• No se han encontrado resultados

Laboratorios de innovación – casos de referencia internacional

3. Fase I: Identificación de recursos para la creación de un laboratorio de innovación

3.1. Laboratorios de innovación – casos de referencia internacional

The techniques of disciplinary/biopower are pervasive, yet power is also subject to limits inherent to the relationship between power and freedom. In this section, I will bring out the ways in which the relationship between power and freedom within Foucault’s account of self-government more fully reveals the political possibilities for individuals. Foucault calls for us to recognize the historical situatedness of our self- understandings and to engage in a “politics of the self” in order to change those practices that have shaped our self-understandings (Foucault, 1993: 222-223). The relationship between the individual and self-understanding is mediated not only by specific forms of power/knowledge, but also through practices of self-constitution that question the necessity of the relationship between power and knowledge (Foucault, 1997a: 281-282). Self-constitution is only possible through our understanding of the rules and principles that underpin the knowledge we have of ourselves, allowing us to recognize who we are and to reflect upon who we may become through caring for ourselves (Foucault, 1997a: 284-285).

In caring for ourselves we practice a form of self-government that has

implications for the domain of governing others. As discussed in Chapter Three, the care of the self requires a particular relationship of self-government based on a recognition of our freedom as well as recognition of the limits to which we are subjected and the possibilities for our actions in a field of power. Indeed, the government of the self by the self engenders a kind of permanent political relationship that is theorized by Foucault as containing within it the possibility of a transformative politics (Foucault, 1991a: 362- 363).

In order to question and transform the techniques of power that have made us who we are, Foucault asks us to achieve the seemingly impossible: to recognize that we are constituted by power and to find within ourselves a capacity to resist this power (Allen, 2011: 44). Going back to Allen’s interpretation of autonomy in Foucault’s work, it is possible to understand how we can engage in a politics of the self when the self is politically constituted. Allen argues that “… deliberate self-transformation in Foucault’s sense necessarily involves taking up in a transformative way the relations of subjection that have made us who we are.” (Allen, 2011: 51).

This relates closely to Foucault’s understanding of freedom as our capacity to question, contest and transform the social practices that constitute our subjectivity (Rajchman, 1985: 104-105). The possibility of transformation and self-constitution implies autonomy, but only in the sense in which Allen has identified. For Foucault, as socially and historically situated beings we are already implicated in relations of power

that are always “rooted deep in the social nexus” (Foucault, 2002; 343). Yet Foucault’s recognition of the necessity of a kind of free agency within relations of power (a space of possibilities for action) implies that human beings retain their capacity to question, resist and to choose a particular course of action among others, despite their constitution through power (Foucault, 2003a: 139).

As I emphasized in Chapter Three, the capacity to resist is a form of autonomy that embodies the capacity to critically reflect upon power/knowledge relations and the capacity to engage in self-transformative practices (Allen, 2011: 44). This free

questioning is internal to the framework of power and as freedom operates in the domain of power relations any transformation is in the context of utilizing the relations of

subjection in novel and revolutionary ways (Allen, 2011: 51). One such possibility is the “care of the self”, which, when supported by a critical attitude, can effectively oppose the effects of disciplinary power and engender a space for refusal and transformation

(Ransom, 1997: 155-156). According to Ransom (1997: 155-156) care of the self as an activity of self-constitution that shapes what is provided within the realm of its

experience requires an ongoing examination of what is experienced and learned and the capability to assess the actions and ends towards which others are aiming.

Foucault’s “politics of the self” is open to some criticism on the grounds that it does not fully account for the possibility of consensus and the power of solidarity (Allen, 1999: 57; Allen, 2011: 52-53). While there is little explicit theorization of the collective dimension of politics within Foucault’s writing, there are possibilities for drawing out a

collective dimension to Foucault’s political thought (Allen, 2011: 52). Foucault

recognizes the possibilities for collective politics that arise from an inner experience of community not associated with forms of group solidarity that traditionally emerge from categories such as class, economics or nationality (Foucault, 1988: 212-214). In an interview published in 1979, Foucault draws out the particular character of the Iranian revolution which embodied an expression of a collective will; a collective will of the people to transform not only the political situation but also their political destiny through transforming their own subjectivity (Foucault, 1988: 211-215). Foucault raised the possibility of a collective arising between a plurality of people whose basis for solidarity comes from something more fundamental than the need for political alliance and

compromise (Foucault, 1988: 215-219). This revolutionary experience is a fragile yet intense phenomenon that can traverse an entire people despite their significant

differences and can provide the impetus for transformation of a political situation (Foucault, 1988: 219).11

11 This “collective will” is a rare occurrence within the political realm, yet in the Iranian context, the

people found their collective purpose within themselves, aiming to transform their way of being, their

relationships with others, with their culture and with their history (Foucault, 1988: 217-218). According to

Foucault, it was the spiritual role that Islam played for the people that allowed this to take place. Although

Foucault emphasizes that there was a different plane of reality for those people of the revolution who were inspired by something other than the usual conflicts and

alliances (Foucault, 1988: 219). What he argues is that while we all act as individuals participating within strategic games of power that create associations and conflicts, on rare occasions, there is something that inspires a form of collective solidarity that comes from an uninterested self; one that stands somewhat apart from prior alliances, conflict and compromises. In the Iranian revolution, this “something” appears to have

transcended the traditional political considerations upon which revolutions have historically been based just as it rose above the violent dangers of the revolutionary situation (Foucault, 1988: 219-220). Any transformation must acknowledge the social, cultural and historical circumstances from which it emerges, as transformative action requires its own limits to provide it with a form that can engage with the world. In the context of Iran, Foucault asks whether this revolutionary movement has the potency to go beyond its own limits and question its own foundations (Foucault, 1988: 224).

As Foucault argues, “Revolts belong to history. But, in a certain way, they escape from it.” (Foucault, 2002: 449). In this simple statement Foucault acknowledges that revolts are part of a human story of action shaped within a historical context, yet he also raises the possibility that revolts have at their core something outside this historical

words, Islam as a spiritual practice provided the unity that supported the collective will and therefore the

framework. Again in a later statement, Foucault refers to the irreducible human impulse to make a stand against injustice; an impulse that can never be ruled out by any

government (Foucault, 2002: 449). It is this human impulse, this freedom that is the intricately intertwined with power.