Vietnamese Diplomacy
It was not Vietnamese intransigence that left insoluble the
Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict. Strong nationalism and what
Burchett terms as Pol P o t ’s megalomania alienated the
Vietnamese from the Khmer Rouge.42 Ironically, it was
Vietnam that promoted Khmer nationalism into 1976 so as to
ensure Cambodian independence from China.43 Hanoi was
unhappy with the Cambodian communist party's movement away
from relations with other Indochinese communist parties and
the desire by Cambodia to develop a foreign policy distinct
from Vietnam's. Displeased with an assertive, nationalist
anti-Vietnamese grouping in Cambodia, the Vietnamese
nevertheless tried to maintain a dialogue with the Khmer
R o u ge .
Chanda asserts that it was not until the fall of 1977 that
the Vietnamese had become certain of the extent of China's
aid to the Khmer Rouge.44 Hanoi then became convinced that
Beijing's support for the Khmer Rouge formed part of a
policy of "encircling" Vietnam.
Before 1977 however, calling for solidarity among the three
Indochinese countries and the strengthening of the countries
"special relationship", Vietnam, in a joint communique
signed by Laotian and Vietnamese officials on 12 February
42. Burchett, 69.
43. Barnett, "Interview with Le Duc Tho," in e d s . Pilger and Barnett, 55.
1976, beckoned for long term mutual aid and coordination.45 But the proposed scheme was couched in language which would coyly extend nothing but friendship and brotherliness, with Vietnam playing the role of the elder sibling, to the Kampucheans. A wary Khmer Rouge discounted the proposition as a Vietnamese plot to establish an "Indochina Federation" to dominate the smaller Khmer nation.
In July 1976, a number of Vietnamese journalists visited Kampuchea at the invitation of the Kampuchean government.46 Although their stay could not be considered a success, the visit indicates, at least, a semblance of civility between Hanoi and Phnom Penh.
Neither the Chinese nor the Kampucheans sent an official delegation to the Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1976, even though invitations requesting their attendance had been extended. The Kampucheans as a token gesture did send a group of seven journalists. At the Congress, the Vietnamese again called for the strengthening of cooperation and the defence of the three Indochinese states. 47
In February 1977, as Chanda indicates, Vietnam sent a delegation of women to Phnom Penh to promote the Vietnamese- Khmer amity. As well, from 15-17 February, Vietnamese
45. Ibid., 31. 46. Ibid.# 34.
47. Ibid., 84.; Chang, 47; and Barnett, "The Chinese Invasion," in eds. Pilger and Barnett, 21.
Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Van Loi travelled to Phnom
Penh to persuade the Khmer Rouge to participate in a meeting
of the Indochinese states - tantamount to what the Khmer
Rouge considered to be an Indochina Federation. To coax the
Khmer Rouge into the talks, Loi offered Vietnamese
assistance in the repatriation of Khmers who had fled
Kampuchea in the previous few months. February proved a
chilling month as both offers were rejected.48
Even though it became quite obvious, following Pol P o t ’s
October visit to Beijing, that the PRC was increasing
assistance to the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese never gave up
hope of luring Kampuchea away from China. While Pol Pot was
still in Beijing, Vietnamese top negotiator Phan Hien asked
China to set up a meeting between the Khmer Rouge and
Vietnamese officials. The request can be interpreted in two
ways. First, Vietnam may still have hoped for some form of
accommodation between itself and Cambodia. Second,
according to Chanda, Vietnam was ascertaining what amount of
power China could wield over the Khmer Rouge. The
Vietnamese were disappointed to find that the Chinese were
able to organize the meeting, convincing the Khmer Rouge to
meet with Hanoi officials.49
Although Vietnam made conciliatory overtures towards the
Kampucheans, the Khmer Rouge relentlessly continued an
internal purge of Khmer Rouge, especially in the Eastern
48. Chanda, 85.
Zone, who were suspected of sympathizing with Vietnam. On 17 April 1977, the date of the second anniversary of the Khmer Rouge takeover, Ieng Sary admitted to anti-Vietnamese purges in Cambodia, despite elements of the Cambodian Eastern Zone vowing that there could not be a political solution so long as the Vietnamese were in Kampuchea.50 Although unadmitted, by July 1977, the Khmer Rouge had gained Chinese support for their purges. In a confidential report, Huang Hua justified the Khmer Rouge purges because they "purified its army and fortified its fighting ability."51
Believing that Pol Pot’s hostility to Vietnam could no longer be tolerated, and that the Chinese-Kampuchean alliance posed a threat to Vietnam's security, on 25 December 1978, in a dry season offensive which would place in power a regime sympathetic to Vietnam, the Vietnamese attacked Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge could not have done more to provoke Hanoi. As John Pilger put it:
Pol Pot increased his attacks on the ricelands [of Vietnam] to a level of almost daily atrocities in Vietnamese border villages; and finally the Vietnamese, who had offered the Khmer Rouge a demilitarized border with international inspection, had little choice but to 'invade’ Pol
50. Even though in May 1978 the Eastern Zone leaders