Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 9
Facts:
This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. Popularly known as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre.
Twelve people died and the heirs of these people are seeking for retribution. (the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian reforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shooting and no one knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.)
Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages.
President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizen‘s Mendiola Commission and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that they made was that the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for damages by the petitioners.
February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.
Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit.
Held: No
Ratio:
Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reason of public policy – that public policy would be hindered and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government.
Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of the commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place.
The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.
Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent was given in this case. The commission was a fact finding body. The commission was merely a preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself.
The case does not qualify as a suit against the state. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are
o When the Republic is sued by name
o When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
o When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. Based on the investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. The committed a prohibited act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.
The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.
LANSANG vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M.
Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the kiosks, without again anything shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or spent.
With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate.
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business.
GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted that no such proof was presented.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued
in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages"8 according to the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in not holding that private respondents‘ complaint against petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
2. WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner‘s act of terminating respondent GABI‘s concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty.
Held:
1. NO - The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties.
RULE: Suit must be regarded : as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where the satisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself to perform positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are
not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also does not apply when the official acts in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. This is evident in paragraph 4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
2. NO - There was no evidence of any abuse of authority on the part of Lansang.
Public streets, Public parks are beyond the commerce of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park was a matter of accommodation by previous administrators. Lansang may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary.
FACTS:
In January, 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. It was also
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza
A canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 wherein the bid of the Singkier Motor Service owned by respondent Felipe Singson was accepted.
After being approved by Secretary of Public Works, a voucher for the payment of the parts reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit which later approved it finding it just and reasonable. He approved the payment of for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His reason for withholding the 20% was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor
The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to respondent Singson.
Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising auditor who found that there was an overpricing on the spare parts and equipments as shown in the vouchers.
Because of the failure of Singson to receive the balance of the purchase price, he filed for mandamus with the lower court which was granted. Thus this petition with the SC.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in issuing the mandamus sought for by respondent
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary SAYSON V.SINGZON
DECEMBER 19,1973
action for specific performance. The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State.
What respondent should have done was to file his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, which the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of and used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road. They also allege that demanded either payment or return of the property to which
defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General did not reply.
Defendants, through the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown.
The lower court dismissed the petition and held that it was a suit against the government. It was also held that
although the suit was filed in the name of the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, they were filed against them in their official capacity and thus the action is one against the National Government.
Thus this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on the ground that it is a suit against the National Government