sitiv e' item s w ithin the p referen ce lists. For exam ple, In donesia did not w ant the grow th of its infant m anufacturing sector to be jeo p a rd iz ed by a flood of im ports from estab lish ed plants in S in g a p o re .
A n o th e r co n seq u en ce o f the B ali S um m it w as an ag reem en t to set-up the A SEA N Industrial P rojects(A IP s). T hese w ere to be show cases of A SEA N co o p eratio n and w ere to be e stab lish ed in field s th at w ould not dam age existing industries w ith in countries of the A ssociation. Each of the m em bers w as allo cated a p ro ject: U rea F e rtilise r (In d o n esia and M alaysia), Superphosphate (The P hilippines), D iesel Engines (Singapore) and R ock-Salt Soda Ash P roject (Thailand).
The w orld econom ic clim ate had played a p art in encouraging the A SEA N leaders to adopt some m easures fo r econom ic cooperation but the A SEA N was not yet ready to m ove w ith m uch haste in this field. This fact becam e o b vious w hen the K u ala L u m pur S um m it in the fo llo w in g year rev ealed very little su b stan tial pro g ress resu ltin g from the m easures - such as the establishm ent of the Industrial Projects - adopted at B ali.31
A sim ilar phenom enon was ev id en t in D ecem b er 1987 w hen the A SEA N m em bers m et in M a n ila .3^ This m eeting fell not long after the stock
m ark et c ra sh at a tim e w hen even the A S E A N e co n o m ie s, w h ich had rem ain ed b u o y a n t w hen m any W estern eco n o m ies sta g n ated , w ere facing
tro u b led tim es. M ost im p o rta n tly , 1985 and 1986 w itn esse d the ASEAN states hav in g to face the in cre asin g ly p ro te c tio n ist p o lic ies o f the U nited S ta te s.
T h is clim ate g en erated the w illin g n ess to agree upon a range of e co n o m ic m e a su re s w h ich w ere d e sig n e d to b o o st in tra -A S E A N trade including expansion o f the PTA s along w ith a deepening of the M argin of Preference. T here was also U S$2 billion of loan guarantees forthcom ing from v isitin g Jap an ese P rim e M in ister T ak esh ita. A gain, how ever, th ere was no dram atic acceleratio n of econom ic cooperation.
As w as the case w ith the econom ic m easures agreed upon at the first and second sum m its, once the in d iv id u al A SEA N econom ies im proved much of the resolution needed to enhance intra-A S E A N econom ic cooperation sig n ifican tly tended to e v a p o ra te .33 C om m itm ent to the A SEA N seem s to be open to flu ctu atio n and is affected by the h ealth o f the m em ber's own e c o n o m y .
T he exception to this phenom enon has been the grow th of private sector co llab o ratio n , w hich, though encouraged by the A SEA N organization has not produced the type of p o litica l in teg ratio n th at the neo -fu n ctio n alist thesis w ould d ictate. T hese c o o p erativ e v entures have continued to operate under n atio n al law and have not req u ired su p ran atio n al reg u latio n to iron out pro b lem s in w hat rem ain s a series of n atio n al m arkets (rather than a
sin g le in te g ra te d one). S ig n ific an tly , h o w ev er, this new trend am ong the A SEA N econom ies represents a healthy m ovem ent away from the focus upon the artificial attem pts of governm ents to produce 'sym bols of cooperation’ of q u estio n ab le econom ic w orth.
M o re fo rm a lly , th e p ro c e s s o f e x te rn a lly fo c u s e d p o litic a l co operation aim ed largely at econom ic ends has been seen in the D ialogue P artn er p ro cess w hereby, the A SEA N fo reig n m in isters follow their regular m eetings by co n su ltatio n s w ith the rep resen tativ es o f A u stralia, C anada, the EC, Japan, N ew Zealand, South K orea and the USA. Econom ic issues have been one of the concerns of these dialogue m eetings.
T h e ro le o f e x te rn a l e c o n o m ic fa c to rs in p re c ip ita tin g the d e te rm in a tio n re q u ire d fo r in te g ra tiv e c h an g e s w as d e m o n s tra te d m ost re c e n tly in the S in g a p o re H ead s o f G o v e rn m e n t M e etin g . F irstly , the structure of the w orld trading system was in question. The U ruguay Round of the G en eral A g reem en t on T a riffs and T rad e (G A T T ) n e g o tiatio n s was encountering serious difficulties in reaching a conclusion. Further, there were signs that the w orld was in danger of fragm enting w ith the form ation of two p ro tec tio n ist trading blocs focused on E urope and N orth A m erica. Both of these developm ents posed p otential problem s for the A SEA N due to the fact that they risked being shut out of m arkets and because of the fact that the S ingle In teg rated M arket (SIM ) and N orth A m erican Free T rade A greem ent (N A FTA ) w ould prove to be very strong lures for in tern atio n al in v esto rs.34 Both of these groupings w ould perm it access to vast ’in tern al’ m arkets.
T he m ag n itu d e o f the ch an g es facin g the A S E A N p ro v id ed the im petus to produce w hat, at least on paper, seem s to be a sig n ifican t step forw ard in (su b -)reg io n al econom ic in teg ratio n . In the first place, the Heads of G o v ern m en t agreed upon su b stan tial and d e fin ite m easu res th a t w ould lead to the creation of a free-trad e zone. This m ove had been prom oted by the governm ent of Thai Prim e M inister Anand P anyarachun - who pointed to the ex am p les of N A FTA and E u ro p e's S ingle In tern al M arket (SIM ) - and found ready support from S ingapore.
It w as In d o n esia th at p roposed the C om m on P referen tial E ffective T arriffs (C E PT ) schem e w hich provides for ta riff red u ctio n and elim ination across a v a rie ty of e x p o rt c a te g o rie s acco u n tin g fo r n in ety p er cent of intra-A sean trade. T here w ould be provision both for acceleration on the 'six m inus x' basis and for individual states to exclude sensitive item s. Indonesia, now m ore am enable to trade lib e raliza tio n , caused su rp rise by agreeing to have the tariff cuts extend to the category o f capital g oods.35 A lso, a group w ould be set-up to supervise the im plem entation of CEPT.
T he a c c e p ta n c e o f th e 's ix m in u s x' fo rm u la w as bo th a d em o n stratio n o f the A S E A N 's real co n fid en ce (sin ce it w ould now allow som e m em b ers to b reak w ith the c o n v e n tio n a l c o n sen su s ap p ro ach on eco n o m ic issu e s w ith o u t fea rin g th a t th is w ould d isru p t or d estro y the A S E A N 's s o lid a rity ) and an e n d o rs e m e n t o f th e fa c t th a t trila te ra l co o p eratio n was now ach iev in g signal success through the grow th triangle c o n c e p t . 36 'S ix m inus x ’ co o p eratio n allow s the m ore ad v an ced A SEA N
econom ies to accelerate cooperation.
A fu rth e r m ove to w ard s g rea ter eco n o m ic c o o p eratio n stem m ing from th e v o la tile in te rn a tio n a l trad in g situ atio n has been the E ast A sia Econom ic Caucus (EAEC) proposal cham pioned by M alaysia. This was to be a support group w ith m em bership open to the states on the W estern rim of the