Grupo de trabajo “Competencias profesionales y formación”
3. LAS COMPETENCIAS DEL CARDIÓLOGO DEL FUTURO
Seemingly, it would be fairer to see what Hick intends to achieve before
all religious traditions, then it would be unfair to blame him for not doing so.
As mentioned above, it is not his original intention to suggest a new, universal
faith. Rather, his mission is to propose the “best explanatory theory” for the world
religious situation:
As I’ve always insisted, the hypothesis is offered as the ‘best explanation’,
i.e. the most comprehensive and economical explanation, from a religious
point of view, of the facts of the history of religions. A proffered ‘best
explanation’ is not a proof, because it is always open to someone else to
come forward and offer what they believe is a better explanation. And so the
right response of someone who does not like my proposed explanation is
not to complain that it is not proved but to work out a viable alternative
(Hick, 1995, p.51).
Cheetham (2003) agrees that Hick’s model is in essence a “second-order
philosophical exercise or a meta-theory” rather than a “first-order discourse”
(pp.159-167). As he understands, this is perhaps the only way for a pluralist theory to
“facilitate the equal validity of all” and genuinely “speak for itself” instead of
also believes that “Hick does not just want us to remain unaffected by his pluralist
perspective on religion”, and characterises his practical proposal as: “Stay put in
whatever (salvific) faith you belong to, but keep one eye on the other faiths because
they are your (equally legitimate) fellow travellers towards the Ultimate” (ibid,
p.165).
Up to this point, we may further conclude that what Hick intends to achieve is to
propose the most comprehensive and economical explanation of the world religious
situation and to urge the followers of various “great world faiths” to respect each
other’s tradition as an authentic response to the ‘Real’. These two proposals are in fact
closely related, because the main reason why we should consider the faiths of the
others authentic or legitimate is that Hick’s explanation is likely to be true. In other
words, if, for some reason, we believe that his explanation is unlikely, then we would
have no reason to consider other faiths legitimate, at least not because of Hick’s
suggestion. In addition, if we can suggest a more comprehensive explanatory theory,
then Hick would have to agree that it is a better theory, because by “the best” he
meant “the most comprehensive (and economical)”.
A pluralist model shall be as comprehensive as possible because it is preferred (if
not supposed) to have the function of resolving interreligious conflicts. Though not
religions that are able to lead their followers to a salvific-end is certainly one way to
convince them to mutually respect each other and provide basis for peaceful and
meaningful dialogue. Therefore, if there are traditions that a pluralist model does not
consider authentic, then suggestively, the model would not help us to respect those
particular traditions equally, let alone establishing a fair relationship or dialogue with
them. At the very most, it may convert some followers of these unauthentic traditions
into a practitioner of the ‘Golden Rule’ or a believer of the more authentic faiths such
as Christianity or Buddhism, provided that they did not originally hold a very strong
faith towards those unauthentic traditions (otherwise, they would probably find Hick’s
theory biased, untrue, or insulting). Nevertheless, it is also an understandable
approach for Hick to disregard some particular traditions to make way for his
criteriology and avoid relativism as well as postmodernism21. The question is, is the
disregard necessary and fair? Is it possible to have a more comprehensive theory
without being too relativistic or postmodern? Why must a pluralist avoid being
relativistic, postmodern or agnostic22 anyway?
In fact, although it is said to be a neutral, second-order philosophical theory,
Hick (1989a) himself has also mentioned what he thinks his model may be able to
21 Cheetham (2003) believes that by providing his own modernist and absolutist metanarrative, Hick’s
position is in fact “terribly un-postmodern” and may be accused by the postmodern critics of eliminating “real diversity, relativity and difference” (p.159).
22
As we will see in the next Chapter, Hick does not want to admit that his ideas are agnostic in any sense.
achieve. First, while explaining his ethical criterion, he expresses, “…if all human
beings lived in accordance with it [the Golden Rule] there would be no wars, no
injustice, no crime, no needless suffering” (p.312). This is, however, a pure
humanistic concern. Religiously speaking, even if an exclusivist theory would
encourage wars or other earthly sufferings, it could be ultimately better if it will lead
more souls to the salvific-end. As a reflection on the neutral pluralist position,
Schowobel (1992) argues:
The pluralist approach that associates itself programmatically with
interreligious dialogue seems to see the possibility of such a dialogue only
by bracketing, reinterpreting, or relativizing the particular truth claims of
particular religious traditions. This immediately provokes the danger that a
dialogue which suspends religious truth claims cannot even develop into a
dialogue of religions, but turns into a dialogue of cultural traditions based
on principles such as universal tolerance and respect, whose foundation is
very often not to be seen in the religions themselves but in a humanist
critique of all religions (p.33).
on the religious aspect. While discussing his view on conflicting trans-historical
truth-claims, he writes:
My far from original suggestion, then, concerning issues of trans-historical
fact is (a) that they should be fully and freely recognised as matters on
which directly opposed views are often held; (b) that – although by no
means everyone ranged on either side of these disagreements will be able to
accept this – the questions are ones to which humanity does not at present
know the answers; (c) that this ignorance does not hinder the process of
salvation/liberation; and (d) that we should therefore learn to live with these
differences, tolerating contrary convictions even when we suspect them to
be mistaken (Hick, 1989a, p.370).
Though this appears to be a mere practical suggestion, it actually implies that his
model has the ability to encourage religious believers to live with differences and
tolerate contrary convictions, because the reason for them to do so is that Hick’s
assumption is likely, which is that ignoring the contradictions between trans-historical
truth-claims would not hinder the process of salvation/liberation. Supposedly, then, if
convince him to follow the above suggestion (again, it does not mean that such person
would not tolerate contrary convictions for some other reasons). As we will see, there
are in fact religionists, including Christian scholars, who do not think his assumption
that some doctrines are mere myths is likely, even though Hick’s argument does
favour the “great world faiths” (or “post-axial religions” as another term Hick often
applies) including Christianity. As Eddy (2002) comments, although Hick’s challenge
implies that the correct response to his proposal is to suggest a better one and that we
should not complain that his assumption is not proved, the fact that it is not proven
would make it less convincing or appealing because it has offended both the
modernist and postmodernist religious views (pp.201-202). That is, it is in practice a
failure, or, in Eddy’s words, “Hick’s religious pluralism is ultimately unsuccessful
with respect to its intended purpose” (ibid, p.204).
Apart from providing a necessary basis for interreligious dialogue and mutual
respects, Hick also believes that his practical suggestions have the potential to effect
certain positive social transformations. As a concluding remark, he writes:
And so the kind of spirituality that is appropriate to the hopeful and stirred
by a sense of joy in celebration of the goodness, from our human point of
love/compassion to which all the great traditions call us; and in our
sociologically conscious age this is likely to be increasingly a politically
conscious and active agape/karuna which seeks to change the structures of
society so as to promote rather than hinder the transformation of all human
life (Hick, 1989a, p.380).
As argued, however, whether following his practical suggestions can effect such
an ultimately better social change would depend on whether his pluralist assumption
is correct. If it is mistaken, then it is possible that the Christian exclusivist position, or,
more precisely, the Christian mission that is based on an exclusivist religious view,
will actually be more preferable, because it can lead more souls to the heavenly place.
That being said, the reason why we have to focus on the convincingness or
practicability of a pluralist model is that the assumptions that concern metaphysical
matters are not yet proven empirically, it may be a pluralist assumption, an exclusivist
assumption, or an atheist assumption. Given that none of these theories is fully proven,
the only choice left is to prefer the one that appears to be the most likely or the one
that offers the best promises. Therefore, the criticisms we will discuss in the next two
Chapters are proposed from either these two perspectives. In other words, the critics
unlikely, undesirable, or inapplicable.