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The democratic ideal is defined as self-rule (Dahl, 1989: 3) or self-determination (Bohman, 2007: 2). Gandhi referred to self-rule as Swaraj and argued that it represented both a political and an ethical project. In Gandhi’s view, democracy

required the ability to learn how to exercise personal power responsibly in order to secure the freedom of the collective. He (1910, as cited in Parel, 1997: 73) claimed, ‘it is Swaraj when we learn to rule ourselves….If we become free, India is free.’

The concept of self-rule is particularly meaningful in Indian society. This is not least due to the centuries of imperial rule and colonial oppression which the country has endured, and which culminated in a long fight for freedom from British rule.60 Through the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi and other nationalist leaders, this struggle for freedom became a mass movement and serves as the legacy for the formation of the contemporary Indian state.

It is also recognised, however, that the realisation of self-rule as a political praxis in a country of India’s inequality, complexity and diversity has proved notoriously difficult. In fact, authors argue that India has been undergoing a ‘crisis of governability’ (Kohli, 1990: ix; Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 253) for some time. The celebrated Indian political analyst, Rajni Kothari (2005: 69), contends that the legitimacy of India’s democratic institutions has been slowly eroded since Independence. This ‘deinstitutionalisation’ (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 76) of Indian politics is particularly linked with Indira Gandhi’s61 time in office. Indian

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British rule in India is generally regarded to have begun with the Battle of Plassey in 1757. As a result of this conflict, the British East India Company, initially established as a commercial venture, gained the power to extract revenues from the local population (Nehru, [1946], 2004: 321). The British occupation of India ended in 1947 following a long struggle for independence.

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Indira Gandhi served as Prime Minister of India for fifteen years (1966-1977; 1980-1984). She imposed Emergency rule on the country between 1975 and 1977 when democratic rights were suspended, and political opponents arrested. This time was associated with a by-passing of the decision-making institutions of government, and a subsequent damage to their legitimacy from which they have struggled to recover (Sharma, 2010: 79).

politics has also been associated with increasing levels of criminalisation, corruption and violence (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 95; Mohanty, 2004: 110; Frankel, 2005: 21; Sharma, 2010: 68).

And, yet, it is also acknowledged that Indian democracy cannot be lightly dismissed. Instead, the world’s largest democracy is noted for its deeply paradoxical nature (Chandhoke and Priyadarshi, 2009: ix). The country has a free press, numerous political parties and free elections, with a voter turnout of around sixty per cent (Sharma, 2010: 89). It is also recognised that grave concerns for the institutionalisation of democratic praxis coincide with the diffusion of the democratic ideal to increasing sections of Indian society.

Sharma (2010: 67) observes, ‘democracy has become such an indelible part of the nation’s political consciousness that – despite the disillusionment with ‘politics as usual’ – most Indians continue to maintain a deep philosophical commitment to democracy.’ This ‘deepening of democracy’ (ibid.: 68) has, however, created problems associated with increasing political fragmentation. Thus, it is argued that India has become ‘increasingly democratic and increasingly difficult to govern’ (Manor, 1988: 72, as cited in Corbridge et al., 2013: 125).

India is also the site of an ideological struggle with regard to the country’s development and the way in which risk should be negotiated as part of this. As has been noted, this has seen the redistributive focus of the socialist approach favoured

by Nehru largely eschewed in favour of a ‘growth first’ (Kohli, 2009: 154) neo- liberal emphasis on improvements in productivity.

It is recognised that the ideal of self-rule in a country marked by the poverty of the Indian context is highly problematic. It is argued that the ongoing liberalisation62 of the Indian economy, rather than occurring as a result of reasoned decision-making by India’s leaders in consultation with its citizens, has instead been imposed by external powerful structures in return for borrowing and, in the past, for food aid (Frankel, 2005: 271).63

The link between self-sufficiency and a country’s ability to define its own decisions was noted by Indira Gandhi, who argued that ‘many countries were trying to influence India’ as the nation was not self-sufficient (1969, as cited in Frankel, 2005: 403). Critics contend that the undue influence of the United States government and the reliance on IMF and World Bank funding are exposing India to risk, and undermining the autonomy of India’s decision-making institutions (Frankel, 2005: 403; Kothari, 2005: 57; Kohli, 2009: 153). It is also argued that food aid was allocated on a ‘short-tether’ basis in 1965 in order to exert pressure on India’s leaders to undertake the agrarian reforms associated with the Green

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Liberalisation measures include currency devaluation, deregulation, privatisation and trade liberalisation (Le Mons Walker, 2008: 559).

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The rupee was devalued by thirty-six per cent by Indira Gandhi in return for food aid in 1966 (Frankel, 2005: 298). Similarly, a $5 billion loan from the IMF in 1981 was approved on the basis that India would remove trade barriers (Mohanty, 1986: 254; Kohli, 2009: 157). The more recent structural adjustment undertaken as a result of borrowing in 1991 is largely regarded as India’s shift to a more fully neo-liberal approach. This is associated with the further removal of barriers to globalised trade, and the increased withdrawal of the state from public spending on welfare measures (Le Mons Walker, 2008: 573; Kohli, 2009: 39). Talks are also ongoing regarding a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union.

Revolution (Varshney, 1998: 70; Corbridge and Harris, 2000: 69; Frankel, 2005: 286). This also served to secure the ideological shift away from socialism which the US government was keen to secure (Varshney, 1998: 28; Frankel, 2005: 341).

The influence of external actors, such as the United States, on India’s policy- making with regard to the negotiation of risk remains strong. In 2005, India entered into an Indo-US Knowledge Initiative in agriculture which was signed with President Bush as a precursor to India’s ‘second Green Revolution’ (Raina, 2006: 1622). This aims to foster public-private partnerships between the two countries. However, the agreement, which seeks closer collaboration with multinationals as part of India’s development, precluded public consultation and is unavailable for open perusal (ibid.).

The Indian political analyst, Atul Kohli (2009: 42), argues that the state in India is increasingly required to alternate between demands to its legitimacy related to economic growth and those related to redistribution. It should be recognised, however, that the discourse of risk also serves as a new basis for challenging the legitimacy of the state. This has been reinforced through the protests and civil unrest which are an indelible aspect of Indian society.64

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The idea that the current development model is strongly contested on the grounds of its risks is evident from a brief selection of Indian media reports during the nine months covering the research period. These include protests against a thermal power plant in Sompeta, Andhra Pradesh (Times of India, 15/07/2010), claims of unfair compensation and illegalities with regard to land grabs for industry (Times of India, 8/9/2010; 10/9/2010), the displacement of India’s indigenous tribal populations due to mining activities in Srikakulam, Andhra Pradesh (Times of India, 31/01/2011) and demonstrations against the building of

There are also signs that India’s global positioning has been changing in recent years. This may signal the beginning of a somewhat strengthened, though still highly circumscribed, ability to negotiate risk on its own terms. India’s altered positioning in ‘development’ terms was highlighted by the recent announcement that the UK intends to stop all aid funding to India by 2015. The Indian foreign minister, Salman Khurshid, asserted the view that ‘[a]id is the past and trade is the future.’65 This posturing is significant given that, as has previously been highlighted, global power relations exert a significant influence on a state’s ability to negotiate risk on its own terms, in ways which respond to the legitimation demands of its citizens.

The changing stature of India within global power circles is evident from the heightened pressure by India’s politicians on the United States government to endorse a permanent seat for India on the UN Security Council in return for trade alliances (Sharma, 2011: 120-122; Times of India, 17/11/2010). This was a particularly prominent theme during the visit of President Obama in 2010 (Sharma, 2011: 120-122), and highlights India’s attempts to re-negotiate its place in global power relations.

In light of this wider context, this chapter now turns to a closer examination of the Indian democratic process, using the struggle to define the risk associated with Bt

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Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20265583 Accessed on 2/4/2013.

An article in the Times of India (13/3/2011) entitled ‘Post-colonial British angst at Indian disdain for aid’ also asserted the view that India would be ‘unmoved’ if British aid money was spent elsewhere.

technology as the lens with which to explore the political praxis of Andhra Pradesh in greater detail. This analysis is undertaken using the Habermasian core-periphery model (1996: 356-359) as a central analytical framework.