LA LARGA ESPERA: TERRA-GAIA DESPERTADA.

Germany and Japan which might endanger the achievement of a total package. Australia continued to support a strong and viable authority with machinery with maximum flexibility and justified its particular interest in the issue by reference to Australia’s rich mineral production.128 Australia’s firm commitment to a strong Authority was elaborated by Foreign Minister W illesee.129

Australia’s position was to essentially support the middle ground view of the chairman of the Working Group on Basic Conditions of Exploitation who introduced a personal draft that focussed primarily on basic contractual joint ventures, including reservation of areas for exploitation by states and direct exploitation by the Authority. That proposal was, however, rejected by G77 which felt those draft articles that would require the Authority to provide access to the area at the request of any state and the reservation o f areas for private firms represented a derogation of power of the Authority to control all activities in the international area.130

In what was the most detailed Australian elaboration of its position on the machinery for seabed mining the Australian delegate Lauterpacht put Australia in the middle ground131 between the developing countries arguing for the dominance of the Assembly (where the developing countries views would prevail) and the developed states who argued for dominance of the Council with mining countries having most influence.132 The resulting SNT on the powers and functions of the Council and Assem bly appeared to accommodate the points elaborated by Lauterpacht, although in terms of the composition of the Council it ignored the interests of Australia as a land based exporter of minerals which may be derived from the area.133 From A ustralia’s viewpoint as a m inerals producer the economic commission which would maintain continuous surveillance on the effects of seabed mining on land based mineral producers was regarded as the most important commission to be established by the Council,134 and A ustralia’s objective appeared to be partly attained here when the SNT appeared at the end of the session.135 Within the framework of seeking compromise solutions on the deep seabed issue, Australian representatives discussed the merits of particular forms of jo in t venture operations136 and emphasized the need for adequate dispute settlement procedures in any final regim e.137 A ustralia’s commitment to a regime that would be negotiated as a compromise was evident in its strong opposition to a notice of unilateral action taken by American mining interests to claim exclusive rights to exploit 60,000 square kilometres of seabed in the Pacific over a period of 30 years after which the area would be reduced to 30,000 square miles for an indefinite period.138 The Australian Foreign M inister said in

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Committee One that this was a development which caused Australia ‘concern’. As the Minister explained:

The company was clearly intending to establish for its own benefit a kind o f priority right vis-a-vis the future international Authority and anyone who might wish to exploit that sector before the Authority’s rights were duly recognized...The principle of freedom of the high seas did not permit companies of any nationality to claim exclusive rights over the resources of the high seas, its seabed or subsoil. Use was permitted; appropriation was n o t.139

Committee One negotiations were by no means free of conflict as the G77 increased their representation on the working group of Committee One and adopted a more vigorous strategy of linking the seabed issue with demands for a ‘new economic order’.140 In fact, the section in the Geneva SNT dealing with the seabed regime contained provisions that went strongly in the G77 direction.141 Given that the SNT provisions dealing with access to the area and its resources were therefore likely to prove unacceptable to the mining states it seemed probable that at the next session Australia would have to devote greater effort to find articles acceptable to the developed states in order that an overall convention could be secured.142

Committee Two

In committee two the shelf issue continued as the number one priority for the delegation. The main activity here was in the Evensen group,where Australia was a member.143 At the same time Australian delegates also participated in a small informal working group on shelf issues.144 The main issues discussed related to revenue sharing in the area beyond 200 miles and defining precisely the outer edge of the m argin.145 The US, which had supported the idea of jurisdiction coupled with revenue sharing beyond 200 miles or the 200 metre isobath, whichever was further, indicated that it could go along with applying revenue sharing only in the area of the margin beyond 200 miles and suggested an illustrative schedule.146 Canada also revived the idea of revenue sharing (from its support early in the days of the SBC) as a compromise between the margin and 200 mile limit positions147 and the text was included in the Evensen group’s draft on the shelf and found its way into the SNT at the end of the session.148 A ustralia’s position was to fight, largely unsuccessfully, against this trend. The delegation took a hard line against revenue sharing ideas at Geneva for reasons of principle and unworkability as well as a fear of economic disadvantage to Australia, but the principal thrust of H arry’s remarks that the concept was an attack on state sovereignty ignored the political fact that other broad shelf states were choosing to assert their sovereignty by opting to support the revenue sharing concept.149

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