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2-37. When the planning cell completes its mission analysis, it will brief the SFOB commander. The briefing should begin with the S-2 intelligence estimate. This estimate will lay the foundation for follow-on COA development. The S-2 should also present his recommended PIR, which may include PR requirements identified by the PR coordinators. The S-3 will next present the staff mission analysis. The staff mission analysis should include the following:

• Specified and implied tasks.

• Mission-essential tasks.

• Constraints.

• Restrictions.

• Timeline.

• Risk assessment.

• Feasibility analysis.

• Restated mission.

FM 3-05.231

2-38. The staff may also update the commander on availability of resources to support the mission and the recovery of the SFODA.

2-39. Following this initial briefing, the SFOB commander will articulate his own independent analysis of the mission and provide planning guidance. His planning guidance should include abort and evasion criteria. His planning guidance may also include levels of acceptable risk and recommended COAs for the staff to analyze.

2-40. Following the first briefing, the staff will begin COA development. The PR coordinator should help with COA development by identifying potential PR support assets within the theater for each COA and by focusing his efforts on synchronizing PR planning with comprehensive mission planning. The PR coordinator should coordinate with the PSYOP officer in the OPCEN to assess support to PR. PSYOP themes that support PR and complement the JFC’s PSYOP campaign plan may prove useful by influencing the local populace to either assist or refrain from interfering with potential evaders. (Chapter 5 includes more information on this subject.)

2-41. After the staff has developed multiple COAs, it must analyze each one by using the evaluation criteria specified by the SFOB commander. The battlefield operating systems (BOS) are excellent tools for evaluating each COA. The SF PR coordinator should also analyze each PR COA from a BOS perspective. The SF PR coordinator must provide the PR analysis of each COA to the OPCEN director to define PR supportability and aid the COA analysis process.

2-42. Part of the COA analysis will be war-gaming. The proposed PR plan should be war-gamed using the same methodology as the proposed COAs.

The most popular methods of war-gaming are belt, box, and avenue in depth.

The belt method provides an excellent tool for war-gaming a PR plan. It allows the war-gamer to focus on specific events and actions (action, reaction, and counteraction). The SF PR coordinator acts as the friendly forces, and the PR intelligence analyst or S-2 acts as the enemy. During this step of the MDMP, the PR DST is developed. The PR DST is an overlay that graphically depicts the war-gaming process. This overlay should include all enemy, friendly, noncombatant, and PR data and MCOO graphics.

2-43. Also during war-gaming, the SF PR coordinator should develop an evasion support timeline (EST). The EST is determined from the PR DST.

The PR coordinator must determine the decision points requiring decisions from the SFOB or SFODA commander. Example decision points include the following:

• After no radio contact, when should an SFODA or individual be considered as evading?

• When should an emergency resupply bundle be transported to the airfield?

• When should the SFODA begin movement to the resupply drop zone (DZ)?

• When should a restricted operations zone (ROZ) be coordinated, established, and deactivated?

2-44. It is doubtful that the entire evasion corridor will be a ROZ. The SF PR coordinator must be able to visualize the EST and be able to coordinate the activation and deactivation of applicable ROZs. The SF PR coordinator must also advise the staff on resupply options that would facilitate the continuation of the SFODA mission and/or affect its recovery. Some events that should be included on the EST are as follows:

• Earliest anticipated launch time (EALT).

• Target window.

• Critical decision points for the SFOB or SFODA commander.

• Not later than (NLT) times:

NLT for SFODA to establish initial communications.

NLT time to notify SOC RCC of a potential CSAR mission.

NLT time to drop emergency resupply.

NLT time to deliver resupply bundle to airfield.

NLT time to notify resupply or recovery aircraft.

NLT time to submit SARIR after liaison officer’s (LNO’s) contact with element.

NLT times to activate or deactivate ROZs.

NLT time to notify SOC RCC of a potential CSAR mission and transmit required EPA and ISOPREP information.

• Earliest anticipated exfiltration (exfil) times.

• EST matrix (Figure 2-8). This matrix allows the coordinator to visualize time and space in relation to activities of friendly forces and enemy forces.

• Sequence of events timeline for recovering an SFODA with organic assets. Figure 2-9, page 2-19 shows an EST.

SR Target Window 02001Z-04001Z to resupply DZ or continue with mission) 022200Z

SUPCEN transports bundle to airfield 040100Z

Figure 2-8. Sample EST Matrix

FM 3-05.231

N hour

FOB determines SFODA is conducting E&R.

FOB submits SARIR to SOC RCC.

FOB determines if it can recover the SFODA with its own assets.

SUPCEN assembles and rigs resupply bundle.

SF PR coordinator transmits EPA to SOC RCC.

SF PR coordinator reviews EPA and E&R overlay with OPCEN.

N + 1 OPCEN director briefs FOB commander on situation and recommended objective area (OA), organic recovery team notified, mission preparation begins.

N + 2 Finalize organic recovery plan, and brief SOA pilots.

N + 3 SUPCEN transports resupply bundle to airfield.

N + 4

SOA ensures route deconfliction through JSOAC, SOC RCC, and JSRC. Organic CSARTF briefs FOB commander. All RCCs, SOC RCC, and JSRC notified of impending CSAR mission. Organic CSARTF conducts final rehearsals and inspections.

N + 5 Organic CSARTF launches, if METT-TC permits and only after launch authority has been granted by the appropriate HQ;

that is, JTF, JFSOCC, JFACC, or JSRC.

NOTE: N hour occurs 24 hours after infiltration or 24 hours after a missed communications window.

Figure 2-9. Sample EST

2-45. Following the COA analysis, the SFOB staff will compare COAs to determine a recommended COA. The PR coordinator should provide input on PR supportability of each COA. The planning staff and OPCEN director consider the SF PR coordinator’s input when comparing various COAs.

Normally, the planning staff uses a decision matrix to facilitate this process.

2-46. The planning staff will present a decision brief on the recommended COA, usually including the decision matrix, to the SFOB commander. The SFOB commander will approve, approve pending changes to, or disapprove the COA. The planning staff should also present the PR plan to the SFOB commander for his final approval. Additionally, the PR coordinator should reiterate the abort and evasion criteria and ensure its inclusion in the OPORD. Although the commander’s decision is the final step of the SFOB MDMP, it is not the end of this particular phase of planning.

2-47. The SF PR coordinator must ensure the required PR data are included in the appropriate sections of the OPORD. Additionally, the SF PR coordinator must build the shell of the EPA with information derived from the theater-specific PR references; for example, theater SERE and high-risk-of-capture guidance, isolated personnel guidance, applicable SERE contingency guides, area-specific JPRSPs, and theater-specific ATO, CSAR CONOPS, and CSAR SPINS. By completing portions of the EPA from PR references and intelligence data, an isolated SFODA can use its isolation time for more important activities, such as rehearsals.

2-48. Upon completion of the OPORD (to include the EPA annex), the OPCEN will provide a designated SFODA with its isolation packet. This packet should include the isolation schedule, OPORD, copies of the SFOB MDMP, copies of theater-specific PR references, and copies of the PR

coordinator’s MDMP. This packet should be provided to the SFODA as soon as possible to allow the SFODA to digest the available information and prompt appropriate questions from the SFODA during the staff mission brief.

2-49. The SFOB staff will present a staff mission briefing to the designated SFODA. This briefing will include all staff sections of the SFOB. During the briefing is also the first opportunity for the SFODA to address the SFOB commander and his entire staff. Following this briefing, the SFOB commander will articulate his intent, specific planning guidance, acceptable risk, and specific rehearsal requirements. The SFOB commander may include portions of the PR plan in the rehearsal requirements for the SFODA.

2-50. At this point, the SF PR coordinator and the LNO of the isolated SFODA become the focal point for the SFODA PR planning. The LNO, who participated in the SFOB MDMP, provides continuity between the OPCEN and the isolated SFODA. The SFODA conducts its own MDMP similar to that of the SFOB staff. The SFODA completes its EPA, tailored to the SFODA and its assigned mission. If the SFODA intends to infiltrate by air, the SFODA, facilitated by the LNO and the PR coordinator, should coordinate PR contingency plans with the infiltration air mission commander and crew. The SFODA also ensures ISOPREP cards are complete and current for each deploying team member. The EPA and ISOPREP cards of the SFODA should be secured together to facilitate coordination for recovery of the SFODA should it become necessary. The LNO should be intimately familiar with the plan of the SFODA.

2-51. The briefback is the key piece. The commander must be thoroughly briefed on the EPA. The commander must “know” that the EPA is

“coordinated” and “supportable.” If only one portion of the SFODA mission can be briefed, it should be the EPA. The SFODA must be sure to “inform”

the commander that its EPA is “our plan.” It is not “set in stone.” EPA phase lines (PLs) may or may not be met by the projected timeline. The SF PR coordinator must be present at the briefback.

2-52. Following the SFODA infiltration, the LNO becomes part of the OPCEN and tracks the progress of the SFODA. This places the LNO in the best position to react to potential evasion situations and interface with the PR coordinator.