PUNTO FINAL PARA LAS GUERRAS DEL TIEMPO LA HISTORIA ORIGINAL DE MALDEK

Australia’s position at Caracas on seabed mining was to elaborate the views presented in the SBC, in particular the views incorporated in the proposal submitted to the sixth session of the SBC.18 Australia argued that its interests would be best served by a treaty which established and m aintained a strict balance of powers between the Assembly, Council and Operating Arm and where each organ was provided with the powers relating

50

to their functional responsibilities. The operating arm would have wide powers relating to the exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources but would have considerable flexibility in determining which form of operation should be utilized.

The m ajor issues on SBM were a continuation of those raised in the SBC and proved again to be politically volatile— who may exploit the area, under what terms and conditions and what would be the economic implications of seabed mining.19 Australian delegates continued to emphasize the importance of encouraging nodule mining, stressing that the machinery must be able to exploit the seabed ‘for the benefit of mankind as a whole’.20 Australia maintained its policy articulated in the latter years of the SBC that the agency ‘should not merely be a regulatory or licensing authority but should be em pow ered to enter into other contractual arrangements with other states and also undertake exploration and exploitation on its own behalf when it accumulated the necessary resources and experience’.21 The agency would also give ‘preference to the developing countries in distributing benefits derived from production in the international area’.22

Australian delegates justified support for international machinery with direct exploitation powers firstly on the basis of Australia’s interests as a land based producer of metals that would be mined on the seabed and secondly on the basis of a commitment to a law of the sea Convention that could be threatened if a satisfactory compromise was not reached on the deep seabed regim e.23 The Australian delegate Loomes argued that one of the guidelines that should be institutionalized in any international regime was to ensure an appropriate flow of seabed commodities having regard to the need to provide a reasonable return for land based producers. In this context he argued that one of the tasks o f the conference was to include in any international machinery an organ which would be responsible for surveillance of the economic implications of seabed production to consumers and producers. He went on to suggest the establishment of a Commission com posed o f experts representing the interests of consumers and producers o f the minerals to be exploited from the deep seabed with powers to recommend to the Council measures appropriate to deal with any adverse implications which may occur as a result of deep seabed exploitation.24

A ustralia’s position was closer to G77 than the developed states (that excluded the A uthority itself as a potential operator)25 since it was Australian policy to seek establishm ent of an Authority with wide powers of control over exploration and exploitation over the area. The role of the ‘good guy’ on side with developing states was assisted here by the fact that deep seabed mining appeared to be an activity that would arise well in to the future. Australia’s position, however, did not go as far as G77 in one

51 respect. Australia qualified the Authority s power to the extent that Australia felt that the Authority should only exercise such powers when it had the technical and financial capacity from its own income to do so.26 This qualification was not stated in the G77 text but it appeared that the G77 recognized that the Authority would not have the capacity to undertake these activities itself in the early stages. It was for that reason that the G77 text was sufficiently flexible as to allow the Authority to enter into contractual arrangements with groups to undertake these activities.27 While Australia maintained that the main terms and conditions of exploration and exploitation should be established in the Convention, Australian delegates appeared open-m inded on the question o f how precisely these needed to be detailed in the Convention 28 The US and other developed states, on the one hand, were advancing almost a mining code, whilst the G77 wanted more general criteria under which activities in the international area might be carried ou t.29

On the question of controlling the rate of seabed exploitation, Australian delegates were unwilling to commit themselves, apart from supporting the notion that any form of international regulation of seabed mining must be sufficiently flexible to adapt itself and its methods and objectives to a changing economic order and that there was little point in specifying precise measures to deal with problems which may arise in the future.30 This position did not go as far as the developing countries that presented a solid front in expressing the view that the Authority should have the power to control production, a position they linked to the expanding North-South debate on the ‘New International Economic Order’. The developed states, on the other hand, believed that seabed minerals would not disrupt suppliers of land based sources as seabed production would represent a small addition to land based production and that seabed production controls would inhibit mining, a view that was in part shaped by the impact of the OPEC oil embargo.31 Overall Australia’s position on DSBM at Caracas was closer to G77 than the developed states. In particular the support for the establishment of an operating arm with wide powers had distinct advantages to Australia not only as a land based metal producer but also because support held out the promise of distinct tactical advantages within the conference for Australia to gain support for its shelf policy.32

Australia played an active role in Committee One at Caracas33 but it was clear by the end of the Caracas session that too strong support for G77 positions was risky if it was pushed too hard, for there was always the danger of unilateral mining outside the proposed Convention.34 There was a reasonable expectation therefore that Australia would not adopt positions in Committee One that could possibly alienate the developed states from joining an eventual Convention, although as Australia was not one o f the

52

m ajor contenders on the issue it did not appear that circumstances would allow the delegation to take a high profile.