The meanings o f primitive signs can be explained by means o f elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if
the meanings o f those signs are already known. (TLP 3.263)
As we saw above, Hacker interprets TLP 3-263 as saying that the ‘elucidations’ which help to explain the meanings of simple names are pseudo-propositions (i.e. propositions which are not well-formed). These propositions provide ostensive definitions of the meanings of simple names. Hence, according to Hacker, the meanings of simple names are explained by pointing to the simple objects designated by these names. In contrast, Ishiguro and McGuinness hold that elucidations are well-formed, senseful propositions which display the use of simple names. Since, in their account, the meaning of a simple name is exhausted by its use (in that objects are purely formal) such propositions are capable of explaining the meanings of simple names in their entirety. Both accounts are, however, ultimately unsatisfactory. Hacker’s account relies on the view that it is possible to ostensively point, and thus to perceive, simple objects, whilst Ishiguro and McGuinness’ accounts only work if we assume that objects are purely formal. We therefore need to explore an alternative way of understanding TLP 3-263-
The first thing to note is that by ‘primitive signs’ Wittgenstein does means, in TLP 3-263, simple names. For, according to Wittgenstein’s numbering system, TLP 3-263 is a comment on TLP 3-26, and the latter states that unanalysable names are ‘primitive signs’. Indeed, all of the TLP 3-2s are primarily concerned with Tractarian names, with those names which designate simple objects.
In TLP 3-26 and TLP 3-261, Wittgenstein discusses the idea that, whereas signs for complex objects can be defined by analysing them into simpler signs, this cannot be done in the case of
simple names:
A name cannot be dissected any further by means o f a definition: it is a primitive sign
(TIP 3.26)
Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve to define it; and the definitions point the way.
Two signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primitive and the other is defined by means o f primitive signs. Names ca n n o t be anatomized by means o f definitions.
(Nor can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own.) (TLP
3.261)
Simple names, like simple objects, cannot be dissected further: explaining simple names cannot thus involve providing definitions which analyse them into even simpler names. It is interesting to note the similarities that exist between Wittgenstein’s remarks on how we can explain the meanings of simple names {TLP 3.263) and his remarks on how we can gain knowledge of simple objects (TIP 2.0123 and TLP 2.01231). For, in both accounts, he directs us towards that which is more complex: knowing a simple object involves knowing the states of affairs that the object can help to produce, whilst explaining a simple name involves using propositions which contain that name. As was noted above, it isn’t possible to know a simple object by means of direct perceptual acquaintance: it is only possible to know by perceptual acquaintance those complex objects which consist in the instantiation of possible situations of the world. In fact, it is impossible to know a simple object before having carried out a complete analysis of language, since only after having performed such an analysis could we be in a position to tell which states of affairs the object helps to produce.
Carrying out a complete analysis of language would involve analysing the non-elementary propositions we use in everyday life, those propositions which represent possible situations of the world and which mention complex objects. Such an analysis would start off with the analysis of words for complex objects that we can perceive (e.g. ‘this red apple’). We would, first of all, analyse these words into non-elementary propositions (e.g. ‘there is redness at this location in space, at this time’, ‘there is solidity at this location in space, at this time’, etc.) and we would eventually reach the level of elementary propositions made up of simple names. Having completed a full analysis of language, we would be able to know complex objects, in that we would know that this object is the one which helps to produce these states of affairs, represented by these elementary propositions, and that it helps to produce, at a higher level of complexity, these perceivable complexes (e.g. redness o ïsolidity, etc.) and these perceivable possible situations of the world (e.g. this apple is red), represented by these non-elementary propositions.
Bearing this in mind, it is possible to give an interpretation of TLP 3.263 which is not circular and which helps to explain the resemblance that exists between Wittgenstein's account of how we can know simple objects and his account of how we can explain simple signs. For a plausible way of interpreting TLP 3.263 would be to say that the meanings of simple names can be explained by means of non-elementary propositions, but that these non-elementary propositions can only be understood if we understand the meanings of the words for complex objects that are used in them.’^^ In this interpretation, ‘those signs’ in ‘So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known’ (TLP 3.263) would refer, not to the primitive signs that need explaining, but to the non-elementary propositional signs which help to elucidate the meanings of the primitive signs in question. Note indeed that Wittgenstein often uses the term ‘Zeichen’ (‘sign’) on its own as a short-hand for ‘propositional sign’, in other words for the perceptible element of a proposition (e.g. TLP 4.061, TLP 4.062, TLP 4.0621) and that he has indeed just used it in this way in TLP 3.261 (two entries before TLP 3.263) to refer to signs for complexes.
The idea would be as follows: we can explain the meaning of the simple sign ‘a’ by means of elucidations such as, for instance, “a’ is the name which helps to produce the propositions ‘this apple is red’, ‘this table is green’, etc.’, but these elucidations can only be understood if we understand the propositional signs mentioned in the elucidations (i.e. ‘this apple is red’, ‘this table is green’, etc.). In turn, these propositional signs can only be understood if the words that make them up (‘this apple’, ‘this table’, ‘red’, ‘green’, etc.) are understood, that is if their meanings have been explained to us by means of ostensive definitions. The resemblance between Wittgenstein’s account of how we gain knowledge of simple objects and his account of how we explain the meaning of simple names is now revealed in full: to know an object is to know that it helps to produce all of these possible states of the world (which can of course be represented by means of propositions), whilst to explain the meaning of a simple sign is to point out that this simple sign is one of the ultimate constituents of these propositions (which, of course, depict certain possible states of the world). This should not come as a surprise, since the meanings of simple names are the simple objects designated by these names (TIP 3.203). Hence, to explain the meaning of a simple name is to explain what simple object is designated by this name, and this has to involve knowing the designated object. Note also that, according to this interpretation, Wittgenstein is, in this entry, indicating once more that learning the meanings of ordinary words
(such as ‘table, ‘apple’, etc.) is prior to learning the meaning of simple names. Indeed, explaining the meanings of simple names presupposes a mastery of ordinary language (cf. TLP 4.002).
Elucidations of simple names (i.e. statements of the type ‘this simple name is the one which helps to produce these non-elementary propositions’) are thus not well-formed propositions, but nonsensical ones. Indeed Wittgenstein uses exactly the same term (i.e. ‘elucidations’) to refer to the elucidating propositions of TLP 3.263 and to the propositions of TLP 6.54 (i.e. to the propositions of the Tractatids), which he explicitly characterises in that entry as being nonsensical. The ‘elucidations’ of TLP 3.263 are nonsensical statements of the first kind. These ‘elucidations’ appear and purport to be saying something, but they do not say anything since they do not depict possible states of the world. Indeed, if a simple name genuinely helps to produce these propositions it will do so in all possible worlds; if it doesn’t it won’t in any possible worlds.- either way, elucidations will fail to be bivalent and bipolar. However, if an elucidation succeeds in its role of explaining a simple name (i.e. if it explains it correctly), then the elucidation will capture an insight which is (unsayably) correct. The elucidation will convey a correct insight, but, by attempting to put this insight into words, it will also end up conveying a mistaken and misleading impression about what can and cannot be said.
In summary, according to Wittgenstein, all names, whether they designate simple objects (and are therefore genuine Tractarian names) or complex objects need to be explained to us if we are to understand them. Learning a language indeed starts off by learning the meanings of ordinary words for complexes, not the meanings of propositions. But there is a difference between explaining the meanings of simple signs and explaining the meanings of ordinary words for complexes. Explaining the meanings of simple names cannot involve ostensively pointing to the simple objects they designate, for the latter are not perceivable. Hence, explaining the meanings of simple names is done by means of the nonsensical (in sense 1) ‘elucidations’ described above. In contrast, since complexes consisting in the instantiation of possible situations are perceivable, the words for these complex objects can be explained by means of ostensive definitions. When such ostensive definitions are put into words by means of statements such as ‘This word means this'
(accompanied by a pointing), these statements will be nonsensical in the first sense, just like the elucidations that help to explain the meaning of simple names. Hacker was therefore right in arguing that ostension helps to explain the meanings of words in the Tractatus, and he was also right in claiming that ostensive definitions cannot be regarded as senseful, well-formed propositions. His account errs, however, in its target: for it isn’t the meanings of simple names that can be
explained by means of ostension, but only the words standing for perceivable, and therefore complex, objects.