QUE CAMBIARÁN LA PRÁCTICA DE LA CARDIOLOGÍA EN LOS AÑOS VENIDEROS?

Chapter 2 discussed the key ideas of Hick’s model and, essentially, the reasons

for him to develop a rather exclusivistic criteriology which does not approve any

ideology except the one he proposes. It was learned that, by choosing a neutral

position, Hick actually wants to suggest that all ‘world great faiths’ (i.e., major

contemporary religions) are equally capable of leading their followers to what he

terms as a ‘limitlessly better religious-end’. Such proposal is an attempt to urge his

readers to respect and recognise other faiths as an equally truthful religion, or to offer

a vision that can ease the tensions between conflicting religious traditions. In other

religions equally – it would contradict his purpose if he treats any such religion

unfairly. Hick supports his criteriology by quoting various religious texts, claiming

that the ‘Golden Rule’ is soteriologically and ethnically central to the traditions the

texts represent, and that such rule is too basic a principle to be proven. These are,

however, insufficient to justify his theory unless all religions indeed treat such a

principle as the only soteriologically relevant teaching – in that case, Hick’s model

would be a description of the reality.

Chapter 3 and 4 examined how his critics respond to his model in general and

from a Buddhist perspective. The main aims of the two Chapters are to survey some

opinions as to how we should evaluate a pluralist model as well as demonstrate that

the research question of this thesis has not been raised by even the non-Christian

scholars. Hick’s model is mainly criticised of valuing only the ‘Golden Rule’ and thus

degrading all other religious teachings; assuming the central theme of all religions to

be identical while they are, as the critics believe, foundationally different; and

implying that there is an Ultimate Reality (i.e., ‘Real’) higher than the one addressed

within their own religious traditions. These are problematic because Hick’s theory is

at most eschatologically verifiable, and the only currently available criterion to

evaluate his proposal is to see if it is helpful to the solving of interreligious conflicts

model must be convincing to the audiences involved, yet Hick’s model would be

undesirable to, for example, the Christians who believe that there are other

soteriologically essential religious teachings, even if they agree that the ‘Golden Rule’

is indeed a crucial part of the Christian teachings. Supposedly, the Chinese Folk

Religion followers should find Hick’s assumption even more undesirable/inapplicable

if the central theme of their religion is more directly contradictory to the ‘Golden

Rule’, let alone his other understandings of religion that are incompatible with how

Chinese Folk Religion functions.

The Chapters also described how Heim (1995) tries to propose a different model,

namely the theory of ‘multiple religious-ends’, that does not contain the said problems.

This model would, however, find it more difficult to explain the problem of

conflicting truth-claims, for it has affirmed more literal referential values of religious

truth-claims. His rather Christocentric and thus confessional assumption also makes it

a less preferable approach to adopt. This led to my later suggestion of using the idea

of ‘multiple criteria’ to give equal weight to the original soteriological/ethical

criteriology of Chinese Folk Religion without asserting the reliability of any

truth-claim in the literal sense – it is to integrate the inclusiveness of Heim’s particular

theory of multiple religious-ends into Hick’s assumption without jeopardising the

Chapter 5 looked at how Chinese Folk Religion can be defined. It argues that

some scholars reject the idea that it is a religion because its nature and how it

functions is different from that of what some may term as ‘institutional religions’ –

the fact that it contains neither an authoritative scripture nor a universal doctrine or

that it is ‘functionally-oriented’ makes it challenging to be recognised as a single

tradition. Such viewpoint is however unfair from the pluralist perspective, for one

should not use the structures of some religions as a criterion to judge whether others

are religions. This rather traditional viewpoint has encouraged Hick to define what a

religion believes by interpreting its scripture almost exclusively and regard any

manifestation/phenomenon that is incompatible with such interpretation as a

misapplication of what the religion truly teaches. This approach is at least inapplicable

to the understanding of Chinese Folk Religion, for what its followers believe would

be its definition. As a response, the Chapter suggested a working viewpoint that

defines Chinese Folk Religion by both the religious beliefs and religiosities involved.

Chapter 6 and 7 then described the key beliefs of Chinese Folk Religion that are

considered common (but not necessarily universal). This description may not be

necessary for the traditions that are reasonably recognisable, but is vital to the study of

a tradition that does not have a generally accepted definition. Therefore, in addition to

and religiosities, the Chapters also contributed a usable definition for future studies of

the religion. To briefly summarise, Chapter 6 and 7 pointed out the beliefs related to

the speculations that salvation, if understood in the classical sense, is not the major

concern of this religion; that the central theme of its teachings is not ‘universal

compassion’; and that its gods/organisations do not require a strong

membership/commitment from its followers. Chapter 7 also suggested to treat the

concept of Tien as the Ultimate Reality of the religion, and concluded that certain

degree of distortion is inevitable if Hick wishes to explain this concept with his

dualistic distinction of ‘Real an sich’ and ‘Real as experienced’.

Finally, Chapter 8 attempted to answer the main research question by first

demonstrating that Chinese Folk Religion actually encourages a form of

self-centredness, and then discusses if it is appropriate for Hick to disregard the values

of the beliefs/religiosities involved. Basically, the said self-centredness is referred to

the phenomenon of treating the pursuit of earthly fortunes for oneself as the main

purpose of practicing Chinese Folk Religion, as well as the argument that the

foundation of the moral teachings of the religion is filial piety, which is a form of

conditional compassion. Since Hick’s criteriology is essentially soteriological, the

Chapter also described how salvation is differently understood by Hick and Chinese

equal status to the moral and soteriological ideologies of the religion, and argued that

such relativist assumption is necessary if a neutral model aims to be truly pluralistic.

Chapter 9 reflected upon the previous arguments by examining if Chinese Folk

Religion is merely syncretistic, secular or superstitious, but by studying such

religiosities, it also further identified the religious tradition/phenomenon this thesis

defined as ‘Chinese Folk Religion’; demonstrated that certain preconceptions of

religion are not applicable to all religions; complemented Hick’s interpretation of

religion by describing how some religions would function differently; and supported

the argument that a neutral, pluralist assumption is not necessarily considered

impracticable or undesirable by all religious audiences. Schmidt-Leukel’s (2009)

arguments were adopted to defend the ‘syncretistic/superficial’ nature of the religion,

thus justifying the suggestion of grading it as an equally rational and valuable

religious tradition.

The last Chapter concluded the elements of Hick’s model that we had

reconstructed or maintained. It was argued that his argument that menaces the

strengths of the neutral approach and what he originally intends to achieve is neither

his idea that some religious beliefs are literally false nor his non-confessional position,

but his confessional and rather exclusivistic criteriology, which this thesis has

include a usable definition of Chinese Folk Religion, a more inclusive interpretation

of how the world religions function differently, as well as a practical suggestion that

can help the currently ‘degraded’ traditions to relate to Hick’s theory effectively.