Métodos Cuantitativos de Valoración de Puestos

2.0123)

Objects contain the possibility of all situations. (TLP 2.014)

inherent in the object it designates: only then will it count as a Tractarian name. This is why, although we can mistakenly think that a sign has a meaning when in fact it doesn’t, and thus use it incorrectly, we cannot use a Tractarian name incorrectly: if a name is a genuine Tractarian name, it will comply with the logic of the object it designates. Which is why:

It is as impossible to represent in language anything that ‘contradicts logic’ as it is in geometry to represent by its coordinates a figure that contradicts the laws o f space,

or to give the coordinates o f a point that does not exist. (JLP 3.032)

This therefore means that for a sign to be the representative of an object, it must be used to produce arrangements of names which correspond to the combinatorial possibilities inherent in objects. If a sign isn’t used in this way, it will lack meaning, and the arrangements of signs it will help produce will lack sense. Such a sign will not, therefore, be a genuine Tractarian name, and the arrangements of signs it will contribute to will not be genuine (i.e. senseful) elementary propositions.

As a result, whether or not a combination of signs constitutes a genuine elementary proposition is determined by the possibilities inherent in objects. An expression whose arrangement of simple signs does not reflect any of the combinatorial possibilities inherent in objects is not an elementary proposition. The possibilities inherent in Tractarian objects determine whether an elementary expression has sense, and thus whether it is a genuine elementary proposition. Hence:

Empirical reality is limited by the totality o f objects. The limit also makes itself manifest

in the totality o f elementary propositions. (TLP 5-5561)

As we saw above, the totality of objects determines what counts as a state of affairs, and therefore what counts as a fact. In other words, the totality of objects determines what facts could possibly be included in ordinary reality. Similarly, the totality of objects determines what counts as an elementary proposition. In turn, since all non-elementary propositions are the result of applying logical operations to elementary ones, this means, in turn, that the range of possible non-elementary propositions is limited by the totality of objects.

Suppose that I am given a ll elementary propositions: then I can simply ask what

propositions I can construct out o f them. And there I have a ll propositions, and that

fixes their limits. (TIP 4.51)

That this is the case is shown in the fact that there is a limit to the representational conventions we can adopt: we cannot, for instance, conventionally stipulate that ‘this apple is to the left of itself represents that this apple is to the left o f itself For the latter is not a genuine possible situation of the world, it does not comply with the logic inherent in Tractarian objects.

Hence, the totality of objects determines both what facts can possibly feature in reality, and what expressions are senseful, and thus genuine propositions. Since language is the totality of senseful propositions, it is impossible to represent in language something which ultimately goes against the possibilities inherent in Tractarian objects. An expression which runs counter to these possibilities is not a genuine proposition and does not genuinely belong to language. Once we have conventionally established a particular projective relation, things are out of our hands. The way in which meaningful (simple and complex) names can be used is determined by the possibilities and impossibilities inherent in the objects that all propositions are ultimately about.

Although there Is something arbitrary in our notations, this much is not arbitrary -

that w hen we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else is necessarily the

case, (r z ? 3.342)

Propositions (both elementary and non-elementary ones) therefore succeed in having a determinate

sense because their ultimate constituents are simple names acting as the representatives for simple objects. Which is why:

The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate. (TIP 3.23)

As a result, as soon as a propositional sign has been assigned a particular sense, as soon as a particular projective relation is applied to it, the resulting proposition will have one and only one analysis:

A proposition has one and only one com plete analysis. (TIP 3.25)

Either an expression is a proposition (i.e. a propositional sign in a particular projective relation to the world) and is thus genuinely representing a possible state of the world which is in accord with the possibilities inherent in Tractarian objects, or it isn’t a proposition, in which case it isn’t representing anything. A proposition cannot therefore represent a state of the world which is impossible - that is, which contradicts the set of possibilities inherent in Tractarian objects. (This is indeed part of the reason why a contradictory statement cannot be regarded as a genuine proposition - TLP 4.466). Hence, a proposition, if it is a genuine proposition possessing one and only one analysis, cannot be given a ‘wrong’ sense:

We cannot give a sign the wrong sense. {TLP 5.4732)

Logic must look after itself.

If a sign is possible, then it is also capable o f signifying. Whatsoever is possible in logic is also permitted. (The reason why ‘Socrates is identical’ means nothing is that there is no property called ‘identical’. The proposition is nonsensical, because

we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.)