Generally, scholars have focused on Islam and democracy in Indonesia (Azra, 2006; Hefner, 2000; Hilmy, 2010) and the influence of democratisation in Indonesian political life, including foreign policy (Anwar, 2010a, 2010b; Dosch, 2006; Gindarsah, 2012a). Only a few studies solely address the relationship between Islam and foreign policy. Islam and Indonesia’s domestic politics are inseparable. Given the extent to which the relationship between Islam and the state has greatly coloured the dynamic, internal politics of Indonesia, it is not surprising that many works are mainly devoted to studying Islam and domestic politics in Indonesia.
Scholars generally agree that democratisation has substantially impacted on Indonesian politics, including foreign policy. Its status as a democratic country has prompted the country to project its identity as the biggest Muslim democracy (Anwar, 2010b) and to define Indonesia’s role in the Muslim world. Indonesia aspires to be a bridge builder between the West and the Muslim world. Indonesia also likes to project itself as a role model for other Muslim countries. However, according to Anwar (2010a), Indonesia should substantiate its claim. It has a long way to go. Indonesia still faces challenges regarding how to realise its projected identity.
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Indonesia’s foreign policy has mainly been influenced by external and internal factors such as international pressure and the internal political legitimacy of successive governments, among others (He, 2008). Since democratisation, political legitimacy has become a crucial issue in Indonesian politics. Democratisation has impacted on foreign policy making, structurally and institutionally. It has changed the decision-making process in foreign policy by involving more stakeholders. The regime’s accountability has increased, consolidating the government’s decision-making power. Democratisation has also enhanced state autonomy and protects it from such forces as the military and cronyism. The way democratic regimes shape their foreign policy, be it the structural or institutional framework, is fundamentally different from that of authoritarian regimes (Dosch, 2006). Structurally or institutionally, Indonesia’s autocratic regimes have been shaped by the 1945 Constitution’s institutionalisation of a structural framework that gave a very strong role to the president and government agencies in the foreign policy making process. Government agencies, including the military, took the maximum benefits from this structural framework. Meanwhile, democratic regimes open greater opportunities for other foreign policy stakeholders outside the government. The increasing role of non-state domestic actors is also related to “the way in which regime accountability constrains the government’s latitude of decision making in foreign affairs” (Dosch, 2006, pp. 46-49). Taking into account the fact that Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, a study of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the context of democracy should not neglect Islam as an increasingly important factor. Anwar (2010a) tries to address this concern, however she does not provide details on how Islam influences Indonesia’s foreign policy. A study by Gindarsah (2012a) shows us how democratisation offers more opportunity for the public in the foreign policy decision-making process. Focusing on the Iranian nuclear issue, when Indonesia assumed a non-permanent seat on the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) in the period 2007-2008, Gindarsah (2012a) analyses the interplay among various domestic factors, mainly Muslim groups and the parliament. His study provides a good account of the relationship between the state and domestic actors. He mentions that foreign policy making which is against the aspirations of mainstream domestic groups will lead to political risks. Muslim groups and members of parliaments had a significant influence on the Indonesian government’s policy change regarding Iran’s nuclear policy. However, Gindarsah’s study does not specifically discuss the role of Muslim groups including their
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engagement in attempts to influence the government’s position on the Iranian nuclear programme.
Generally, the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy is under-studied. Studies of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, both under Sukarno and beyond have been conducted by Leifer (1983b) Suryadinata (1995), Sukma (2003), Perwita (2007) and Wicaksana (2012). We may divide these studies into two broad categories. The first are those that provide a comprehensive discussion without necessarily referring to any specific cases. The second are those which offer case study discussions in explaining the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The works of Leifer (1983b), Sukma (2003) and Anwar (2010a) are included in the first category while the rest are in the second category.
Leifer (1983b) and Sukma’s (2003) studies touch on the problem of a state’s ambiguous identity. The role of Islam in this regard was in a matter of functional ambiguity. This ambiguity is a result of the state’s identity, which is neither Islamic nor secular. This ambiguity has led to a ‘non-religious identity’ of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Unlike Leifer (1983b), who only examined the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Sukarno and the early Suharto eras, Sukma (2003) provides a broader account. He examines the role of Islam from the Sukarno era up to the early period of the Megawati presidency.
Suryadinata (1995) and Perwita (2007) focus on Islam and Suharto’s foreign policy, using a case study approach. Suryadinata utilises case studies of Indonesia’s policy towards the Middle-East and Bosnia. Meanwhile, Perwita (2007) uses four different cases occurring during the Suharto era, namely: Indonesia’s relations with the OIC; the Middle-East issue; the Moro problem; and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. In addition, as a postscript, Perwita (2007) also provides an overview on Islam and Indonesia’s foreign policy beyond Suharto, employing the state-society relations approach proposed by Skidmore and Hudson (1993). Having examined the above cases, both Suryadinata (1995) and Perwita (2007) conclude that Indonesia’s participation and position in the Muslim world were not driven by Islamic sentiments or Islamic solidarity. Instead, Indonesia’s foreign policy was based on pragmatic objectives in relation to the domestic and international agenda. For example, Indonesia’s role in the Southern Philippines was not based on Islamic solidarity, but on a desire for regional cohesiveness. Regional security and stability was much more important
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than Islamic sentiments (Perwita, 2007). The general conclusion which is presented by Suryadinata (1995) and Perwita (2007) on the marginality of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy is supported by a recent study by Wicaksana (2012). He reached this conclusion after studying the place of Islam in Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan. However, Wicaksana’s focus on bilateral relations highlights the role of state or government actors without paying sufficient attention to the interplay between the state and Muslim groups. Generally, these scholars conclude that Indonesia’s foreign policy has rarely been shaped by Islamic considerations. However the non-Islamic character of Indonesia’s foreign policy is not necessarily contradictory to Islamic interests. Indonesian foreign policy has not fully served Islamic aspirations, but nor has it produced a predicament for Muslim groups. This policy has been adopted to avoid offence to Muslim society. Foreign policy has entertained Islamic aspirations not in substance but in form (Leifer, 1983b; Perwita, 2007; Sukma, 2003; Suryadinata, 1995).
In addition, domestic pragmatism has required Indonesia to make good relations with non- Islamic states (the West) for the sake of meeting domestic needs, politically and economically (Perwita, 2007; Sukma, 2003). This power structure also led to the low profile of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially in the Suharto era before the 1990s when Suharto relied on the secular Golkar Party and the military to maintain his grip on power. At that time, Islam was often accused of being anti-Pancasila. The military’s fear of Islamic fundamentalists was one of the primary explanations for Indonesia’s non- Islamic foreign policy (Sukma, 2003; Suryadinata, 1995).
The state’s dual identity and domestic constraints in the form of internal weaknesses in the post-Suharto era continued to be a barrier to the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The primacy of domestic pragmatic factors remained an important element determining Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation (Sukma, 2003). On the other hand, Perwita (2007) believed that Indonesia’s foreign policy would become more influenced by Islamic factors in the years to come, considering the changing political landscape, domestically and internationally. In his more recent study on soft power and public diplomacy, Sukma (2011) suggests that the coming of democracy and the growing importance of Islam have had substantial impacts on Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, Indonesia has faced challenges in the way it has incorporated Islam and democracy into its foreign policy.
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Although there is no change in the sense of state dual-identity status in the post Suharto era, this thesis canvasses the possibility that Islam has played a more important role as a result of the advent of democracy in Indonesia. There seems to be a paradigm shift regarding the role of Islam at present and in the future. Unlike previous studies, this thesis argues that post-Suharto political developments have transformed the role of Muslim groups and Islamic political parties. Their role is becoming more evident in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Islam might have more substantial influence than it has had in the past. However, that is not to suggest that Islam is the sole factor behind Indonesia’s foreign policy.
This thesis focuses on the role of Muslim groups in the foreign policy decision-making process without necessarily neglecting other perspectives, which consider the importance of a leader’s religious worldview in shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy. The rise of Islam in contemporary Indonesian politics and the diminishing suspicion of ‘nationalist’ leaders towards Islamist political parties wishing to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia give further opportunity for Muslim groups to have their voice heard both in domestic politics and foreign policy.
As with previous studies on Islam and Indonesian foreign policy, this study places the role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy in the domestic context. It means that domestic politics create the context for the role and influence of Islam in the country’s foreign policy (Sukma, 2003). However, unlike previous studies that do not clearly define ‘Islam’, this study aims to differentiate between Islam as an ideology or ideas, and Islam as a movement, which touches on the roles of Muslim groups and Islamic parties. This is significant because previous studies and more recent coverage in the existing literature do not properly situate the influence of Muslim groups on Indonesia’s foreign policy.