M ´ ETODO DE LOS MODOS NORMALES

As mentioned in chapters I and III, the active inclusion of different voices in European policy making was triggered by two interrelated factors: increasingly loud accusations of legitimacy deficit and a lobbying overcrowd that had become

unmanageable (Goehring 2002). This was followed by a Commission discussion paper focusing on measures to improve and strengthen the existing relationship with NGOs (2000), a White Paper (COM(2001) 428) linking legitimacy and civil society participation, the creation of a Civil Dialogue and the sponsoring of networks like the Social Policy Forum, a permanent framework for cooperation and integration of NGOs with European institutions (Smismans 2006, p.476). Therefore, groups that gained greater access and that had grown in importance in the last 15 years, mainly public interest non-profit, non-governmental groups, are considered here as new actors, while those who had their access to decision makers institutionalised before these changes, like business, trade unions and governments, are taken as incumbents.

The non-governmental organisations actively involved in REACH were environmental groups, arguably the most influential and professional among public interest actors at international and national levels; consumer, women and health groups, mostly represented by federations and associations; and animal rights organisations, which are particularly strong in the UK but were also represented by European coalitions. Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of Earth (FoE), pivotal for the environmental lobbying campaign, mobilised their national and European branches individually. But they were also members of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), a federation of 142 environmental organisations, and part of the Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL), a network that brings together citizens, patients, women, health professionals and environmental groups across Europe. Other

members of the coalition were Women in Europe for a Common Future and ChemSec (International Chemical Secretariat).

Consumers were represented by the BEUC (The European Consumer’s Organisation) and EuroCoop, a coalition of member states’ co-operatives. Animal rights were also mainly acting through federations and alliances, with national charities represented by The European Coalition to End Animal Experiments

(ECEAE) and the Eurogroup for Animals. The former is chaired by the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, a key player with a long-lasting individual campaign

throughout the legislation process. Most of the collective advocacy organisations, be it environmental, health, consumer or animal rights, receive part of their funding from the European Commission, with the Health and Environment Alliance as an example of the permanent networks that have been set up and fully funded by the Commission.

Despite their differences, NGOs were seen by policy makers in the European Commission as a coherent block working on complementary issues. “They were not necessarily monolithic but were working together to define common positions”, said a senior civil servant, while another perceived the NGOs as “united”: “They were focused on different aspects but united and shared the responsibility and the

workload. Greenpeace had one specific approach, WWF another one, Friends of the Earth another one but they were compatible” 15. The involvement of environmental organisations with the Commission started early in the process, with parts of the evidence that led to the Chester meeting in 1998 being provided by NGOs. “There was a lot of evidence mounting, the marine environment, which we were monitoring much before REACH, was already showing signs of the need of a new chemical legislation. We had a couple of people constantly following the chemicals”, explains the leader of the advocacy campaign for an environmental NGO16. Environmental organisations could therefore use their increased access to the DG Environment to act early, knowing what they would like the legislation to cover and how17. Consumer groups were working closer to DG Environment while animal rights groups have more traction in the Parliament, particularly with British MEPs like Caroline Lucas, a Green Party member. Lucas was a member of the all-party Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals in the European Parliament, whose secretariat and expertise is provided by the Eurogroup for Animals. In total, around 20 NGOs employees were working full time on REACH in Brussels during the making of the legislation.

This contrasts with the number of people working for the incumbents. The industry lobbying alone, according to the coordinator of the REACH campaign18, had about 150 people working full time on the legislation including technical experts, members of various companies and national associations and federations. The

15 _{Interviews 2 and 3} 16 _{Interview 7}

17 _{Interview 6 with a director of a consultancy firm specialised in bringing different stakeholders to the}

EU policy debate and coordinator of part of the industry campaign during co-decision

European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) had four people working on it on a daily basis in Brussels: two at the European Parliament, one in liaison with the permanent representations and one in contact with the Commission. Small and medium enterprises were represented by the Eurochambres and the UEAPME – European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.

Giant corporations operated both through CEFIC and individually, with BASF, the world’s leading chemical firm, as the most aggressive and multifaceted player. Between 2002 and 2003, during the work on the final draft, the German firm co-chaired the Chemical Expert Group of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), was part of the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN), had the top job at CEFIC with vice-chairman Eggert Voscherau and the top job at UNICE, the

employers federation, with Jürgen Srube, chairman of the supervisory board of BASF. Moreover, Jürgen Hambrecht, BASF president, would in the end of 2003 add the position of chairman of the German Chemical Industry Association (VDI) to the vice- chairmanship of the German Industry Confederation (BDI). Dow and Unilever were also actively operating behind the scenes.

Part of the work of federations, associations and giant firms was to engage national states, another traditional incumbent, in the debate. In REACH, this was clearly achieved with Germany, France and United Kingdom, with top politicians speaking publicly against REACH’s potential negative impact on the European industry. Outside the European Union, major allies were the United States and Japan, both involved with CEFIC to “anticipate debates that were coming later anyway”19. According to civil servants working on REACH, the American government offensive was “unusual at least in scope, intensity and vehemence of it”. 20 Lobbying from firms was channelled through the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) and the American Chemistry Council (ACC)21. Japan surprised because of its less intrusive but still strong lobbying based on “lots and lots of questions and clarifications”, while China, the up and coming player in chemicals, did “not much lobbying at all”22.

A third group of incumbents, the trade union movement, was represented by two main groups: the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the EMCEF- European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers Federation. A third active

19 _{Interview 5} 20 _{Interview 2} 21 Interview 1 22 _Ibidem

organisation was the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), a body funded by the European Union. ETUC, whose UK partner is the Trade Union Congress, worked closer to NGOs and ETUI. EMCEF, linked to United in the UK, signed a common position with CEFIC and the ECEG European Chemical Employers Group. The alignment with NGOs, however, was a gradual rather than instantaneous process: “This was something interesting during the REACH process because part of the trade unions in Brussels shifted. At the beginning, they were being very critical, worried about the health of their companies. But then they realised how much information and benefits REACH was going to bring to workers, not only in the chemical companies but also downstream users”. 23

These key actors, as discussed in chapter III, have their strategies, success and failure linked to the structures in which they operated. Therefore, any meaningful analysis of strategies and stories has to take into consideration the institutional set up. We look briefly at the European policy making environment next before getting to strategies and storytelling.