De la sociedad a la empresa: una ética integradora

Fraser   is   keen   to   emphasise   an   important   mismatch   between   the   world   of   deep   contestation   that   she   describes   and   the   “familiar   theories   of   justice”   available   to   us   (2008,   p.396).   The   theoretical   perspectives   that   currently   hold   the   most   sway   in   the   Western   liberal   world   in   particular   are,   she   claims,   insufficiently   accommodating   of   abnormal  situations  in  which  the  basic  substance,  framing,  and  application  of  justice  are   also  absorbed  into  the  field  of  contestation.  This  is  because,  at  their  base,  these  'normal'   modes  of  theorising  are  formulated  in  light  of  contexts  –  whether  real  or  imagined  –  in   which  some  level  of  fundamental  agreement  on  such  features  exists  between  disputants.  

Relying  in  a  more  or  less  unproblematised  fashion  on  some  key  assumptions  about  the   proper  practical  and  conceptual  limits  of  justice,  these  modes  of  theorising  tend  either   to  shield  those  assumptions  from  view  (holding  them  as  natural  or  self-­‐evident  truths)   or  else  present  them  as  possessing  a  kind  of  universal  normative  validity  (and  therefore   as  external  to  the  contexts  of  contestation  engaged).  In  either  case,  the  accommodation   of   disputation   around   issues   of   justice   is   restricted   in   some   fashion.   The   underlying   drive  in  these  normal  modes  of  theorising  is  to  connect  the  concept  of  justice  with  an   uncontroversial  ground:  a  form  of  settled  norm,  convention,  rule,  or  grammar  that  can   be  applied  to  all  cases  and  which  ought  to  provide  a  skeleton  of  certainty  upon  which  an   otherwise   (potentially)   radically   contested   discursive   space   can   be   anchored.  

Consequently,   though   a   deeply   disputed   social   sphere   and   an   ineliminable   plurality   of   subjective   positions   might   be   well   recognised   within   these   normal   ways   of   thinking   about   justice,   this   accommodation   of   difference   does   not   go   all   the   way   down,   so   to   speak.   At   some   juncture,   however   discreet,   there   is   the   imposition   of   a   limit   beyond  

which   contestation   ought   not   to   pass   –   whether   that   be   in   the   form   of   assumptions   about  the  correct  way  of  framing  disputes,  or  about  the  particular  substance(s)  justice   can   be   taken   to   measure,   or   even   the   establishment   of   an   apparently   impartial   procedure   or   principle   promising   to   provide   a   means   of   fair   adjudication   between   disputing   positions   in   all   cases.   The   precise   strategy   taken   in   this   respect   in   normal   modes   of   theorising   no   doubt   varies   considerably,   but   the   uniting   factor   is   that   the   conceptual   boundaries   of   justice   are   shielded   from   the   full   impact   of   the   public   discursive  sphere.  As  such,  on  Fraser’s  terms,  for  all  their  present  influence  and  value  in   efforts  to  understand  and  institutionalise  justice,  these  normal  modes  of  theorising  “fail   to   provide   the   conceptual   resources   for   dealing   with   problems   of   abnormal   justice”  

(Fraser  2008,  p.396).  A  different  kind  of  response,  one  that  is  more  directly  attuned  to  a   deeper  and  broader  condition  of  contestation,  is  therefore  required  for  abnormal  times.  

It  is  not  my  intention  yet  to  look  in  any  real  detail  at  Fraser's  specific  recommendations   for   how   such   a   response   ought   to   look   (that   task   is   undertaken   in   Part   Two   of   this   thesis).   For   now,   the   matter   of   greater   interest   is   the   distinction   being   drawn   here   between  ‘normal’  and  suitably  ‘abnormal’  modes  of  theorising  and  what  this  can  tell  us   about   the   broader   theoretical   perspective   that   Fraser   is   constructing.   For,   whilst   it   seems  obvious  that  Fraser  is  adverse  to  any  mode  of  theorising  that  threatens  to  unduly   close   down   possibilities   for   contestation   (and   therefore   establish   a   hostility   to   the   positive  aspects  of  abnormality),  it  is  equally  clear  that  she  is  unwilling  to  simply  commit   to,  or  unabatedly  revel  in,  a  critical  project  that  takes  the  dismantling  of  certainty  and   assurance   as   its   only   concern.   Rather,   there   are   two   definite   forces   directing   Fraser's   thinking:   one   corresponding   with   the   positive   side   of   abnormality   and   the   new   opportunities  to  challenge  injustice  that  it  heralds;  and  another  corresponding  with  the   negative  side  of  abnormality  and  the  threat  of  impotence  to  take  effective  action  against   harm  and  suffering  that  it  carries.  

This  conjunction  of  concerns  for  the  positive  and  negative  sides  of  abnormality,  and  the   air   of   tension   that   it   operates   to   establish,   is   acutely   indicative   of   the   more   general   theoretical-­‐philosophical   position   that   underpins   Fraser's   diagnostic   account.   The   conflict   made   visible   here   synthesises   a   broader   set   of   tensions   that   have   emerged   within  contemporary  Western  political  philosophy,  drawn  between  committed  defences   and   critiques   of   modernity.   Fraser’s   aversion   to   a   course   of   theorising   that   trespasses   too   far   in   favour   of   either   force   –   that   is,   which   centres   itself   too   completely   or   too   permanently  on  either  the  positive  or  the  negative  sides  of  expanded  contestation  –  also   provides  insight  into  the  space  that  she  is  trying  to  occupy  in  respect  of  this  wider  body  

of  political  thought.  We  can  gain  a  clearer  picture  of  this  position  by  briefly  turning  to   consider  a  distinction  offered  by  Stephen  White  (1991).  

White   sets   up   the   frequently   encountered   tension   between   modernity   and   postmodernity   as   corresponding,   principally,   with   a   distinction   between   two   different  

"senses  of  responsibility"  that  drive  political  reflection:  namely,  (1)  a  responsibility  to  act   and  (2)  a  responsibility  to  otherness  (1991,  p.19).  White  finds  that  the  first  of  these,  the   responsibility  to  act,  is  resolutely  embedded  within  modern  life  and  within  the  dominant   styles   of   Western   political   and   ethical   thought   connected   to   it.   Deriving   from   an   encounter   with   the   everyday   pressures   of   physical   and   political   life   to   which   we   are   each  exposed  (e.g.  to  meet  needs  of  survival  and  to  avoid  harm,  to  satisfy  certain  time   constraints   or   to   honour   certain   values   and   expectations,   and   so   on),   this   sense   of   responsibility  reflects  "a  moral-­‐prudential  obligation  to  acquire  reliable  knowledge  and   act  to  achieve  practical  ends  in  some  defensible  manner"  (White  1991,  p.21).  There  is  a   strongly   familiar,   even   common-­‐sense   tone   to   this   sense   of   responsibility,   and   it   is   accompanied   by   an   associated   impulse   towards   the   creation   of   action-­‐coordinating   forms   of   knowledge:   contributions   that   directly   address   the   encountered   pressures   of   physical   and   political   life   and,   in   doing   so,   also   lend   themselves   to   the   construction   of   senses  of  tractability,  order,  and  conviction  in  responding  to  those  pressures.  

The  second  sense  of  responsibility,  in  contrast  –  the  responsibility  to  otherness  –  is  more   apparent  within  postmodern  streams  of  political  thought,  forming  a  central  pillar  of  the   critiques   that   thinkers   such   as   Foucault,   Derrida,   and   Lyotard   (amongst   others)   have   brought  against  modernity  and  its  ideologues.  Here,  the  emphasis  of  political  and  ethical   inquiry   falls   less   onto   the   themes   of   action   and   order   that   dominate   the   modern   mindset,  and  more  onto  exposing  and  tracking  the  way  in  which  that  "modern  cognitive   machinery   operates   to   deny   the   ineradicability   of   dissonance"   –   or,   put   differently,   an   inevitability   of   'otherness'   –   within   the   world   it   engages   (White   1991,   p.20).   Typically   driven  by  strong  commitments  towards  the  idea  that  all  forms  of  meaning  and  identity   are  borne  out  only  in  relations  of  difference  with  constellations  of  other  meanings  and   identities,  and  that,  since  all  subjects  are  similarly  embroiled  in  this  process  of  perpetual   constitution,  none  can  ever  anchor  it  permanently  or  absolutely,  proponents  of  this  form   of  critique  consider  there  to  be  a  resulting  ‘impossibility  of  closure’  around  all  meaning   and   identity.   Accordingly,   the   responsibility   to   otherness   derives   from   the   expectation   that   any   human   construct   inevitably   spawns   a   perpetually   under-­‐definable   set   of  

‘others’   that,   whether   existing   in   possibility   or   in   fact,   always   also   partially   constitute   that   construct   itself.   Consequently,   exposing   the   ways   in   which   an   inevitable   and  

ineradicable   otherness   is   concealed   in   social   and   political   life   is   essential   if   potential   violences   associated   with   it   are   to   be   minimised.   In   improperly   or   insufficiently   acknowledging  this  need,  thinkers  in  the  postmodern  vein  argue,  the  action-­‐  and  order-­‐

orientated  preoccupations  of  modernity  come  at  a  high  cost.  As  White  puts  it:  

What   the   postmodern   thinker   wants   to   assert   here   is   that   meeting   [the   'modern'   responsibility   to   act]   always   requires   one,   at   some   point,   to   fix   or   close   down   parameters   of   thought   and   to   ignore   or   homogenize   at   least   some   dimensions   of   specificity  or  difference  among  actors.  

(1991,  p.21)  

Accordingly,   the   responsibility   to   otherness   encourages   a   contrasting   mode   of   political   critique,   one   that   possesses,   instead,   a   world-­‐disclosing   impetus.   The   overriding   urge   from   this   direction   is   to   disturb   or   (on   slightly   more   radical   terms)   to   dismantle   the   apparent   self-­‐certainties   that   lay   behind   the   preference   of   modernists   for   action-­‐

coordinating  forms  of  knowledge  and  language,  and  to  demonstrate  the  violence  toward   otherness  that  exists  within  the  worlds  they  seek  to  defend  or  construct.  Again,  as  White   puts  it:  

Both   of   these   tasks   require   a   deep   affirmation   of   the   world-­‐disclosing   capacity   of   language,  since  it  is  the  use  of  that  capacity  that  can  loosen  our  world's  hold  upon  us   by  confronting  us  with  the  ways  in  which  it  is  structured  by  unrecognized  or  wilfully   forgotten  fictions.  And  as  this  hold  is  loosened,  we  become  far  more  sensitized  to  the   otherness  that  is  engendered  by  those  structures.  

(1991,  p.27)  

This   way   of   framing   the   clash   between   modernity   and   postmodernity   as   a   meeting   of   action-­‐coordinating   and   world-­‐disclosing   preoccupations   is   useful,   first,   because   it   affirms  something  important  of  what  is  shared  across  the  differences  signified  via  this   tension:  most  notably,  a  mutual  concern  for  adopting  an  ethical  stance  in  relation  to  the   political   world   and   an   interest   in   pursuing   justice.   Of   course,   each   camp   would,   by   its   own   standards,   tend   to   understand   the   other   to   be   importantly   ‘irresponsible’   in   its   endeavours  and  would  seek  to  offer  criticism  on  that  ground.  Nevertheless,  setting  out   the  problem  in  this  way  at  least  reminds  us  that  such  disagreements  do  not  determine   the  relationship  completely,  and  that  space  for  productive  conversation  is  certainly  also   apparent.   More   specifically   for   the   present   discussion,   the   idea   of   action-­‐coordinating   and  world-­‐disclosing  functions  of  critique  is  one  that  can  be  traced  relatively  neatly  onto  

the  diagnostic  account  given  to  us  by  Fraser,  and  so  offers  a  way  of  further  developing   our  understanding  of  its  general  character.