The tensions portrayed here are confined to the relationship between the FSG and three groups: the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI), the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and some leading Muslim scholars within Pekanbaru Malay society. In this study, these three groups have been considered as representative of Pekanbaru Muslim society due to some reasons: the MUI is the only government-recognised ulema organisation; the NU is the biggest Muslim organisation in Indonesia (Pringle 2010), and the Muslim scholars are relevant due to their social and political role in Pekanbaru.
In regard to the MUI, Muhammad Atho’ Mudzhar ((2002, pp. 315-6) explained that it was historically established in 1975 to meet four main objectives:
To gain acceptance within society and to construct good relation with various Muslim organisations
To maintain good relation with the governmen
To encourage Muslim participation in development programs
To maintain harmonious relations with the non-Muslim religious groups. The first objective of the establishment of the MUI, as clearly stated above, is for internal Muslim relationship: to construct good relations with various Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Perti, al Washliyah and al Irsyad. To this end, the MUI became a “formal house” where members of the various organisations could meet and discuss issues of common interest, in particular religious issues faced by the Muslim society. In its adopted role, MUI regularly invites all Muslim organisations to its central office to discuss a wide range of issues, not only religious, such as blasphemy issues, but also the political situation of the country. However, the FSG have never accepted the invitation to join these discussions. According to the
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MUI, the FSG has become a splinter group detaching itself from the mainstream Muslims due to its perceived religious peculiarities.
The FSG have an ambiguous relationship with the MUI; despite giving total obedience to the government, the FSG refuse to participate in the MUI, which was created by the government to bring together all groups of Muslims and Islamic organisations. One Salafi informant (interview, 29 January 2016) gave me some reasons why the FSG distance themselves from the MUI: (i) the MUI ustadzs are widely perceived among the Salafis as being too materially oriented, and therefore not sincere in da’wa; (ii) some MUI ustadzs have publicly expressed their disapproval of their Salafis in sermons; (iii) the MUI ustadzs are perceived as being “too soft” towards the splinter groups; (iv), in many cases, the MUI tends to follow the “desire of the masses” rather than firmly upholding the religious texts; and (v) the Salafis have no supporters in the MUI institutions. As a result of all the above, the Salafis have no trust in the MUI as a religious institution. By stereotyping the MUI in this way, the FSG creates further divisions between themselves and mainstream Muslims, sustaining latent tensions.
The outright refusal of the FSG to engage in the MUI programs or activities has disrupted the function of MUI within Pekanbaru Muslim society, even leading to various religious disputes. These have mainly been caused by the attitude of the FSG who do not distinguish between the principle (aqīda) and the secondary (furūiyya) issues, which in Islam have different religious effects. For example, the false practice of the furūiyya rituals has never invalidated the Islamicity of a Muslim, while the false practice of the aqida has directly impacted the status of a Muslim in that he or she could no longer considered be a Muslim. Elevating of the furuiyya to the level of aqida has a profound effect in Muslim society. Such polemics were supposed to be debated within the confines of the MUI level and not for public consumption, but the FSG preachers brought it out into the open creating further divisions within their local community. Therefore, the implementation of the objective of the MUI to be the main actor to maintain unity among the umma has been challenged by the behaviour of the FSG preachers.
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As one of the MUI members, Umar has tried to resolve the growing disunity among the Muslim community, which has been caused by two hubs of Muslim activities in Pekanbaru: the RJ Salafi Mosque, and the al Nur Grand Mosque. According to Anas (interview, December 10, 2015), a former MUI chairman, a charismatic ulema, Buya Bachtiar Daud, had already cautioned that the establishment of the RJ Mosque had in fact been to compete for the role of al Nur Grand Mosque. Umar was very aware of this issue and in order to unite the two mosques, he invited Ustadz Abdullah Shaleh al Hadlramy, a Javanese Salafi and disciple of Syeikh Utsaimin for four years in Mecca, to speak at the al Nur Mosque. Following this, Umar asked the RJ Mosque if they would like Ustadz Abdullah Saleh al Hadlramy to give a sermon. In spite of having been taught by one of the most influential Salafi ulemas of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah was rejected by the RJ management, primarily due to his having mingled with various Muslim communities and ulemas, as a result of which he had been transformed into a new Salafi: more inclusive in his thinking and more flexible in his relationships with Muslims of various schools of thought. For example, unlike the FSG, Abdullah clearly stated that the followers of Asharite and Maturidy are among the “saved groups” (firqa al najiya).He also stated that various Muslim groups, such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis, Hizbu al Tahrir, al Irsyad, Tablighi Jemaa are part of the correct Sunni which follow the steps of al-salaf al-sālih. Abdullah’s acceptance of a range of Muslim groups has, according to the FSG, excluded him from Salafism and therefore he no longer has any authority to talk about Islam. This is yet another example of the exclusivity of the FSG, only accepting those ustadzs who fall in line with their understanding.
In addition to the exclusive nature of the FSG, their failure to adopt an appropriate strategy to convey their perceived correct belief to people has caused many rejections from people. Culturally, people’s acceptance of the da’wa mainly relies on two aspects: the essence that must be correct and good, and the method which respects people’s belief as reflected in their tradition. The Salafi’s emphasis on the first aspect (essence) and ignorance of the second one would only result to people rejection. Udin (interview, April 21, 2016), an informant, told me of how a communal conflict
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almost broke out when a group of the FSG members used a mosque in his housing complex, despite having been warned several times not to do so. The reason they ignored the warnings was because some of their Salafi followers lived within this housing complex. Udin further recounted that such tension was primarily caused by the intolerance of FSG’s followers towards other people’s belief and practices. He explained that it is not acceptable culturally if those FSG preachers from outside the housing complex use people’s amenities while at the same time accusing them of deviating from the right path. In this case it is not only a religious issue, but this is also related to socio-cultural values on how to show respect to members of the community.
The rigid attitude of the FSG is closely related to its strict adherence to the Hanbali School of law. This literalist school of law is strict (Al-Azmeh 1988) with regard to religious matters. Eclectic behaviour, in the sense that all good things can be accommodated into Islam, regardless of the sources, including from local cultural values, has never been acknowledged by the FSG. In this regards, Idham (interview, November 15, 2015), an anthropologist from the University of Riau, is highly critical of the FSG:
It is true that those Salafis depart from the Quran and Hadith, but they never see the reality of Malay people and do not understand at all how they interact with Islam. They then criticise them on the basis of al Quran and Hadith. The da’wa that these Salafis do disconnected the Malay people from their culture…don’t do it instantly as it will not be accepted by people…it is the anthropological key of the da’wa (Memang inyo batulak dari Quran dan Hadith sudah betul. Tapi inyo ndak pernah melihat kenyataan, macam mano urang Melayu dengan Islam tu, inyo ndak pernah tau dengan topek. Lalu urang Melayu ko dikritik dari sudut Quran dan hadith, jadi ndak bisa nyambuang…jangan sakali tutua, ndak tolok dek urang awak do…jadi pahami kunci antropologis tu).
The FSG’s disrespect towards local culture is also a consequence of the priority it gives to the religious texts, regardless of situation, over akhlāq (social norms). As
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previously mentioned in Chapter 4, the Kubang conflict was a result of this strict understanding. The FSG’s nonconformity stance over culture is very different from the strategy of da’wa adopted by the NU preachers who, in many ways, always seek the less risky path in order to reduce social discontent. In this regard, the NU prefers to adopt a gradual change strategy allowing the people to re-think and reconsider the Islamic da’wa. The NU reason for placing great emphasis on dialogue is their strong belief that the universality of Islam relies on its capability to have dialogue with various localities, believing this will enrich Islamic doctrine itself. The FSG on the other hand, considers this to be a bid’a.These differing viewpoints have characterised the relationship between NU and the FSG, making them like water and oil which can never be mixed. The obvious example of this is a dispute over a commemoration of the dead of a family member conducted on the day of seventh, twenty first, fourtieth and one hundred after his or her dead. The FSG rejects it for a simply it was no precedent in the Prophet era, while the NU emphasises the socio-cultural aspects of this event regardless of the absence of the strong argument in the religious text.
This polemic on the part of the FSG can also be seen in their relationship with mainstream Muslims. An example of this is a question put to the Prophet concerning hell:
A man came to the Prophet asking the fate of his father in the hereafter. The Prophet replied that his father would be in hell. The man then left the Prophet feeling sad. The Prophet then called him back, saying that my father and your father are in hell (Min Anas, anna rajulan, qāla yā Rasūlallah: aina abī? Qāla fī al-nār. Falamma qaffa, da’āhu faqāla: inna abī wa abāka fī al-nār) (narrated by Muslim).
Yunus, a leading MUI ustadz, graduate of al Azhar University in Cairo and a lecturer at the Islamic State University of Pekanbaru, interpreted the meaning of “abī ” in that hadith as uncle—that the passage in fact referred to the Prophet’s uncle, Abu Thalib, who refused to convert to Islam. To support his argument, Yunus cited some narrations from the work of al-Imam al-Suyuthi, Syeikh Abu Bakar al-Jazairy and Murtadla al-Zabidi who explain that it was common practice among the Arabs to use
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aby to refer to uncle instead of father. Unlike Yunus, the Salafi preachers such as Khalid Basalamah, Firanda Andirja, Umar and Abu Zaid openly stated that the word abī only referred to father. Therefore, they believe that the Prophet’s father, Abdullah will enter hell. This interpretation is psychologically unpalatable to most Indonesian Muslims who have great respect for the Prophet’s family, including his father and mother. It is interesting to note here the way those FSG preachers refute Yunus’s interpretation. On 25 November 2014, one of the FSG preachers, a graduate of the IUM, commented cynically in front of his followers, that Arab people have never used aby when referring to their uncle. “None of the Arabs use abī to refer to their uncle. What kind of Arabic is that?” (Mana ada orang Arab memanggil “abī” kepada pamannya. Bahasa Arab mana itu?), he commented with laugh. Students who listened to his interpretation then added the comment: “it seems that Egyptian Arabic is very different from the Arabic in Medina” (ternyata lain ya, Bahasa Arab Mesir dengan Bahasa Arab Madinah). All the attendees laughed because of this comment. For the FSG, however, the above dialogue shows that they made no reference to Islamic classical books to refute Yunus’s interpretation. Instead, they interpreted it literally regardless of the context of the text. Instead of proposing a valid argument, they used Medina, the city of the Prophet, as the source of authority or legitimacy; therefore, the Salafi ustadz who are graduates of the IUM are more authoritative than a graduate of al Azhar University of Cairo.
5.4. Concluding Remarks
The above explanation provides an understanding of the dynamics of Salafism within the local context of Pekanbaru. On the basis of its strategy, political affiliation and religious understanding, Pekanbaru Salafism can be categorised into the purist Salafis or the Salafi da’wa. In spite of its unobtrusive strategy in conducting the da’wa, the Salafis in the sense of the FSG have created two situations as a result of their approach: cooperation with the local government on the one hand, and tensions with some elements of Islamic organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI) on the other. Maintaining a close distance and dedicating their obedience to the government allow the FSG to obtain benefits from both sides, expanding the scope of their da’wa and extricating themselves from the
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National Police watch, as stated by the two Salafi preachers Abu Zaid and Hasan. It also ensures that other religious groups with whom they have friction are less able to prevail upon the government to side with them in these disputes, which could be highly detrimental to the FSG. Overall, this chapter has discussed the process of the growth of the Salafi group and how they have tried to attain the place among Muslims in order to be able to guide them to the right path, and offer a solution for their existential deprivation.
The dynamics of Pekanbaru Salafism also provides an understanding of how it develops within the Muslim society of Pekanbaru in the terms of how it overcomes the negative image of recent Salafism by becoming essentialists rather than formalists. However, it becomes appealing only in the part of non-religious Muslims who are being existentially deprived, leading them to seek the truth and certainty. Salafism, in this case, offers the solution for those deprived non-religious Muslims. The following chapter will discuss these issues.
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