Del método a la fundamentación

The  diagnostic  perspective  that  Nancy  Fraser  offers  us  through  ‘Abnormal  Justice’  owes   much  to  an  empirical  encounter  with  contestation  around  the  basic  meaning  and  scope   of   justice   in   the   contemporary   social   world.   It   is   not,   as   such,   a   perspective   that   is   motivated   wholly   or   simply   by   a   set   of   relatively   abstract   ideas   about   difference   and   disagreement,  but  is  instead  imbued  with  a  very  pronounced  sense  of  ethical  duty  and   responsiveness  in  respect  of  the  actual  experiences  of  injustice  amongst  social  actors  in   the  contemporary  world.  This  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  Fraser’s  perspective  is  attuned   exclusively  to  empirical  questions  of  difference  in  the  here  and  now,  or  that  it  embodies   any   necessary   hostility   towards,   or   disregard   for,   deeper   or   more   'radical'   understandings   of   difference.   As   we   shall   see,   the   diagnostic   position   that   Fraser   has   developed  is  in  fact  of  a  quite  sophisticated  character  in  this  respect.  Nevertheless,  the   empirical   encounter   with   contestation   in   the   contemporary   social   world   undoubtedly   plays  a  fundamental  conditioning  role  in  the  diagnostic  picture  that  Fraser  draws,  and,   as  such,  represents  a  good  place  to  begin  a  deeper  consideration  of  the  specific  form  and   implications  of  that  picture.  

The   prominence   and   importance   of   this   encounter   with   the   historical   specificities   of   contemporary  disputes  within  Fraser’s  work  is  evident  in  the  fact  that  it  is  the  particular   destabilisation  of  what  she  refers  to  as  the  "Westphalian-­‐distributivist"  framework  that   occupies   her   attentions   most   directly   (Fraser   2010).   For   better   or   worse,   Fraser   contends,   this   framework   has   represented   the   overwhelmingly   dominant   paradigm   of   political  thought  and  practice  on  the  global  stage  in  the  post-­‐WWII  era.  This  hegemonic   grip   has   brought   with   it   a   variety   of   assumptions   about   the   fundamental   character   of   justice\injustice   that   have   become   normalised   in   a   range   of   contemporary   settings.  

Under  the  Westphalian-­‐distributivist  paradigm,  for  instance,  it  has  conventionally  been   presumed  that  the  proper  subjects  of  justice  in  any  given  dispute  should  be  limited  to   the  citizenry  of  bounded  political  communities  (in  most  cases  territorial  states).  It  has   also  been  presumed  that  the  public  institutions  of  those  bounded  communities  ought  to   possess  sole  legitimate  (usually  sovereign)  authority  to  preside  over  disputes,  and  that   the  principal  focus  of  justice  should  be  the  achievement  of  fair  allocations  of  social  goods   between   members   (i.e.   that   justice   is   primarily   a   question   of   equitable   distribution).  

Although   discourses   of   justice   that   deviate   from,   or   go   beyond,   these   normal   bounds   have,  no  doubt,  also  been  present  to  some  degree  –  with  one  obvious  example  being  the   global   human   rights   discourse   that   emerged   through   the   middle   of   the   twentieth   century   –   such   deviations   have   tended   to   be   conceived   and   pursued   on   terms   that   tie  

them  back  to  the  primacy  and  moral  efficacy  of  the  Westphalian-­‐distributivist  paradigm   in   one   way   or   another.   As   a   result,   until   relatively   recently,   the   central   tenets   of   the   Westphalian-­‐distributivist  paradigm  held  a  more  or  less  stable  position  in  political  life   since   they   were   not   subject   to   significantly   threatening   levels   of   challenge,   helping   to   establish  a  widely  accepted  ‘normal’  face  of  justice.  

Particularly   since   the   1970s,   however,   the   dominant   Westphalian-­‐distributivist   paradigm   has   increasingly   been   subject   to   serious   questioning   and   disturbance.   Due   largely   to   rapidly   globalising   economic,   social,   cultural,   and   political   spheres,   coupled   with  the  breakdown  of  the  polarising  consequences  of  Cold  War  politics,  a  range  of  new   and   complex   forms   of   discontent   have   emerged   and,   along   with   others   that   were   formerly   obscured   or   suppressed,   been   rendered   immanent   to   public   consciousnesses   in  unprecedented,  and  often  unexpected,  ways.  The  result  is  that  many  formerly  unseen,   unproblematised,   and   taken-­‐for-­‐granted   features   of   justice   have   begun   to   unravel   somewhat  in  contemporary  social  contexts.  The  specific  presumptions  upon  which  the   normal   view   of   justice   has   been   based,   and   those   which   it   has   operated   to   inscribe   in   political  and  social  life,  have  increasingly  been  exposed  and  opened  up  to  processes  of   public  scrutiny.  

The  forms  of  contestation  brought  against  the  Westphalian-­‐distributivist  normal  in  this   respect   are   not,   however,   wholly   random.   Rather,   Fraser   finds   that   they   tend   to   constellate  around  three  primary  “nodes”:  the  ‘what’,  the  ‘who’,  and  the  ‘how’  of  justice.  

It  will  help  to  consider  each  of  these  in  turn.  

‘What’  

The  ‘what’  of  justice  relates  to  the  conceptual  space  that  disputants  use  to  identify  and   theorise  the  injustice(s)  they  experience.  That  is,  if  justice\injustice  can  be  understood   as   a   relative   measure,   the   ‘what’   describes   the   substance   that   should   be   measured   in   order  to  assess  it.  As  Fraser  understands  it,  there  are  at  least  three  rival  understandings   of   the   ‘what’   active   within   contemporary   disputes,   each   of   which   corresponds   with   a   particular  “species”  of  injustice  (2010,  p.16).    

First,   there   is   the   familiar   grammar   of   redistribution   which   locates   the   substance   of   justice  within  the  economic  or  class  structures  of  society.  This  distributivist  conception,   which  has  had  such  a  hugely  influential  role  in  the  way  that  justice  has  conventionally   been  conceived  and  institutionalised  over  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century,  takes  as   its   central   principle   the   idea   that   justice   is   realised   (or   approximated)   insofar   as   the  

wealth,  resources,  and  other  divisible  goods  within  a  societal  context  are  allocated  in  an   open   and   equitable   manner   amongst   its   members.   Accordingly,   the   principal   form   of   injustice  according  to  this  view  is  maldistribution  of  some  form.  

Second,   and   situated   alongside   the   distributivist   conception   in   many   contemporary   disputes,   are   claims   and   discontents   couched   in   a   grammar   of   recognition.   Coming   to   prominence   following   the   flourishing   of   identity-­‐   and   difference-­‐based   social   movements  through  the  1960s  and  1970s,  here,  the  principal  substance  of  justice  is  not   the  equitable  allocation  of  material  goods  (although  this  usually  remains  important  for   disputants)   but   rather   the   way   in   which   society   is   structured   so   as   to   implicitly   or   explicitly   support   some   identities,   values,   and   cultures   whilst   unfairly   hindering   or   marginalising  others.  Whether  the  injustices  of  misrecognition  claimed  by  disputants  are   conceptualised  according  to  markers  of  gender,  age,  ethnicity,  religion,  or  anything  else,   their   common   central   root   resides   with   the   presence   of   oppressive   status   hierarchies   within   society,   and   they   provoke   an   accompanying   desire   to   transform   norms   of   recognition  within  the  public  realm  in  one  way  or  another.  

Third,   Fraser   finds   that   contemporary   disputes   also   frequently   include   appeals   to   the   grammar  of  representation,  centred  primarily  on  issues  of  community  membership  and   associated   procedure   within   social   life.   This,   for   Fraser,   is   the   most   overtly   political   grammar   insomuch   as   it   directly   pertains   to   the   criteria   of   social   belonging   that   determine   “who   is   included   in,   or   excluded   from,   the   circle   of   those   entitled   to   a   just   distribution   and   reciprocal   recognition”   (2010,   p.17).   In   this   register,   the   injustice   of   misrepresentation   occurs   when   “political   boundaries   and/or   decision   rules   function   wrongly   to   deny   some   people   the   possibility   of   participating   on   a   par   with   others   in   social  interaction  –  including,  but  not  only,  political  arenas”  (Fraser  2010,  p.18).  Though   in  practice  usually  closely  entwined  with  claims  of  maldistribution  and  misrecognition,   the  substance  of  justice  here  is  not  located  directly  with  the  economic  or  status  order  of   a  social  context,  but  with  the  manner  in  which  its  boundaries  are  politically  constituted   and  policed.  Fraser  contends  that  such  experiences  of  misrepresentation  can  occur  even   in   the   absence   of   instances   of   misrecognition   or   maldistribution,   and   so   are   not   reducible   to   either   of   these   other   grammars.   Accordingly,   the   experience   of   misrepresentation   arises   as   a   third   distinctive   species   of   injustice   claimed   within   contemporary  disputes.  

Each  of  these  three  grammars  attempts  to  describe  a  plausible  form  of  moral  injury  that   cannot  be  fully  or  consistently  collapsed  into  the  others,  since  each  attempts  to  isolate  a  

different   basic   substance   connected   with   the   concept   of   justice.   In   contemporary   disputes,   Fraser   argues,   claims   pertaining   to   these   distinctive   views   of   the   ‘what’  

regularly   butt   up   against   one   another   as   disputants   find   that   the   injustices   they   experience  and  seek  to  address  are  conceptualised  on  different  terms,  or  are  sometimes   missed   entirely,   by   the   individuals,   groups,   and   institutions   with   whom   they   are   engaged.   As   a   result,   absent   a   settled   norm   regarding   the   basic   substance   of   justice,   these   disputes   also   lack   a   settled   way   of   describing   senses   of   injustice   and   discontent   even  when  there  is  general  agreement  that  some  form  of  injury  has  occurred.  

It  is  important  to  take  a  moment  here  in  order  to  note  that,  conceptually  speaking,  the   distinction  that  Fraser  draws  between  normality  and  abnormality  does  not  depend  upon   the  substance  of  justice  being  contested  in  these  specific  ways  in  order  for  it  to  hold  the   same   critical   function.   Rather,   insofar   as   a   condition   of   abnormality   is   seen   to   reflect   merely  the  absence  of  agreement  as  to  the  basic  substance  of  justice,  it  matters  less  what   the   precise   nature   of   that   disagreement   is   than   it   does   the   fact   that   disagreement   pervades  the  discursive  sphere.  As  such,  though  the  identified  competing  grammars  of   distribution,   recognition,   and   representation   say   something   important   about   the   empirical   reality   of   abnormality   as   it   presently   confronts   us,   it   should   not   simply   be   presumed  that  these  grammars  fully  exhaust  ideas  about  the  substance  of  justice  in  this   time  or  in  any  other.  It  is  at  least  conceivable  that  these  three  grammars  do  not  possess   a  total  critical  efficacy  and  that  some  experiences  of  injury  are  not  sufficiently  described   through  reference  to  the  ideas  of  substance  that  presently  occupy  the  discursive  sphere   most  visibly.  Consequently,  it  serves  to  be  at  least  open  to  the  possibility  that  additional   conceptions  of  exactly  what  it  is  that  justice  should  be  taken  to  measure  might  emerge,   become  necessary,  or  even  already  be  present  but  subverted  within  existing   bodies  of   dispute.  

‘Who’  

The   ‘who’   of   justice   is   used   by   Fraser   in   order   to   describe   questions   of   scope   and   framing   within   disputes.   On   one   level,   this   can   relate   to   challenges   of   whether   only   individuals  can  be  considered  suitable  subjects  of  justice  or  if  other  sorts  of  actors  (for   instance,  groups)  might  also  present  a  reliable  moral  unit.  On  another,  it  describes  how   the  bounding  of  political  space  (i.e.  who  is  included/excluded),  and  also  the  location  of   institutional   authority   in   respect   of   those   constructed   perimeters,   are   themselves   subject  to  contestation.  

Previously,   uncertainty   surrounding   the   ‘who’   of   justice   rarely   erupted   into   public   discourse   due   largely   to   the   overwhelming   dominance   of   the   Westphalian   (and   increasingly  liberal)  paradigm  on  the  global  stage.  The  normal  assumption  held  in  place   by  this  paradigm  was  that  only  individuals  could  be  suitably  regarded  as  moral  subjects   of  justice,  and  that  the  proper  bounding  of  communities  in  respect  of  justice  coincided   exactly   with   the   borders   and   sovereign   reach   of   the   modern   territorial   state.   This  

“territorializing”   of   justice   had   the   effect   of   restricting   expectations   about   the   validity   and  relevancy  of  interests  and  concerns  almost  solely  to  the  citizenry  of  geographically   bounded  political  communities,  and  in  doing  so  drastically  limited  ideas  about  binding   obligations   of   justice   that   transgressed   those   borders   or   operated   along   altogether   different  pathways  (Fraser  2008,  p.400).  Assumptions  about  the  sole  authority  of  state   institutions   to   adjudicate   over   disputes   within   those   territories,   and   to   legitimately   impose  binding  outcomes  on  community  members,  also  became  habitually  re-­‐inscribed   under  the  hold  of  this  hegemonic  normal.    

In   the   contemporary   era,   however,   these   assumptions   are   regularly   challenged   from   multiple   directions.   Fraser   identifies   three   general   forms:   (1)   through   the   claims   of   localists   and   communalists   who   reject   the   frame   of   the   territorial   state   in   favour   of   subnational   units;   (2)   through   the   claims   of   regionalists  and  nationalists   who   propose   larger  (though  non-­‐universal)  units  such  as  Europe  or  Islam;  and  (3)  through  the  claims   of  globalists  and  cosmopolitans  who  “propose  to  accord  equal  consideration  to  all  human   beings”  and  question  any  non-­‐universal  bounding  of  subjects  (2008,  p.401).  In  different   ways,   each   of   these   positions   contests   the   assumption   that   the   territorial   state   represents   a   morally   valid   and/or   practically   viable   bounding   of   political   space.  

Accordingly,  arguments  abound  as  to  whether  the  imposition  of  the  Westphalian  frame   can,  in  and  of  itself,  be  regarded  as  a  form  of  injustice  in  at  least  some  contexts;  whether   the   Westphalian   paradigm   demands   a   partitioning   of   political   space   that   too   readily   leaves  those  subject  to  injustice  unable  to  effectively  challenge  the  forces  that  oppress   them;   and   whether   building   sufficiently   detailed   understandings   of   experiences   of   injustice  becomes  impossible  so  long  as  a  strong  adherence  to  the  Westphalian  normal   holds,   with   potentially   catastrophic   consequences   in   terms   of   mounting   effective   responses.   As   such,   in   many   contemporary   disputes   there   is   a   high   degree   of   abnormality   concerning   the   appropriate   ‘who’   of   justice,   and   the   formerly   stable   presumptions   of   the   Westphalian   and   liberal   paradigms   are   now   subject   to   serious   challenge  from  a  multiplicity  of  directions.    

It   is   again   worth   noting,   however,   that,   in   terms   of   the   broader   diagnostic   view   of   abnormality,   the   particular   way   in   which   the   hegemonic   ‘who’   is   being   empirically   contested  in  the  contemporary  era  is  again,  conceptually  speaking,  less  important  than   the   fact   that   a   resolute   absence   of   agreement   as   to   its   proper   form   prevails.   In   an   abnormal  context,  disputants  regularly  disagree  about  which  interests  and  voices  must   be   included   within   justice   deliberations   (or   excluded   from   them),   have   different   ideas   about  which  arenas  disputes  should  be  assessed  within  (and  by  whom),  or  else  highlight   how   politically   constructed   boundaries   may   operate   to   place   the   causes   of   some   injustices   beyond   the   effective   reach   of   those   that   are   constrained   by   them.   Thus,   in   addition  to  uncertainty  over  what  it  is  that  justice  should  be  taken  to  measure,  we  also   encounter  deep  uncertainty  as  to  its  scope  and  who  counts  in  relation  to  it.  

‘How’  

The   destabilisation   of   assumptions   surrounding   the   ‘what’   and   the   ‘who’   of   justice   inevitably  leads  to  contestation  over  ‘how’  injustices  can  or  should  be  addressed.  When   we  lack  settled  norms  about  what  it  is  that  justice  should  measure  in  any  given  case  (e.g.  

whether   it   should   pertain   to   distribution,   recognition,   or   representation,   to   some   combination   of   these,   or   to   an   entirely   different   substance   of   justice)   as   well   as   who   counts   in   respect   of   it,   there   is   an   associated   breakdown   in   certainty   over   how   such   contests  can  be  equitably  addressed.  On  what  basis  are  we  to  decide  which  substance  of   justice  should  prevail  when  we  lack  an  uncontroversial  authority  to  adjudicate  between   competing   views?   And   how   can   we   devise   effective   and   fair   reparations   when   disagreements  on  the  substance  of  justice  seem  to  persist?  Likewise,  how  can  we  begin   to   even   organise   disputes   when   there   exists   fundamental   disagreement   about   whose   voices  ought  to  be  included  (or  excluded)  in  consideration  of  them  (i.e.  who  the  ‘we’  in   question   should   be),   and   when   the   locations   of   authority   that   some   consider   vital,   legitimate,   and   unassailable   are   impeached   as   unjust   and   inadequate   by   others?   In   an   abnormal   context,   the   means   by   which   deep   disputes   over   the   ‘what’   and   the   ‘who’   of   justice  might  be  equitably  assessed  and  effectively  resolved  are  also  subject  to  profound   and   far-­‐reaching   contestation.   Inevitably,   a   multiplicity   of   views   of   the   ‘what’   and   the  

‘who’  evoke  a  plethora  of  visions  of  the  ‘how’  of  justice.  

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It  is  already  apparent  that  although  Fraser’s  focus  in  painting  this  diagnostic  picture  is   strongly   influenced   by   an   empirical   encounter   with   justice   disputes   in   contemporary   social   contexts,   the   distinctions   that   she   provides,   and   the   processes   of   public   contestation  that  they  help  to  capture,  resonate  beyond  this  historically  specific  aspect  

of  her  work.  In  addition  to  contributing  towards  a  critical  clarification  of  the  present  era,   Fraser’s   work   also   offers   a   steady   and   clear   depiction   of   the   way   in   which   public   disputes   of   all   kinds   may   expand   to   encompass   the   most   fundamental   conceptual   features  associated  with  the  concept  of  justice\injustice.  The  notion  of  abnormality  can   therefore  be  understood  to  hold  relevance  in  all  situations  in  which  no  single  collection   of  assumptions,  values,  or  norms  seems  able  to  adequately  accommodate  –  and  still  less   to   resolve   –   the   range   of   discontents   experienced,   whether   or   not   those   contexts   demonstrate   more   substantial   similarities   with   the   disputes   that   have   guided   Fraser’s   thinking  most  directly.  

A  further  critical  aspect  of  Fraser’s  diagnostic  work  in  this  area  relates  to  her  resolute   insistence  upon  reckoning  with  the  full  array  of  repercussions  that  any  abnormalisation   of   the   social   sphere   brings.   For,   in   one   sense   it   seems   likely   that,   as   the   hold   of   the   exclusionary   normal   becomes   destabilised,   there   is   an   increased   potential   for   injuries   and   discontents   that   were   hitherto   obscured   by   it   to   begin   to   receive   more   successful   articulation   in   public   exchanges.   In   this   sense,   the   expanded   field   of   contestation   signalled  by  abnormal  justice  means  that  public  attentions  stand  to  be  directed  towards   coming   to   recognise   unfamiliar   forms   of   harm   and   perhaps   even   finding   new   possibilities   for   social   ordering   that   can   begin   to   better   address   them.   From   this   direction,   then,   abnormality   presents   an   emancipatory   face   and   seems   to   hold   rather   positive  connotations  in  respect  of  justice.  

At   the   same   time   that   we   meet   with   this   positive   potential   of   an   abnormalising   social   sphere,   however,   we   also   meet   with   its   negative   side.   For,   as   the   dominance   of   the   established  conventions  of  normality  become  increasingly  destabilised,  so  too  does  the   sense   of   certainty   in   respect   of   understanding   and   responding   to   injustice   that   the   sharedness  of  those  basic  assumptions  makes  possible.  As  such,  the  development  of  an   abnormalising   social   sphere   also   brings   with   it   a   considerable   threat   that   some   experiences   of   injustice   will   in   fact   become   further   distanced   from   a   viable   means   of   assessment   and   redress.   When   there   is   deep   disagreement   over   the   appropriate   measures  and  framings  of  justice,  the  location  of  proper  authority  and  sources  of  moral   or   legal   obligation   also   becomes   uncertain.   If   expanded   contestation   has   the   effect   of   clouding   which   actors   and   institutions   must   hear   and   respond   to   injustice   claims,   and   which  conceptual  standards  can  be  drawn  upon  in  order  for  decisive  assessments  to  be   conducted,  there  is  a  worrying  risk  that  some  experiences  of  injustice  may  continue  or   even   be   compounded   through   the   abnormalisation   of   the   public   discursive   sphere.   In  

Fraser’s   words,   “here,   then,   is   the   negative   side   of   abnormal   justice:   amidst   expanded   contestation,  reduced  means  for  corroborating  and  redressing  injustice”  (2008,  p.402).  

This   recognition   of   the   combination   of   profound   opportunity   and   threat   in   respect   of   experiences   of   injustice   is   one   that   deeply   inflects   Fraser’s   understanding   of   abnormality   and   its   relationship   to   justice.   This   side   of   her   work   deserves   particular   attention   because   it   underpins   not   only   the   understanding   of   abnormality   she   would   have  us  adopt  in  a  diagnostic  sense,  but  also  how  she  would  have  us  begin  to  respond  to   it  in  constructive  ways.  We  stand  to  gain  a  better  insight  into  this  area  of  Fraser’s  work   by   turning   to   consider   how   the   distinctive   mode   of   theorising   that   she   calls   for   in   response  to  abnormality  is  situated  in  respect  of  a  wider  body  of  political  thought  in  the   Western  tradition.