Preparación e instalación de campamentos

Given that fifty-five per cent of India’s citizens are classified as poor (Times of

India, 16/7/2010),20 a technology which delivers economic benefits to the wealthy at the expense of the poor cannot be politically or morally legitimated. It is also recognised, however, that the poor are not homogenous, but are characterised by their significant differentiation in line with local power structures. This differentiation impacts not only upon exposure to risk, but also upon the capacity to influence others in risk construction in ways which legitimate the power structures themselves. Renn (2008: 35), too, highlights that risk and the legitimation of power are inextricably linked.

The current study highlights the way in which each of the three villages varies according to their caste composition and land-holding pattern. In order to analyse vulnerability to risk, this thesis posits that, in the context of the Indian village, the

20

This figure is derived using a Multi-dimensional Poverty Index developed by the United Nations Development Project and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative. This includes indicators related to schooling, child mortality, availability of electricity, drinking water, sanitation, cooking fuel and assets. It does not, however, appear to include a measure on indebtedness.

key dimensions relevant to differentiating risk exposure and influencing risk construction are those related to caste, land-holding and gender.

The current analysis uses the term ‘Risk Coalition’ in order to analytically demarcate the ‘social risk positions’ identified by Beck (1992: 23). This combines the idea of a social risk position with Hajer’s (1997: 12-13) concept of a ‘discourse coalition.’ This recognises that risk construction as a micro concern and risk definition as a wider meso institutional concern are conducted through discourse.

Caste as a Social Risk Position

Bayly (1999: 1) refers to the Indian caste system as an ‘elaborately stratified social hierarchy that distinguishe[s] India from all other societies.’ The term casta (derived from the Latin castus meaning chaste) was used in sixteenth century Spain and Portugal to denote species or breed (ibid.: 105). This thesis suggests that the caste system in India is a highly complex and sophisticated means of legitimating the differentiated exposure to risk associated with the power structures which caste represents.21

The race dimension to caste as a desire of the fair-skinned Aryans to maintain pure blood lines, and to segregate themselves from the darker-skinned indigenous Dravidians, was legitimated through the (now discredited) ‘science’ of ethnological studies conducted during British colonialism. This found that the fair-skinned

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Aryans were ethnologically more ‘advanced’ than native Dravidians (Bayly, 1999: 167-175). The association also helped to legitimate British colonialism, as ‘fair skinned’ became synonymous with ‘advanced.’ This highlights the way in which purportedly ‘scientific’ knowledge has historically been used to legitimate power relations, and the differentiated exposure to risk which they entail.

The concept of varna relates to the depiction of caste in the vast body of sacred texts referred to as the Vedas.22 The Veda texts distinguish between the twice-born

(dwija) upper castes23 of Brahmin (priests and scribes), Kshatriya (warriors and lords) and Vaishya (traders) and the lower caste, non-twice-born Shudra or servile class. Here, status is equated with ritual purity, and detailed rules of interaction govern relations between upper and lower castes in order to avoid the potential for ‘pollution’ which lower castes are purported to represent. These include strict rules of connubium (referring to marriage) and commensality (related to the sharing of food).24 So-called Untouchables, and the hill and forest populations now commonly referred to as ‘tribals’, occupy an ambivalent place below, outside or parallel to this

varna scheme (Bayly, 1999: 9).

Brahmins, representing the apex of the caste system, were characterised by their special privilege. As Ramakrishna (1983: 4) notes: ‘[a]lthough they [Brahmins]

22

The Vedas are the earliest records of Indian culture and are estimated to date to between 2,000 and 2,500 B.C. (Nehru, 2004: 72). These legitimate the caste system as a form of social organisation given that they depict caste as divinely ordained.

23

These are associated with the wearing of a sacred thread, the suta. Only male members of the Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vaishya varnas are entitled to undergo the ceremony of upanayana where the sacred thread is bestowed upon the bearer (Frankel, 2005: 5).

were a minority, they commanded unchallenged respect and status and acted as the arbiters of morals in society by virtue of their monopoly over learning and ritualistic supremacy.’ So-called Untouchables, meanwhile, were subject to the most pernicious forms of discrimination. This involved their segregation to the margins of the village.25 They were also traditionally denied admittance to schools, shops and village shrines, and banned from using wells (Freeman, 1977: 37). Even the shadow of an individual designated as untouchable was said to be defiling (Bayly, 1999: 197).

The concept of jati refers to the experience of caste in the ‘concrete and factual’ domain of everyday social life (Khare, 1983: 85). The jati formed the basis of the

jajmani system (Mandelbaum, 1970: 160-180), where occupational services were provided in return for a specific proportion of crop share for the service provider. As Frankel (2005: 5) observes, the jati refers to ‘smaller, hereditary, endogamous groups associated with a traditional occupation and related to one another in terms of ritual pollution or purity.’ Jatis in each region number in the hundreds and can be grouped within the broad varna categories (with the exclusion of the jatis associated with Untouchability). The Shudra varna, as the non-twice-born service providers, contains the most extensive list of jatis.26

25

This segregation continues, and is a characteristic feature of Indian villages. Beteille (1971: 26-39), Freeman (1977: 24), Omvedt (1994: 70), Robinson (1988: 83) and Srinivas (2003: 26) all report a similar segregation in villages studied in various states throughout India.

While varna categories of caste are universal and common to all areas of India, ‘caste (as jati) at the local level often contains considerable ambiguity about rank in the context of complex economic and social relations’ (Frankel, 2005: 5).27 Robinson (1988: 20), too, in her study of Medak district in Andhra Pradesh, notes that jatis are regionally variable with regard to both naming conventions and ranking. The analysis for the current study suggests that the power associated with caste jatis is strongly related to their numerical representation and ownership of land within particular villages.

The occupations of alleged Untouchables included those deemed too lowly and polluting for the caste Hindus defined within the varna system. These included that of ‘sweepers’ (of roads) and leather workers (Freeman, 1977: 37). So-called Untouchables were also involved in the handling of dung and animal remains and, given that death was regarded as particularly defiling, they served as cremation- ground attendants and tonsurers (head-shavers) of mourners (Bayly, 1999: 192).

It is clear that caste had a significant influence on the ability of social actors to negotiate and construct risk. As Frankel (2005: 5) notes, ‘in pre-modern times, rigorous criteria of pollution and purity had qualified only the upper twenty per cent or so of the population for even the rudiments of education.’ This meant that upper caste Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas were well placed to claim privileged positions during imperial rule. This also served to reinforce their elevated positioning within the village power structure. At the other extreme, the heightened

exposure of purported Untouchables to risk is highlighted by Bayly’s (1999: 195) observation that nineteenth-century famine records indicate that village servants designated as Untouchable were among the first to perish in times of scarcity.

Land-holding and Social Risk Positioning

Ownership of land is particularly central to risk negotiation in a country such as India where agriculture often represents the primary means of subsistence. Upper castes were in a better position to gain access to land as a result of the allocation of land rights to upper caste zamindars and revenue collectors during British rule. This meant that higher castes not only enjoyed access to privileged positions of power, but also benefitted from greater land ownership. Landlords came from higher castes, while lower castes were often landless (Varshney, 1998: 45).

The revenue-taking associated with British rule, and the poverty of the majority of cultivators, led to the strengthened status of the upper caste Vaishya or merchant

varna. These self-made traders often served as money lenders and were referred to in regional vernaculars as banias or saukars (Bayly, 1999: 213). They often went on to buy up land from Brahmins28 and other indebted proprietary groups (ibid.), and so materially reinforced their ideologically-sanctioned power.

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Gender and Social Risk Positioning

Omvedt (1993: 12) argues that the ‘self-sufficient village [was] linked to the paternalistic rule of kings.’ Within this, the need for the conduct of women to be closely controlled owing to their potential for the destruction of the very underpinnings of the caste system is highlighted in the sacred text, the Bhagavad

Gita, contained within the ancient Mahabharata epic.29 Here, it is stated that ‘when women are corrupted, confusion of castes arises’ (as cited in Bayly, 1999: 13). The positioning of women is thus legitimated on the basis of caste values which have been defined by men.

Females continue to be regarded as a burden in Indian society. This is asserted by Bayly (1999: 54) who claims that caste values define the family of wife-receivers as conferring honour on the family of the bride, the wife-givers. Bayly (ibid.: 332) also highlights how, in the case of weddings, the giving of dowry (a payment made by the bride’s family to the groom) is considered an upper caste custom, while bride price (where the groom’s family pays the bride’s family) is associated with lower castes.30

The perception of females as a burden persists despite the fact that they undertake the majority of agricultural and household work. Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu

29

The Sanskrit epic, the Mahabharata, has been dated to c. 900-800 B.C. (Metcalf and Metcalf, [2001]; (2006): xxvi). It remains a highly influential narrative within Indian society, and discusses the ethics of kingship and views on the legitimate exercise of power.

30

The practice of the giving of dowry was made illegal under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 (Shurmer-Smith, 2000: 89). As the current research highlights, however, it is still very much a feature of Indian life. The costs of dowry have risen significantly in recent years. Shurmer-Smith (2000: 91) notes the emergence of the term ‘Maruti marriages’ where new Maruti cars are offered in partial settlement of a dowry in urban areas.

(1999: 71) note the increasing ‘feminisation of agricultural labour’. According to Garikipati (2009: 517), a study conducted in 2001 estimated that 43.4 per cent of agricultural labourers are women. However, women’s household status, wages and working conditions remain acutely depressed (ibid.). Similarly, their rights to property are also poorly defined (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 209), and property remains subject to patrilineal inheritance (Agarwal, 1995: A-39). As a result of their restricted access to assets and to political power, Krishnaraj (2006: 5376) notes that women are most at risk from food deprivation.