LA REVOLUCIÓN JURÍDICA (Finales de 1788-Junio de 1789)

The first task of this conclusion w ill be briefly to verify that general th eo ries o f reg io n alism have in d eed not p ro p erly co m p reh en d ed the birth and grow th o f the A SEA N . F irstly , it m ust be observed th at the A SEA N's d e v e lo p m e n t has n o t c o n fo rm e d to M ittra n y 's b ran d o f fu n c tio n a lism . Indeed, the level of fu n ctio n al cooperation am ong m em bers o f the ASEAN has only becom e sig n ifican t in recen t years. T hus, it is im possible to cite 'passive spillover' as a m otive force in the ASEAN's growth.

d raw s a b la n k . T w e n ty -fiv e y e ars ago, w hen H aas w ro te his a rtic le 1 p ro c la im in g th a t the c o n v e n tio n a l n e o -fu n c tio n a lis t view o f in te n sifie d reg io n al co o p eratio n did not p ro v id e an adequate ex p lan atio n for w hat had o ccu rred in the sixties in W estern E urope, he could not have know n the m an n e r by w h ich re g io n a lis m w o u ld d e v elo p in S o u th e a s t A sia. H is conclusion has though, proved, to be accurate.

T he A SEA N has not d isplayed the key dynam ic o f increm ental, fun ctio n ally driven grow th tow ards m ore intensive levels of cooperation. The A S E A N 's d e a lin g s h av e rem a in e d stric tly b ased on n a tio n a l u n its and th erefo re have not req u ired m eans of reg u latio n beyond the national level. There has been no evidence of the spillover effect.

T he A SEA N has, how ever, d isp lay ed som e co m p atib ility with the N eo-realist outlook. The state has rem ained the key actor and the key unit of d ecisio n -m ak in g . Y et the state-cen tric view is also not quite adequate. The A SEA N leaders have been keen to foster the cause of regional identity. The IC A P d isp u te certain ly illu strates a realizatio n that the necessity to deal in and su p p o rt a u n it la rg e r than the n a tio n -sta te m ig h t w ell req u ire the su b o rd in atio n o f n ational in terests.

T he A SEA N is som ething m ore than the co n v en tio n al nation-state but does n o t seek to rep la ce th at en tity w ith som e so rt o f m ega-state. R e g io n a lism both in the E u ro p ean case and that o f S o u th east A sia has d e m o n s tra te d a lo n g e v ity , an a ttra c tiv e n e s s and a p e rv a siv e n e s s th at dem ands serious attention yet defies general theories.

4.3 The A SEA N and Europe: C ontext, P olitical W ill and Leadership

H a v in g c o n firm e d th a t g e n e ra l th e o r ie s c a n n o t a d e q u a te ly com prehend the genesis and grow th of the ASEA N, it is now tim e to test the utility of the reference dim ensions proposed in chapter one and em ployed in chapters tw o and three. This w ill be accom plished by considering each axis in turn. The procedure w ill be to recapitulate briefly on the E uropean case and then to m ake application to the ASEAN.

B oth the A SEA N and the E C 2 have been greatly affected by their resp ectiv e co n texts . E uropean cooperation has been founded upon extensive functional links and a shared p olitical and cultural heritage. W estern Europe is also m ade up of states w hich are internally integrated and are dem ocratic in character. Further, it was shown in chapter one that the end of W orld W ar II left a core of W estern E uropean states in a fram e of m ind - both at the g o v ern m en t and p o p u lar lev els - th at w as rip e fo r reg io n a l co o p eratio n . Thus, E uropean regionalism was greatly facilitated by its context.

The ASEA N has also been greatly affected by its context, yet in a very d ifferen t way. The A ssociation's context has proved to be a constraint. The A SEA N started am ong states with m inim al functional links and a history of d iv isio n . A d d itio n ally , the A S EA N 's m em bership in clu d ed co u n tries that w ere only new ly in d ep en d en t and still estab lish in g th eir nationhood w ithin their own borders. Southeast A sia did not have a heritage of regional identity and lacked popular support for regionalism . The A SEA N ’s context has placed a d efinite lim it upon w hat can be realistically achieved in term s of regional

c o o p e ra tio n .

A second axis for m easurem ent o f regional co operation is that of

p o litic a l w ill . It has been show n that reg io n alism is fu elled by various im p e rativ es th at stim u la te key d ecisio n -m a k ers to in itia te or to in ten sify re g io n a l c o o p e ra tio n . C o m m itm e n t to E u ro p e a n c o o p e ra tio n has been m ain tain ed by the ch alle n g e of C om m unism in the E ast, along w ith the p e rc e p tio n th a t ta n g ib le e co n o m ic g ain s can be a ch iev e d by w orking together. T here is a reco g n itio n that supranational in stitu tio n s have a part to play in adv an cin g E u ro p ean in teg ratio n . To som e ex ten t, the v isio n of a united E urope w hich it is hoped w ill reg ain for its m em bers a p lace of preem inence upon the w orld stage has also facilitated E uropean regionalism .

P articu lar im peratives such as security and econom ic concerns have likew ise served to galvanize the will to act on the part of the ASEA N leaders. The resp o n se, though, has been sig n ifican tly d ifferen t. T he A SEA N states have tried to achieve stab ility w ithin the region by seeking the acceptance by all states in S outheast A sia of the p rin cip les of m utual resp ect for the p o st-co lo n ial borders and fo r territo rial integrity.

Econom ic concerns for m ost of the A SEA N ’s history have given rise to little m ore than show case cooperation (such as the AIPs and PTAs). The context - prim arily the lack of com plem entarity am ong the ASEA N econom ies and Indonesia's desire to p ro tect its infant m anufacturing sector - w ould not perm it anything else. W ithin the confines o f the S o u th east A sian situation, the im p erativ es that have stim ulated the b est resu lts have been those that

required little or no sacrifice upon the part of the ASEA N m em bers. Exam ples included the jo in t lobbying over Japanese synthetic rubber, A ustralia's IC A P3 and the acco m m o d atio n o f boat p eo p le as w ell as the C am bodian issue. Southeast A sian reg io n alism has not generated in its m em bers a w illingness to hand over any aspects of sovereignty to a supranational authority. Such an idea is foreign to the A SEA N 's experience as well as its vocabulary.

T he third referen ce dim ension of leadership w ill firstly be treated on the i n d i v i d u a l level. De G aulle upset the theory by acting as a brake u pon m o re in te n s ifie d p o litic a l c o o p e ra tio n w h ile e co n o m ic in te g ratio n c o n tin u e d . C h ap ter th ree o f th is su b -th e sis illu s tra te d the ro le o f key statesm en, principally Soeharto and Lee K uan Yew, in m odulating the pace of Southeast A sian cooperation. Thus, both the A SEA N and the EC have shown that they are susceptible to the influence of one or tw o leaders affecting their pace and direction.

T his phenom enon leaves room for a v ariety of d isparate outcom es th at stu d en ts o f reg io n a l c o o p eratio n are u n lik ely to be able to predict. Indeed, because the A SEA N depends so h eavily upon the com m itm ent of national elites, in the absence of p o p u lar support, it is p articu larly open to having a leader such as S oeharto placing his stam p upon its direction. And o b v io u sly , lea d ers' w o rld v iew s, w h ich in fo rm th e ir actio n s, can d iffer m arkedly. C onsequently, the fact that individual lead ers are able to have a sig n ifican t im pact upon the nature of regional cooperation in both Southeast A sia and the EC is m ore likely to be a source of divergence than sim ilarity.

The concept of leadership has also been considered in the n a t i o n a l

and b u r e a u c r a t i c ! e l i t e senses. In the European case single states have been unable to ex ercise a lo n g -term dom inance of the group's direction. Europe has a num ber o f sim ilarly -sized larg er m em bers (F rance, G erm any and the U nited K ingdom ). It also has in B russels an elite bureaucratic culture with an in -b u ilt m otivation for pushing along the E C ’s developm ent.

T he A SEA N by c o n tra st has one g ian t m em ber, In d o n esia. The prev io u s tw o chapters have dem onstrated th at In d o n esia has played a m ost sig n ific a n t p art in allo w in g the g ro u p 's fo rm atio n and in m odu latin g its p ro g re s s . T h e A S E A N 's b u re a u c ra tic m a c h in e ry re m a in s m in im al and therefore contributes little as an extra source fostering regional cooperation.

T he p re s e n t w rite r su b m its th at the a p p ro a c h a d v o ca te d here su cceed s in p ro v id in g a u se fu l tool in u n d e rsta n d in g re g io n a lism , and esp ecially the case o f S o u th east A sia. It also acco u n ts fo r the frustration ex p erien ced by those seeking to estab lish a general th eo ry of regionalism . T he three m easures suggested for w hich cases of reg io n al cooperation are m o st re a d ily c o m p a ra b le , d o , p a ra d o x ic a lly , g iv e ris e to the la rg e st d isc rep a n cies. T hus, the m o st p ro fo u n d sim ila ritie s b etw een the E uropean C om m unity and the A SEA N - context, political w ill and leadership - actually give rise to some of the greatest practical differences.

4.4 The Formula f o r Successful Regionalism ?

T he above analysis can be taken a little fu rth er by considering the

c o m p a r a t i v e str e ng th s of context, po litical will and leadership . Once more, the p rin cip le w ill be outlined for E urope and then it w ill be applied to the S o u th east A sian situation.

E urope has great strength in context; h a s had significant political, se cu rity and econom ic im p e rativ es, and c o n t i n u e s to have econom ically g en erated im peratives for in creased co o p eratio n ; and is strong in term s of b u reau cratic leadership, yet is at tim es ham pered by n ational and individual leadership. The size of the first two m uliplicands is sufficient to m ore than c o m p e n s a te fo r o c c a s io n a l flu c tu a tio n s in th e th ird and so re g io n a l co operation and integration is sustained.

The ASEA N m easures up quite differently. Its singular achievem ent has been com pensating for its fragile c o n t e x t through the d e te r m i n a t io n o f

its leaders. This determ ination has been generated by a variety of propitious

circu m stan ces related to econom ic, security and other concerns. It has been m uch assisted by the ro le of key in d iv id u als and the steadying hand of I n d o n e s ia .

T h u s , s u c c e s s f u l r e g io n a l c o o p e r a tio n c an u se d if f e r e n t com binations of strength in the three key dim ensions o f context, political will and lead ersh ip . It req u ires not a sum but a c r i t i c a l v o l u m e . The three d im e n sio n s m u st re a c h a p a rtic u la r p ro d u c t th o u g h th e sizes of the in d iv id u al m ultiplicands m ay vary. A zero or negative score in a particular

dim ension w ill prevent successful regional cooperation. A sm all score in one dim ension w ill require a com pensatory larger m easurem ent in one or both of the other two.

E u ro p e's volum e should be seen as sim ilar to a cube, w ith good m easurem ents in all three dim ensions. The A SEA N 's shape, how ever, is akin to a w all, the narrow dim ension being context. W hether it is likely to topple, to be given a broader foundation or to be absorbed into som ething larger, is the concern of the next section.

4.5 The Future o f R egionalism in Southeast Asia