Los ejemplares impresos y manuscritos del Vocabulista

Traditionally, national security defines the ability of a state to protect its territory and people from external threats. However, currently the threat to a particular state is not that much from other states as it is from within. There is, therefore, a strong

3 Christopher Snedden, “The India-Pakistan Peace Process: Overcoming the Trust Deficit,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Bradford UK, Brief Number 20, 2 October .2007, p.5.

4 Spokesman Briefings of 26-06-2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, http://ww.mofa.gov.pk/

Spokesperson/2008/June/Spokes 26-06-08.htm

Chapter V Revival of Poonch-Rawalakot Road: Constraints & Challenges

realization for widening the scope of discourse on security scenario while taking insurgency, drugs, arms, money laundering,5 environment, food, and the like non- traditional security threats into account.6 The questions related to their source, nature, organization, implications, etc. become necessary for scholars to reply.7

The menu of India’s security challenges has also broadened over the years because of its disputed borders with Pakistan and China. Such disputes could not be resolved despite periodic India-Pakistan and India-China wars in 40s, 60s, 70s and 90s. Consequently, new modus operandi based on non-traditional constructs is devised to settle scores, say for instance, through insurgency. This is because of changes taking place in the nature and techniques of global warfare. Conflicts for territorial occupation are losing scope in the face of influence sought to create through geo- economic mechanism based on foreign investment and transcontinental competition for resource exploitation. Further, nuclear weapons are becoming a deterrent to the traditional wars. Thus, the contending parties, in some cases, try to settle the issues through the medium of insurgency, drug and arms smuggling and money laundering.

India is overwhelmed with the activities of the non-state forces in the disputed land of Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere.8 Insurgents from across borders poured into North Eastern and Jammu and Kashmir states to support separatist movement against New Delhi. They tried to fail Indian currency shifting of unregistered money called “hawala” money for the separatists and militants. In fact, instances of militant infiltration and pumping of illegal money for Kashmiri separatists and militants are reported J&K across the otherwise rigid traditional trade routes.

5 Dipankar Banerjee, Security Studies in South Asia and Challenge, New Delhi: Manohar, 2000, p.50.

6 The Copenhagen school has advocated this for long: See Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An Agenda for International security in the post cold war era, New York: Harvester- Wheatsheaf, 1991.

7 James Derian, “The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzche and Boudrillard” In David Campbell and Micheal Dillon (eds), The political subject of violence, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, p.97. 8 “Security Environment” at http://mod.in.

Chapter V Revival of Poonch-Rawalakot Road: Constraints & Challenges

Obviously, several rounds of India-Pakistan peace talks were held to take regard to above doubts and apprehensions, and on almost every occasion, the two parties reaffirmed to fight terrorism as a key deterrent to resolution of long-pending disputes: “the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.” Islamabad agreed that it “would not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used for terrorism in any manner.”9 _{The leaders and officials strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and}

resolved to jointly scuttle it for larger peace of the region. Even they decided to establish “an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism” to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations.10

Though militancy is marginalized but it has not ended at all. The infiltration continues and every passing day is registered with army-militant clashes in one or the other part of the Valley, indicating India-Pakistan sharp differences on Kashmir and terrorism. Pakistan feels that there has not been concrete progress on the resolution of Kashmir while it has done everything to address India’s concern about “cross-border terrorism.” On the other hand, India notes that Pakistan has not given up support to the Kashmiri militants, which lies at the sources of continued cross-border terrorism. The joint statements issued at the end of each round of talks on the peace and security, show that both sides want to register the importance they attach to their respective concerns on Kashmir and terrorism. Indian leadership continues to highlight the issue of “cross LoC infiltration” and contents that it is directly linked with reduction of troops from J&K (Indian Administrated Kashmir); hence, she has been agreeing with reluctance the idea of CBMs, reduction of troops, abrogation of Special Powers (Armed Forces) Act, etc. in J&K India has linked all these steps to the security situation in Kashmir. In contrast, Pakistani leadership continued to make efforts to keep Kashmir at the centre of the dialogue and emphasized on the Kashmir specific CBMs. All this suffices to indicate militancy as a potent threat to the peace process and opening of ancient trade routes between J&K and PAK.

9 “Pakistan, India Joint statement,” Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan, January 7 , 2004.

10 Anjali Ghosh, India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Pearson and Longman, 2009, p.244.

Chapter V Revival of Poonch-Rawalakot Road: Constraints & Challenges