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Inrecentyears,theCourthasdemonstratedawillingnesstolegitimize claimsthattransgresstheprotective-projectivedistinctionsuggestedbythe Court’s earlier religionjurisprudence. As MaryAnne Case has observed, theCourt’srecentcaseshave“vastlyincreasedtheabilityofthereligiousto exert control over public governmental space and resources.”²⁷⁰ One re-sponse to this phenomenon might be to cabin such claims to the personal sphere,withoutcastingjudgmentonthesubstanceoftheclaimitself. Ifclaims ofreligiousidentityattempttodictaterelationshipsbetweenothersoroccupy the roleoflaw,they shouldnot warrantconstitutionalprotectionunderthe FirstAmendment.

One such claim was raised in the case of Elane Photography, LLC v.

Willock,²⁷¹decidedbytheNewMexicoSupremeCourtin2013. Inthiscase, Elane Photography refused to photograph a wedding ceremony between Vanessa Willock and Misti Collingsworth.²⁷² Willock subsequently filed a complaintwiththeNewMexicoHumanRightsCommission,claimingthat the refusal constituted a violationof the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA),whichprotectsagainstdiscriminationonthebasisofsexual ori-entation.²⁷³ InresponseElanePhotographyargued,amongotherthings,that theNMHRAviolateditsrighttofreelyexerciseitsreligion.²⁷⁴

269. Thismightappeartosomeasequivalenttothepromotionorprojectionofsecularism,tothe exclusion of religious identity. While this Article does not find that categorization objectionable,the mainintentionisnottopromotesecularismoverreligiousidentity,but insteadtopreventreligiousidentityfromoverreaching.

270. MaryAnneCase,Why“Live-and-Let-Live”IsNotaViableSolutiontotheDifficultProblemsof ReligiousAccommodationintheAgeofSexualCivilRights,88S.CAL.L.REV.463,475(2015).

271. ElanePhotography,LLCv.Willock,309P.3d53(N.M.2013).

272. Id.at59–60.

273. Id.at58–60.

274. Id.at60.

ElanePhotographyarguedthatithadnotdiscriminatedagainstthe cou-ple;instead,thebusinessexplained,it”didnotwanttoconveythrough[the co-ownerandleadphotographer]’spicturesthestoryofaneventcelebratingan understandingofmarriagethatconflictswith[theowners’]beliefs.”²⁷⁵ Inits briefonappealfromtheadversedecisionoftheNewMexicoHumanRights Commission,thecompanyarguedthatithadnever“refuse[d]totake pho-tographs of peoplebecause of their sexual orientation.”²⁷⁶ The brief then wentontodescribetheownersandphotographers’(theHuguenins)identity asChristiansandthe“strongmoralandphilosophicalbeliefs”thataccompany thatidentity,includingthebeliefsthatmarriageshouldbedefinedasbetween amanandawomanandthat“marriagedefinedasonemanandwomanisthe bestwaytobenefit,protectandenhanceasociety,itsfamiliesanditsindividual members.”²⁷⁷

WhattheHugueninsarticulatedisadefinitionofself,whichby exten-sion is adefinition of theircompanyidentity, butalso a visionfor how the worldshouldbe—includingavisionastowhattypesofromanticandlegal re-lationshipsareappropriate. Thebriefalsoexplainedthatduetotheir“moral, philosophicalandreligiousbeliefsaboutthedefinitionofmarriage,theowners andphotographersofElaneCompanywillnotphotographanysituationthat willcommunicateaviewthatcontradictsorconflictswiththeowners’beliefs about thedefinitionof marriage.”²⁷⁸ Thus,the Hugueninswish to conduct theirbusinessinamannerthatdoesnotundermineorchallengetheiridentity.

Thecourt’s discussionofthis argumenttakes thereligiousobjectionat facevalue,andthenfocusesonthenatureofthediscriminationanditseffect ontheplaintiffs. Thecourtcharacterizedthecompany’sargumentasan“an attempttodistinguishbetweenanindividual’sstatusofbeinghomosexualand hisorherconductinopenlycommittingtoapersonofthesamesex”and hold-ingthatastatus-conductdistinctioninthiscontextisuntenable.²⁷⁹ Astothe freeexerciseclaimspecifically,thecourtfoundthattheNMHRAwasa neu-tral law of general applicability, and that Elane Photography hadnot ade-quatelybriefedtheargumentthatitsfreeexerciseandcompelledspeechclaims

275. Id.at61.

276. AppealFromtheDecisionandFinalOrderoftheNewMexicoHumanRightsCommission at2,ElanePhotographyv.Willock,309P.3d53(N.M.2013)(No.CV-2008-06632).

277. Id.

278. Id.at3.

279. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at61. As a result, the court rejected as irrelevant Elane Photography’s claim that it would photograph a gay person in a single-person portrait becausethatphotographwouldnotreflecttheclient’ssexualpreferences. Id.

created a“hybrid-rights”situationthat mightrendersuchalaw unconstitu-tional.²⁸⁰

Insteadof assumingthe applicability of the FreeExercise Clause and thenapplyingaSmith-typeanalysisorweighingthecompany’srightsagainst that ofthe couple,thecourt might—undertheframework describedinthis Article—have viewed Elane Photography’s refusal asnon-cognizable under theFreeExercise Clause. The rightto freeexerciseentitlesElane Photog-raphy,aswellasitsownersandemployees,toassociateandidentifywitha reli-gious faith that objectsto same-sex weddingsand other demonstrations of sexualpreference. Anditprotectstheirabilitytoengageasindividualsorwith othersofthesamefaithincustomsandpracticesthatarepartofthatreligion.

Yetwhattheownersseekintheinstantcaseissomethingdifferent:Theaspect of identityfor whichthey seek accommodationrelatesonly to whetherand howothers’relationshipsarerecognizedbythelaw. Whiletheyhaveframed that belief as an aspect of their personal identity,²⁸¹ it is ultimately other-regardingandfallssquarelywithintherealmofwhatlawisintendedtogovern—

thewayinwhichothersmaypermissiblyrelate.

Totheextentthatsuchindividuals—or thecorporationthatthey have created—wishtoimposethatvaluestructureonothersordisplacethelawin that realm, their actionsconstitute a projectiveexerciseof religious identity andshouldnotbeprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.²⁸² Thisisdistinctfrom religiousexpression,whichisameansofconveyingone’sownbeliefsto oth-ers.²⁸³ TheexerciseofreligiousidentityexemplifiedbycaseslikeElane Photog-raphy is not merely the conveyance of one’s ideas or values—for example,

280. Id.at72–76;seealsosupranote216andaccompanyingtext. Thecourtspendsafewlines debatingwhetherElaneCompany,asalimited-liabilitycorporation,evenhasfreeexercise rights;finally,itproceedsbyexplainingthatevenifitdoeshavesuchrights,theyhavenot beenviolatedhere. ElanePhotography,309P.3d.at72–73.

281. Whatifitiscriticaltotheformationandpursuitofone’spersonalidentitythatoneimpose thatidentity on others? Sucha question clearly teststhe boundaries of the protective-projectiveframework. Forthe frameworktoremaineffective,itmust necessarilyadopta moreindividualizeddefinitionofidentity—arguably,adefinitioninlinewiththeSupreme Court’sviewofidentity,seeLUCAS,UndoingRace?,supranote11,at1284–85,1288—that woulddefinesuchaclaimasinherentlyprojectiveandthusnon-cognizable.

282. ThisisnottosuggestthattheHugueninsshouldbeforcedtotakesuchpictures,onlythatto the extent theywish to engagein the wedding photographybusiness, they willhave to complywiththelaw—includingitsantidiscriminationprovisions—andcannotbeexempted fromitonthebasisofreligion.

283. Alsodistinguishableisthecaseofindividualsorgroupsforwhomproselytizingisacritical partoftheirreligionand,subsequently,oftheirreligiousidentity. Nothingintheframework suggestedin this Article would prevent those individuals fromexpressing their faith or attemptingtoconvertothers. Thatisdistinct,however,fromlegallyimposingone’sbeliefs onothersorattemptingtostructuretheworldinwhichothersoperate.

perhapsitwouldbepermissibleforElanePhotographytohangaposterespousing suchvaluesinitsstore—butgoesfurtherbyobstructingthewayinwhichthelaw relatesnotjusttothem,butalsotoothers.²⁸⁴

Tocontrastthistypeofclaimwiththosedescribedasprotectiveinnature, onemightcomparetheHuguenins’claimtoYoder’sclaim. Yoderbelievedit wouldcontradicthisreligiousidentity(and,arguably,thatofhischildren—see thecaveatinnote193)to sendhischildrentopublicorprivateschool. The Huguenins argue that it would contradict their religious identity to serve same-sex couples, given their belief that such relationships are immoral.

Yoder’sclaimdoesnotnecessarilyimplyanythinggenerallyaboutthe sound-ness or appropriateness of a formal education requirement and, more im-portant,hisclaimdoesnotdictatehowitshouldapplytoothers. Incontrast, whiletheHuguenins’claimisalsoframedasonebasedonreligiousidentity, thebelieforaspectofidentitytheyarepurportingtoprotectfocuses specifical-lyonhowothersrelatetooneanother. Inthatsense,theirclaim—oruseof religiousidentity—isother-regardingratherthaninternallyfocused(suchas concentratingonthewayinwhichoneeducatesoneselforone’schildrenor onthetypesofrelationshipsonechoosestoenter).

Insome ways,it may be difficult to distinguishthe Huguenins’ claim fromYoder’s:Bothpartiescouldbeviewedasseekinganopt-outthatreflectsa critiqueofhowotherpeoplerelate. InYoder’scase,forexample,therequest foranexemptionmaybejustasmuchacritiqueofcompulsoryformal educa-tionasitisameansofprotectingtheAmishtradition. And,inbothcases,one mightarguethattheonlyeffectonothersisindirect,oraresultofdownstream consequences. Whileallowinganunlimitednumberofexemptionswould im-perilaccess toservices,asapracticalmatter thesame-sexcouple cansimply hireanotherweddingphotographer,andtheformaleducationsystemwillstill

284. WithcredittoJulesEpstein,itisinterestingtoconsiderthefollowinghypotheticalandhow itwouldbetreatedundertheprotective-projectiveframework:WhatifaMuslimwitnessina criminaltrialwearsaburqa,whichobscuresherfaceandmakesitdifficultforthejudgeto fullyobserveherdemeanor? Assumingitisviewedaspartofherreligioustradition,doesher personaldecisiontoweartheburqa(andtoseekanaccommodationtowardthatend)impose onotheractorsinvolvedinthetrialoronthecriminaljusticesystemmoregenerallysuchthat itshouldbedeemedprojective? Thishypotheticalisdemonstrativeoftherealitythatevery frameworkusedtolimitreligiousfreedomclaimswillcreateagrayareaandresultinhard questions. Rather than try to avoid those questions, which are inevitable regardless of approach,weshouldensurethattheframeworkchosenresultsintherighthardquestions—in otherwords,thosequestionsthataretrulydifficulttoresolveasasubstantivematterandnot thosethatareunclearastoresultonlybecauseofhowtheinquiryisstructured.

governmostchildrenwithoutanynoticeableimpact.²⁸⁵ Inthatsense,Elane Photographydoespresentperhapsthegreatesttestoftheprotective-projective framework. Themostrelevantdistinctionbetweenthetwo—anda determi-nativeone,inthecontextofthisframework—isthefactthattheHuguenins’

claimaimstoprotectbeliefasitrelatestotheactivityofothers. Indoingso,it effectivelyinterfereswiththeapplicationofthelawnotjusttotheHuguenins themselves(asanexemptionoropt-out should),but toothersaswell. The protectionprovidedbyantidiscriminationlawsliketheNMHRAthatwould otherwiseapplytosame-sexcoupleslikeWillockandCollingsworth is evis-ceratedbytheHuguenins’exerciseoftheirreligiousfreedom.²⁸⁶ Incontrast, Yoder’sclaimcreatesnosimilarproblem:Thereisnoparallellegalprotection thatisdisplacedinlightofYoderbeinggrantedanexemption.

Theidentity-basednatureoftheclaimsdescribedhereisdistinctfrom, butsharessomesimilaritieswith,thecomplicity-basedconscienceclaims de-scribedbyDouglasNeJaimeandRevaSiegel.²⁸⁷ AccordingtoNeJaimeand Siegel,someoftherecentreligiousfreeexerciseclaimsdescribedabove—such as the refusal to provide contraceptive coverage within health insurance plans—are complicity-basedconscience claims. Theyview theclaimantsin casessuchasHobbyLobbyascontendingthattheprovisionofinsurancecoverage

“wouldmakethemcomplicitwithemployeeswhomightusetheinsuranceto pur-chaseformsofcontraceptionthatthe employersviewedassinful.”²⁸⁸ Similarly, thosewhoopposesame-sexmarriageforreligiousreasonsclaimthatany involve-mentinsuchaunion,whetheritentailsofficiating theceremonyorbakinga

285. AsinthecaseofThomasv.ReviewBoardoftheIndianaEmploymentSecurityDivision,450 U.S.707(1981),themereexistenceofdownstreamconsequencesthatwillultimatelyhavea minorsystemicimpactoreffectonothersisdistinguishablefromthoseactionsthatdirectly affectothers. Seesupranote200andaccompanyingtext.

286. Thenotionthatreligiousexemptionsarelesspalatableinthecontextofantidiscriminationis notanovelone. Forexample,incaseslikeLovingv.Virginia,388U.S.1(1967),andBob JonesUniversityv.UnitedStates,461U.S.574(1983),theSupremeCourthasrefusedto allow“religiousexemptionstoobviateanti-discriminationlaw.” ShannonGilreath&Arley Ward,Same-SexMarriage,ReligiousAccommodation,andtheRaceAnalogy(WakeForestUniv.

Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2748565, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748565 [https://perma.cc/U8PH-B4BB]. AsGilreathandWardnote,laws“aimedattheinequalityharmsofinferiorityand

‘exclusion’”aremoredirectlyunderminedbyreligiousexemptionsthattolerateorfacilitate discrimination. Id.

287. NeJaime&Siegel,supranote77,at2516;seealsoKaveny,supranote24,at20(notinga

“distinctionbetweenlawswhichrequireagentsthemselvestocommitwhattheybelievetobe wrongdoing,andlawswhichrequirethemtobesomehowconnectedtothewrongfulactsof otherpersons”).

288. NeJaime&Siegel,supranote77,at2518.

weddingcake,makesthemcomplicitinsinfulconduct.²⁸⁹ Whilethefocuson identitydescribedhereisdistinctfromthenotionofcomplicity,thetwoare re-lated:Onereasonthatcomplicitymaybeproblematicisbecauseofthe impli-cationthatone’sactionsreflectbackonone’sownidentity. Yet,asNeJaime andSiegelagree,theremustbesomelimitonwhatwillbeprotectedunderthe guiseofsuchclaims.

NeJaimeandSiegelexplainthatcomplicity-basedconscienceclaims con-cernthird-partyconductandarealso“claimsabouthowtoliveinacommunity withotherswhodonotsharetheclaimant’sbeliefs,andwhoselawfulconduct thepersonoffaithbelievestobesinful.”²⁹⁰ Thus,they“support accommodat-ingclaimsforreligiousexemption,butonlyontheconditionthattheir accom-modationdoesnotimpairattainmentofmajorsocietalgoalsorinflicttargeted materialordignitaryharmsonothercitizens.”²⁹¹ Thisapproachtherefore fo-cusesprimarily onthe effectsofaccommodation,ratherthanthemannerin which identity is being exercised. While the first part of the statement—

impairmentofmajor societalgoals—is reflectiveof concernsmotivatingthe protective-projectiveframework(namely,thatidentitywillbeusedtoobstruct operationofthelawasappliedtoothers),thesecondpartofthestatement di-vergesbyfocusingpurelyontheharminflictedratherthantheroleidentityis playing.

Itmaybethatthetypesofclaimsarticulatedinthecontextof contracep-tive coverage and same-sex marriage present unique concerns about third-partyharm.²⁹² ErwinChemerinskyandMicheleGoodwinhaveargued,ina differentcontext, that“people should nothave theright to inflictinjury on

289. Id.at2560–63. NeJaimeandSiegelexplainhowthesamereasoningmayextendtojustifythe refusalto providehealthinsurancethatcovers employees’same-sexspouses. Id.at2563.

MartyLedermanhaspointedoutthatthegovernmentsinquestioninsuchcasesoften“do notchoosetochallengethesincerityoftheever-evolvingtheoriesofcomplicity.” Postingof MartyLederman,[email protected],to[email protected](Sept.8,2015, 6:29PM)(onfilewithauthor).

290. NeJaime&Siegel,supranote77,at2519.

291. NeJaime&Siegel,supranote27,at3–4;seealsoNelsonTebbeetal.,WhenDoReligious Accommodations Burden Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCEBETWEENRELIGION,IDENTITY,ANDEQUALITY(SusannaMancini&Michel Rosenfeldeds.)(forthcoming2017)(manuscriptat2–4)(defendingandattemptingtodefine the metric of third-party harm as a means for assessing the legality of religious accommodations,whichtheauthorsarguemustreferencesubstantiveandnormativevalues).

292. SeeNeJaime&Siegel,supranote77,at2519;seealsoid.at3(“[W]ecallforspecialscrutinyof [complicity-basedconscience claims]because of their distinctivecapacity to harm other citizens.”).

othersinthenameoffreeexerciseofreligion.”²⁹³ Theyarguethatmanyofthe casesinwhichtheCourtprotectedthefreeexerciseofreligioncanbe distin-guished from cases like Hobby Lobby because, in those cases, no one was hurt.²⁹⁴ Basingtheconstitutionalityofone’sactionontheharmexperienced byothersraisesanumberofotherquestions,however,suchas:Whattypeor degreeofharmwilljustifytherestrictionofothers’rights—mustitbematerial orphysical harm,oris emotional orpsychological harmsufficient?²⁹⁵ Ulti-mately,thequestionofhowreligiousidentityisbeingexercised—whetherisit orientedinward,aimedsolelyatpreservingtheindividual’sidentity,or wheth-erisitother-regarding,focusedonhow othersrelatetoeachotherorto the government—maybemoreobjectiveandalsomoretractablebecauseitdoes notrequirethesametypesofsubsequentjudgments.²⁹⁶

Whatwouldanidentity-basedframeworkmakeoftheargumentbysuch aclaimantthatcertainlawsforcehertobecomplicitinothers’immoral behav-iororforcehertoengageinactionthatmaycauseotherstoperceiveher identi-tyinadifferentorinaccurateway? Theremustbesomelimittothislineof argument—otherwisesocietywouldbeunabletoconstructasecularlegal sys-temcapableofeffectivelygoverningtherelationshipsamongindividualsand groups.²⁹⁷ Onesuchlimitmightbetocharacterizecertainreligiousbeliefsas fallinginsideoroutsidethesubstantiverealmofconstitutionallyprotected re-ligiousexercise—forexample,bychallengingthevalidityorcredibilityofan indi-vidual’s substantive religious belief. Arguably, that approach wouldbe more offensivetothenotionthateachindividualshouldbeabletodefineandpursuehis orherownreligiousidentity. Anotherlimitingprinciple,assuggestedabove,

293. Chemerinsky&Goodwin,supranote191,at23(“Asanormativematter,webelievethatthe freedomofonepersonendswhenitinflictsaninjuryonanother.”). Intheiressay,whichisa review of Paul Offit’s book BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN MEDICINE (2015), they focus primarily on parents’ invocation of religious

293. Chemerinsky&Goodwin,supranote191,at23(“Asanormativematter,webelievethatthe freedomofonepersonendswhenitinflictsaninjuryonanother.”). Intheiressay,whichisa review of Paul Offit’s book BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN MEDICINE (2015), they focus primarily on parents’ invocation of religious