Métodos de deshidratación Deshidratación solar

intelligence, see, for instance, Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”?’, pp.4-5, p.9, pp.10-11, p.16 and p.18.

43 _{For example, C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community}

(London: Heinemann, 1985).

44 _{J.T. Richelson, ‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation’, The International Journal of Intelligence}

and Counterintelligence, 4, 3 (Fall, 1990), pp.307-23.

45 _{A.S. Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?’, The Journal}

of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 5, 4 (Winter, 1991-2); and J.J. Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’, The Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 6, 1 (1993).

46 _{J. Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam’s, 1976); R.S. Cline, Secrets,}

Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976) – offers an account of early post-war (1950s) UK-US intelligence liaison by a US intelligence officer. Scattered references to (foreign) liaison can also be found throughout the formerly classified literature – see, for example, J.P. Dimmer, Jr (aka. F.M. Begoum), ‘Observations on the double agent’, Studies in Intelligence, 6 (Winter 1962) and his ‘You And Your Walk-In’, Studies in Intelligence, 6 (Spring 1962), particularly where he emphasised: ‘Know the liaison equities. Know the do’s and don’t’s with respect to the local foreign [liaison] service. How far can you go unilaterally, considering the liaison relationship? In what instances do we feel that we must tell them, and when would holding out fall within acceptable risk? This applies particularly in our larger stations that tend to be sectionalized: they may have an external liaison unit that deals with the local services and an internal unit working on other activities. The walk-in may come to this latter, not the one dealing with liaison. Does it know what the real equities are? Its initial handling may prejudice the liaison relationship and may hamper efficient subsequent handling of the walk-in.’ (pp.54-55) - document accessed via the CIA Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) Reading Room, via URL: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/> (accessed: 13/06/2007).

47 _{See, for instance, the criticism of J. Burkholder Smith’s book, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, in a book}

review by D.S. Blaufarb, under heading ‘Intelligence Bookshelf… Current books of interest to

intelligence buffs’ in Periscope: Official Organ of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 3, 2 (Summer 1977), p.4 – via CREST – CIA-RDP88-01315R000100480001-4 (2005/12/14) – particularly where he notes: ‘… The liaison services whose officers it identifies and whose operational activity it describes are also undoubtedly smarting. All of this can only harm the goal of an improved and tightened American intelligence service which the author claims to support…’

48 _{S. Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation’, The}

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16, 4 (2003), p.533.

49 _{See, for example, footnote ‘10’ in Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era’,}

p.464 – where he states: ‘I must advise readers that the citations given relating to inter-service cooperation in no way suggest that I am confirming or denying any of the material contained therein.’

50 _{See Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’; see also, for an example of focus on economic espionage at this}

Secrets (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993); J. Adams, The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage (London: Hutchinson, 1994).

51 _{Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era’, pp.458-9.} 52 _{Schweizer, Friendly Spies, p.30.}

53 _{For more on these Post-Cold War cuts and their unhelpful impact on intelligence see, for example,}

G. Corera, Shopping for bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), pp.130-1.

54 _{Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’, pp.85-99.} 55 _{ibid., p.95.}

56 _{Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, pp.523-60.}

57 _{M. Herman, ‘Intelligence cooperation’, chapter 12 in his Intelligence Power in Peace and War}

(Cambridge University Press, 1996), from p.200.

58 _{See the definitions of liaison and intelligence liaison in the Introduction (Chapter 1 [3.0/5.0]) of this}

study, above.

59 _{Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, p.523.} 60 _{ibid., p.524.}

61 _{ibid., p.552.}

62 _{See also J.E. Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, International Journal}

of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19 (Summer, 2006), p.214, reference 8 – where she argues: ‘Westerfield’s definition is… unsatisfying, as it mixes motives and obscures the measures of value that must accompany any long-standing liaison relationship…’

63 _{For the difficulties of measuring the ‘cultural’ dimension, see, for example, S. Murden,}

‘Introduction: culture in human affairs’ in his ‘Culture in world affairs’, chapter 24 in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2005 [3ed.]), p.540 – particularly where he notes: ‘Culture is … important to human beings… but using it as an analytical tool can be problematic. Culture is such a multifaceted concept that it may only be possible to apply it in rather vague and intuitive ways.’; see also A.I. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, 19, 4 (Spring 1995), p.52 – where he argues: ‘One of the problems that has plagued cultural analysis, however, has been precisely the difficulty in determining the relationship of attitude to behavior.’; for more on ‘intelligence culture’ see, for example, P.H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004), p.496 - ‘Theories of culture are… difficult to operationalise and test with any real degree of rigour.’; see also ‘C. People and Culture’ in ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence’, p.3.

64 _{Examples of this historical work include: B.F. Smith, ‘The Road to the Anglo-American Intelligence}

Partnership’, American Intelligence Journal, 16, 2/3 (Autumn/Winter, 1995), pp.59-62; and C. Andrew, ‘The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT alliance’, in H.B. Peake and S. Halpern (eds), In the name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994); J. Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940–45 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999).

66 _{Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.7. However, Herman does later draw on}

this theme in his section ‘Spying on friends?’ in his work, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, chapter 12 in Scott and Jackson (eds), Understanding Intelligence, p.188.

67 _{See, for example, Herman, Intelligence Power, p.379. For some first-hand accounts of the 1995}

Sarin attack, see H. Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche (London: Vintage, 2002).

68 _{See the journal Intelligence and National Security, 13, 1 (Spring, 1998), from p.1.} 69 _{See Hulnick and Westerfield’s contributions discussed earlier.}

70 _{Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.2.}

71 _{ibid., pp.3-4; see also US Army, Special Warfare School, English Translation of ‘Mes Comrades}

Sont Morts’: My Comrades are Dead: Volume III (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: ?c.1945) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00671R000200090001-2 (2001/09/04).

72 _{See also A. Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). Later}

texts, such as M. Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation (Oxford University Press, 2002), can also be cited here. These texts grant an insight into other ‘types’ of liaison, for example liaison between police forces.

73 _{Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.8.} 74 _{ibid., p.5, p.7 and p.9.}

75 _{See also, for example, ‘Intelligence Sharing: Prospective Risks, Potential Rewards’, chapter 5 in J.D.}

Ellis and G.D. Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy (John Hopkin’s University Press, 2004), pp.109-144.

76 _{Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’.}

77 _{For an earlier treatment of this theme in the literature see the analysis of the article by J.J. Wirtz}

(Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’), above.

78 _{Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’.}

79 _{Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation’, p.527.} 80 _{ibid., p.528.}

81 _{ibid., p.537.}

82 _{M. Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism’, The}

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17, 2 (2004), p.222; see also for a treatment of similar themes, M.M. Aid, ‘All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against International Terrorism’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (2003), pp.72-120.

83 _{Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers’, pp.193-230.} 84 _{ibid., p.223.}

85 _{ibid., p.195.}

86 _{R.J. Aldrich, ‘Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation’, International Affairs, 80, 4}

(2004), p.732.

87 _{ibid., p.752.} 88 _{ibid., pp.731-53.}